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Abstract             
  
 
 
 
This thesis offers a fresh interpretation of Anglo-American relations in the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia during the period 1941 to 1945. Historians of Anglo-American relations have 
characterized the bilateral relationship as one of rivalry and polarization. While examples of 
underlying national competition can be identified wherever the wartime alliance operated, 
whether on the battlefield or at the conference table, the commonalities which united the allies 
should, however, be given equal weight. My thesis departs from the traditional historiographical 
perspective, arguing that when closely examined, the allies were very aware of the strategic 
reciprocal benefits that would emanate from integrating their policies in Saudi Arabia. First and 
foremost, Britain and the United States’ relations in Saudi Arabia were shaped by the fact that 
the two countries were allies working side by side in the global struggle that was the Second 
World War. In this wartime context, the strategic influence of Saudi Arabia has tended to be 
overlooked. The Kingdom’s influence resided in its geographic location, its religious centrality 
within Islam, and most importantly, its rare political status as a sovereign Arab state. These 
attributes served as a unifying force for British and American wartime interests, encouraging the 
two allies to strive for an Anglo-American partnership in Saudi Arabia that was built on the 
concept of strategic interdependence. While collaboration between Britain and the United States 
ebbed and flowed, it is a testament to their continued pursuit of cooperation that the activities of 
the wartime alliance in Saudi Arabia between 1941 and 1945 were envisaged by policymakers as 
a template for achieving greater Anglo-American accord throughout the Middle East during and 
beyond the Second World War. 
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Introduction            
Anglo-American Relations in Saudi Arabia 1941-1945: A 
Study of a Trying Relationship 
  
With “the stake [having] become world domination”, Britain and the United States were 
before all else allies fighting against a common enemy in the Second World War.
1
 Bound by a 
kindred history, Anglo-Saxon culture and comparable liberal institutions of government, the two 
nations shared complementary national and security interests. Given the fundamentally 
cooperative nature of the bilateral relationship, it is paradoxical that out of all the motifs selected 
by historians, it is depictions of national rivalry and competition that tend to dominate scholarly 
interpretations of the “Special Relationship”. This dichotomy is apparent when viewing the 
Anglo-American experience in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia between the years of 1941 and 
1945. 
  In Saudi Arabia, as in so many other parts of the world, efforts to strengthen the Allied 
position vis-a-vis the Axis powers had led the United States and Britain to be - in the words of 
Winston Churchill - “mixed-up together”.2 Although distant from the famous battlefields of the 
Pacific and Europe, Saudi Arabia throughout the Second World War was considered to be 
strategically important, making it a priority for the allies to be on friendly terms with the 
country’s charismatic king, Ibn Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud. His Kingdom’s significance owed to its 
geographical location, centrality within Islam, and its regional political influence. The latter was 
firmly rooted in Saudi Arabia’s sovereign status, which constituted a political rarity in the Arab 
world. However, Saudi Arabia at the start of the war found itself in a perilous economic state, as 
wartime conditions had crippled the Kingdom’s main source of income, funds accrued from the 
annual Hajj. Unless the wartime alliance acted to address this problem, the stability of the 
Kingdom as well as the strategic interests of the allies that were tied to it would be in jeopardy.  
  Britain and the United States had independently maintained their own bilateral relations 
with Saudi Arabia that were markedly different in emphasis and scale. London’s relationship 
                                               
1
 Henri Michel, The Second World War (Britain: Andre Deutsch, 1975) p. 842. 
2
 David Reynolds, The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance 1937-1941: A Study in Competitive Cooperation 
(London: Europa, 1981) p. 169. 
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with the Kingdom had from the beginning been built on strong, political, strategic and economic 
foundations reaching back to the re-emergence of the Al-Saud dynasty in 1901.3 In the years that 
followed, Britain enjoyed the advantage of being the predominant foreign power in the Arabian 
Peninsula, a state of affairs which caused the Anglo-Saudi relationship to be oscillating between 
the amicable and the contentious.
4
 By the time of the 1927 Treaty of Jeddah, Britain’s 
recognition of the “complete and absolute independence” of Saudi Arabia had guaranteed the 
future security of the new state’s defence under British aegis.5 While Saudi Arabia was at no 
time officially part of the British Empire, London’s commitment to the Kingdom sprang from the 
desire to promote regional stability, which in essence meant protecting British suzerainty in the 
Middle East.  
  Independently of Britain, the United States Government’s relations with Saudi Arabia 
were far less comprehensive, but were nonetheless potentially more momentous. American 
influence mainly came by way of the privately owned Arabian American Oil Company 
(ARAMCO), which had since 1931 held a 360,000 square mile concession in Saudi Arabia.
6
 The 
United States was the world’s leading oil producer at that time. However, Saudi Arabian oil 
would not be discovered until 1938, and it would take eight more years before it came to be 
exported commercially. As American domestic oil reserves were rapidly being channelled 
towards the Allied war effort in the Second World War, policymakers in Washington 
increasingly cast their eye on the Kingdom’s oil potential, seeing it as extra foreign reserves for 
American post-war national security.
7
  
   Based on the distinct American and British spheres of interest in place in Saudi Arabia, 
leading officials on both sides of the Atlantic faced the challenge of how best to coordinate their 
country’s respective policies. The pre-existing fault-lines can be observed in the American 
                                               
3
 Philip Baram, The Department of State in the Middle East: 1919-1945 (United States: University of Pennsylvania 
1978) p. 223. 
4
 For the best work covering this period of Anglo-Saudi relations, see Gary Troeller, The Birth of Saudi Arabia: 
Britain and the Rise of the House of Sa’ud (London: Frank Cass, 1976) pp. 13-23. Also see, Jacob Goldberg, The 
Foreign Policy of Saud Arabia: the Formative Years, 1902-1918 (United States: Harvard University Press, 1987). 
For material on Anglo-Saudi relations after the First World War, see Haifa Alangari, The Struggle for Power in 
Arabia: Ibn Saud, Hussein and Great Britain, 1914-1924 (Lebanon: Ithaca Press, 1998).  
5
 At the time of the treaty’s signing, Saudi Arabia was officially referred to as the Kingdom of the Nejd and Hedjaz 
and its Dependencies. See Daniel Silverfarb, “The Treaty of Jeddah of May 1927” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 18, 
No. 3 (July, 1982). 
6
 Robert Bruce, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980). 
7
 In 1938, the United States produced 60% of world crude oil Irvine Anderson, Aramco, the United States and Saudi 
Arabia: A Study of the Dynamics of Foreign Oil Policy 1933-1950 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981) p. 
37. 
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Secretary of War, Henry Stimson’s May 1944 reaction to the inter-allied suspicions that 
permeated discussions regarding the establishment of a joint Anglo-American military mission 
charged with training Saudi Arabian military forces. Capturing the larger complexity of Anglo-
American relations in Saudi Arabia, Stimson stated: “The United States has considerable interest 
in a sovereign nation [Saudi Arabia] which is also of undeniable importance to the British 
Empire”.8 
Stimson’s assessment points towards the leitmotif of this thesis. When analysing Anglo-
American relations in Saudi Arabia between 1941 and 1945, it is important to resist viewing the 
relationship as a clear-cut case of either competition or cooperation. Paving the way for a more 
reflective starting-point, the initial priority of this thesis is to uncover how, why and to what 
extent Britain and the United States became mutually involved in a place that - in the words of 
one American official at the time - was “probably the largest little-known unit area in the 
habitable world”.9 Furthermore, an important ancillary element relates to considering the 
strategies and politics of the wider wartime alliance and how they factored into the relations 
between the two allies in Saudi Arabia. Only when acknowledging such wider questions and 
taking a broader perspective, can one adequately assess if Anglo-American relations in Saudi 
Arabia amounted to a “Special Relationship”, or whether the Kingdom was in fact a hotbed for 
rivalry and competition. 
*** 
   This thesis will begin with a chapter framing the respective engagements of Britain and 
the United States in Saudi Arabia preceding the Second World War. The historical context of 
Anglo-American relations in Saudi Arabia will be examined with an eye to how the sovereign 
Arab kingdom was linked to British and American foreign policies and by extension with Allied 
strategy.  The chapters that follow the prologue are set up chronologically and pursue the theme 
of the complexion and extent of Anglo-American cooperation between 1941 and 1945.  
Looking at the 1941-1942 period, examples of close Anglo-American collaboration are as 
numerous as they are profound, paving the way for a bilateral alliance that would be 
comprehensive in its scope and character in the years to come. Chapter II examines the genesis 
of that relationship beginning in 1941. Faced with the threat of the Axis advancing in the Middle 
                                               
8
 United States National Archives and Records Administration, College Park (NARA): Records of Department of 
State.  Record Group (RG) 218/190/1/11/6 Box 148.  Stimson to Hull, May 1, 1944. 
9
 K.S. Twitchell, ‘Water Resources of Saudi Arabia’ Geographical Review, Vol. 34, No. 3 (Jul., 1944), p. 365. 
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East, an ad-hoc Anglo-American alliance quickly emerged in Saudi Arabia. A dedicated group 
of Anglo-American officials based in London, Washington, and Jeddah pressed for action to help 
the financially burdened Saudi Arabian government remain stable, a strategic wartime goal. To 
circumvent the United States’ neutrality laws, the two Atlantic powers came to an agreement in 
which London would directly subsidize the Saudi Arabian Government, while Washington 
quietly sent an agricultural mission to the drought-ridden Kingdom.  
Chapter III and IV develop the theme of Anglo-American collaboration, examining it in 
its early incarnations. Chapter III looks at the circumstances which rendered Saudi Arabia an 
integral part of the wider Anglo-American wartime strategy in the Middle East. This includes the 
Allies’ successful acquisition of air and landing rights and the ambiguity that lay beneath 
protracted attempt of Britain and the United States to guard Saudi Arabia’s oilfields in 1942. 
Chapter IV examines the Anglo-American-backed Hoskins Mission, which explored the 
possibility of turning Ibn Saud into an Arab arbiter in Palestine in 1943. In many respects, the 
Hoskins Mission has been a forgotten piece of history, certainly discounted when it comes to the 
historiography of Anglo-American relations in Saudi Arabia. However, the Hoskins Mission 
illustrates the extent in which the subject extends beyond the limits of the Arabian Peninsula. As 
will be shown, the previously mentioned episodes - regardless of their respective outcomes – 
were links in a chain of events that set into motion a concerted attempt by the allies to expand 
Anglo-American cooperation in Saudi Arabia.   
 Chapter V, VI, and VII deal with the latter period of the Second World War from 1943 to 
1945, when British and American officials were formulating how to best define and implement a 
form of Anglo-American collaboration that would work effectively in the interest of both parties. 
Chapter V starts by examining the United States’ growing preoccupation with oil in Saudi Arabia 
and the founding of the Petroleum Reserves Corporation and the ramifications that this had on 
Anglo-American solidarity. Although concerns over oil naturally raised tension between the 
allies, this chapter also reveals another – and often overlooked - perspective. The British and 
American governments both displayed political willingness to seek out ways to assuage bilateral 
animosities over oil, culminating in the signing of the Anglo-American Oil Agreement in August 
1944.  
  Rather than oil, the issues that sparked greater inter-allied discord, which will also be 
elaborated upon in Chapter IV, were debates over how best to reform the Saudi Arabian 
12 
 
Government’s poor fiscal management and limit the scale of Anglo-American subsidies. These 
concerns were a running theme of Anglo-American relations because they dealt with the long-
term objectives of both countries as well as the long-term aim of preserving Saudi Arabia’s 
sovereignty. In the latter phases of the war, a modus vivendi was reached with regard to fiscal 
issues allowing for more immediate concerns to take precedence. The Stettinius Mission, held in 
London April 1944, brought British and American policymakers together to ensure that Allied 
policies were in concurrence, especially with regard to the Middle East. Shortly afterwards there 
were calls on both sides of the Atlantic to remove the British and American ministers from their 
posts in Saudi Arabia because of their “lack of liaison”. Subsequently, fresh efforts were made to 
improve Anglo-American relations in Saudi Arabia as the State Department and Foreign Office 
instructed their respective ministers in Jeddah to work in closer harmony. 
            The important role played by the interaction of personnel representing Britain and the 
United States respectively is further explored in Chapter VI. The arrival of the new American 
minister William Eddy in the autumn of 1944 was interpreted by British authorities as a signal 
that the United States sought to expand its presence in Saudi Arabia. Over the next year, this 
resulted in a series of policy debates between the two allies about the level with which they 
would be willing to continue to cooperate. Sometimes the advantages and pitfalls of 
collaboration during this period were difficult to discern. Subjects that will be examined in this 
chapter include the shared responsibility for subsidizing the Saudi Arabian government, the joint 
Anglo-American military mission, issues concerning aviation and telecommunications and the 
construction of the Dhahran airfield. 
  Chapter VII, the final chapter, goes on to describe the post-war dynamics that were 
already beginning to have a profound effect on Anglo-American relations by 1945. When the 
towering figures of the wartime alliance, Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill, individually 
met with Ibn Saud in February 1945, the occasion has been considered a watershed historical 
moment dramatizing American ascendancy and British decline. These conclusions need to be 
reappraised. American domination in Saudi Arabia was by no means assured at this stage. British 
political influence in the Kingdom was still very much a reality, and thus both countries’ 
relationship remained strategically relevant. From London’s perspective, the United States was 
gaining an established foothold in Saudi Arabia that was extensively linked with Britain’s own 
concerns about a post war Soviet Union getting further involved in the Middle East. The 
13 
 
American presence served to furnish British regional interests with an extra layer of security. 
This policy was made clear with the early formulation of Britain’s “Northern Tier” policy of the 
late 1940s and early 1950s.
10
 Conversely, although American policy was less concerned with 
countering Soviet designs, Washington recognized that Saudi Arabia and the Middle East could 
be a post-war hot zone, an area where British agency and its military installations would be a 
critical commodity.   
  This thesis examines the diplomatic interaction between Britain and the United States 
within Saudi Arabia as it played out against the global backdrop of the Second World War. In 
understanding the multi-facetted relationship between the Americans and the British in Saudi 
Arabia, this thesis primarily views its subject matter from a traditionalist perspective of history. 
As such, it emphasizes national interest, security and influence, but also considers more subtle 
elements outside of the purview of power politics, such as culture and ideology. Recognizing the 
contributions made by the upper echelons of British and American officialdom in shaping policy, 
this thesis will also explore the role played by individuals who were not in the upper tier of 
government, but rather were the "boots on the ground", putting policies into action.  
  The methodology applied in the thesis is that of an historical narrative, which offers the 
best means to explain and analyze the complexities of the subject matter. The research on which 
the thesis is based has been drawn from a variety of different archives. In the United States, these 
include the National Archives in College Park, the Library of Congress, the Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt Presidential Library and the libraries at Princeton University, Georgetown University, 
George Washington University, Virginia University, and Arkansas University. In Britain, the 
bulk of the research was undertaken at the National Archives in Kew, but also at the British 
Library, and the libraries at the London School of Economics and the Middle East Centre at St. 
Antony’s College in Oxford. From these repositories that hold private papers, reference has 
further been made to an assortment of published primary resources, which include, Foreign 
Relations of the United States, Documents on British Overseas Policy, Documents on British 
Foreign Affairs, Hansard’s, The Aramco Handbook and Foreign Office Lists. Finally, a number 
                                               
10
 See, Behcet Kemal Yesilburba, The Baghdad Pact: Anglo-American Defence Policies in the Middle East, 1950-
1959 (Oxford: Frank Cass) 2005. 
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of private papers and memoir-related sources from key British, American and Saudi Arabian 
officials have been consulted to bring further insight to the study.
11
  
 
Historiographical Review 
 
There is no single book-length study directly focusing on Anglo-American relations in 
Saudi Arabia during the Second World War. The research undertaken here draws on a wide 
selection of secondary sources that fall under the historiography of Anglo-American relations. It 
also takes into account material from other fields, such as studies on petroleum, the Cold War, 
and national histories of Britain, the United States and Saudi Arabia. The common denominator 
of these diverse works is that when they touch upon Anglo-American relations in Saudi Arabia, 
the gist of their arguments fall within the established parameters of the literature.
12
  
   While a comprehensive historiographical review is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is 
worth noting that AJP Taylor’s comment that sound scholarship is based on “the ruthless 
dispelling of myths”.13 Therefore, it is necessary for this study to first make sense of the 
mythology surrounding the Anglo-American alliance.
14
 The Allied victory in the Second World 
War brought forth a collective historical memory - one in which the United States and Britain 
were as one in all. In 1942, it was Winston Churchill who coined the phrase “Special 
Relationship”, and in later years, his six-volume History of the Second World War helped carve 
                                               
11
 An assortment of private papers has been reviewed for this study.  From the British Library, London -Gilbert 
Laithwaite Papers. From the Middle East Centre, Oxford-  the Laurence Grafftey Smith Papers, the Andrew Ryan 
Papers, the Reader Bullard Papers, the George Rendell Papers, the Miles Lampson Papers and the Gerald de Gaury 
Papers. From National Archives, College Park- the Harley Notter Papers. From Hyde Park- Roosevelt 
Correspondence with Saudi Arabia, Officials, Etc, the Robert Sherwood Papers, the Harry Hopkins Papers, the 
Henry Stimson Papers (microfiche) the William Rigdon Papers, the Samuel Rosenman Papers, the Anna Roosevelt 
Boettinger Papers and the John Winant Papers. From Princeton Seeley Mudd Library- William Eddy Papers and the 
Karl Twitchell Papers. From Georgetown University- the Clarence McIntosh Papers, Tim Mulligan Papers. From 
the University of Arkansas – the James Moose Papers. From the Library of Congress, Washington DC- the Diaries 
of Harold Ickes, the Hebert Feis Papers, the Loy Henderson Papers, the Archibald Roosevelt Papers. From the 
University of Virginia- the Rive Childs Papers and the Edward Stettinius Papers. 
12
 For historiographical sketches on Anglo-American relations, see David Reynolds, ‘Rethinking Anglo-American 
Relations’ Royal Institute of International Affairs, Vol. 65, 1 (Winter, 1989) pp. 89-111. John Baylis, Anglo-
American Relations since 1939: An Enduring Alliance (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997) pp. 8-16. 
Alex Danchev ‘On Specialness’, Royal Institute of International Affairs. Vol. 72, No. 4 (October, 1996) pp. 737-
750.   
13
 Writing a review for the Observer, A.J.P. Taylor extolled Richard Overy’s The Air War 1939-1945, saying “as so 
often with sound scholarship, is the ruthless dispelling of myths.” 
14
 For essential surveys on Anglo-American diplomatic relations, see David Reynolds, ‘A ‘Special Relationship’? 
America, Britain and the International Order since the Second World War’, Vol. 62, 1 (Winter, 1986) pp. 1-20.  
Wm. Roger Louis & Hedley Bull (eds.) The ‘Special Relationship’ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).  
15 
 
into the public consciousness the idea that the two countries shared common values and a 
familial affinity for one another.
15
 As one modern day historian of the wartime alliance 
facetiously once noted: “In the beginning was the word, and the word was Churchill’s and he 
pronounced it good”.16 
  Given the sacrosanct aspects of the “Special Relationship”, it is no wonder that those 
historians who have expounded the Churchillian attitude have been categorized as 
“Evangelicals”.17 H.C. Allen’s 1954 Great Britain and the United States may be the most 
extreme example of this approach to Anglo-American relations. In the preface of his book, Allen 
had little trouble conceding: “I have not written this book purely as an academic study: I have 
written it because I believe in the necessity for cordial Anglo-American relations”. 18 Such 
accounts in the evangelical mode thus contained an underlying political agenda, which in the 
above context meant trying to arrest Britain’s decline on the international stage.19  
  Out of the post-Suez era arose a new generation of historians ready to tear apart the 
folklore that had been an indelible aspect of the “Special Relationship”. Previously classified 
information from the Second World War had by the early 1970s become available, uncovering a 
reality that was far more problematic, showing little resemblance to earlier rose-tinted 
interpretations.
20
 Given access to these documents, scholars accentuated the role of self-interest 
                                               
15
 For an account of Churchill as historian and his role in establishing a collective memory of the Second World 
War, see David Reynolds In Command of History: Churchill Fighting and Writing the Second World War (United 
States: Random House, 2005).  
16
 John Charmley. Churchill’s Grand Alliance (United States: Harcourt Brace, 1996) p. 3.  
17
 H.C. Allen, Great Britain and the United States (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1955). Other works with an 
Evangelical bent include, H.C. Allen, The Anglo-American Predicament (London: Macmillan, 1960). H.C. Allen 
and Roger Thompson (eds.), Contrast and Connection: Bicentennial Essays in Anglo-American History (Ohio: Ohio 
University Press, 1976) Joseph E. Lash, Roosevelt and Churchill: The Partnership that Saved the West (New York, 
1980).  
18
 Allen, Great Britain and the United States, preface.  
19
 For an example of historians seeking to play an active role bringing about Anglo-American accord, see David 
Cannadine ‘Historians as Diplomats? Roger B. Merriman and George M. Trevelyan and Anglo-American Relations’ 
New England Quarterly (1999) pp. 207-231. To a lesser extent, American historians also partook in this vigorous 
form history writing when assessing the Anglo-American relationship, particularly during the politically charged era 
of the Cold War. For example,  the collection of histories related to the Second World War written by Herbert Feis, 
go out of their way to praise the solidarity of the wartime alliance, while diminishing the contributions of the Soviet 
Union, see Herbert Feis, Roosevelt, Churchill & Stalin (United States: Princeton University Press, 1957). H. Feis, 
From Trust to Terror: The Onset of the Cold War 1945-1950 (United States: Norton Press, 1970). For more recent 
examples of a politically conscious Evangelical outlook, particular in the era of the “War on Terror”, see William 
Shawcross, Allies: The U.S., Britain and Europe in the Aftermath of the Iraq War (United States: Public Affairs, 
2005). 
20
 Ambivalence towards Anglo-American relations arguably reached its highest point during the presidency and 
premiership of Richard Nixon and Edward Heath; the same moment when documents from the Second World War 
were being officially released. It is very easy to speculate that the lukewarm attitude towards the Anglo-American 
16 
 
in developing their analysis. The historiography soon became more sophisticated with the work 
of historians like David Reynolds’s The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance, which 
introduced the concept of “competitive-cooperation” to explain the “undercurrent of transatlantic 
rivalry”.21Also included in this class of scholarship is Christopher Thorne’s Allies of a Kind in 
which he puts forward a hard-hitting account of how British and American interests greatly 
diverged in the Pacific. Thorne’s study debunked what he labels the “realms of mythology” 
celebrating Anglo-American harmony.
22
 
Taking the combative angle to its outer edges, there is John Charmley’s polemical 
Churchill’s Grand Alliance. Charmley makes the bold charge that Britain’s advocacy for the 
‘Special Relationship’ was like another “Dardanelles”, a poorly conceived strategy laid out by 
Churchill that unwittingly ended up damaging British power.
23
 This is not to say that 
interpretations as extreme as Charmley’s have dominated the scholarly debate. There are a 
number of recent texts that equally highlight the unifying traits of the wartime alliance. An 
excellent example of this is Warren Kimball’s Forged in War. The author makes a convincing 
case that: “Whatever Anglo-American quarrels persisted…the British and Americans maintained 
a remarkably close, relatively candid, and extraordinarily cooperative relationship throughout the 
war”.24  
Despite the absence of a specialized in-depth study, scholars of Anglo-American relations 
in Saudi Arabia have tended to see the subject as a microcosm of the wartime alliance during the 
Second World War. David Reynolds, for example, has applied his idea of “competitive-
cooperation” to argue that the two allies worked together most effectively in Saudi Arabia when 
the Axis powers were at their most threatening. Once this danger receded, holds Reynolds, the 
“latent competition between the two powers came to the surface once more".25 Even though the 
                                                                                                                                                       
relationship in the early 1970’s may have influenced those contemporary historians who were interpreting the 
wartime alliance of the 1940’s. 
21
 Reynolds, The Creation of the Anglo American Alliance, p. 2. 
22
 Christopher Thorne, Allies of a Kind, (Britain: Oxford University Press, 1978) p.775. 
23
 Charmley, Grand Alliance, pp. 3-10 & pp.356-360. 
24
 Warren F. Kimball, Forged In War: Roosevelt, Churchill and the Second World War (New York: William 
Morrow and Company, 1997) pp. 33. For similar works that stress the cooperative bonds of Britain and the United 
States, see Henry Butterfield Ryan, The Vision of Anglo-America: The US-UK Alliance and the Emerging Cold War, 
1943-1946 (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1987)pp. 14-38. James Holland, Together We Stand: 
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focus of his work is not on the wartime alliance in Saudi Arabia, Reynolds, however, misses a 
crucial point. The fact is that as the Axis threat waned between 1943 and 1945, this same period 
saw Britain and the United States at their most determined in their diplomatic efforts to 
cooperate in Saudi Arabia. 
   Focusing on Britain’s strategic interests in Saudi Arabia, John Charmley once more 
applies his own theme of Churchill’s Faustian bargain, warning that “co-operation with a much 
stronger and richer power (the United States) was an enterprise not to be hazarded lightly”.26 The 
hegemonic transition of power to which Charmley refers is also studied by Wm. Roger Louis 
who gives considerable analysis of Anglo-American relations in Saudi Arabia in The British 
Empire in the Middle East 1945-1951. According to Louis, London’s disenchantment stemmed 
from what was perceived as a form of American economic and cultural imperialism taking root 
in Saudi Arabia, which one day might threaten Britain’s position in the Middle East.27 If there 
was ever a prime instance illustrating the mutual wartime distrust and apprehension between the 
two allies, concludes Louis, “the case of Saudi Arabia might serve as an example”.28 One 
common denominator between this thesis and the work of Louis is his view that in order to 
understand both British and American perspectives of Saudi Arabia, one must take into account 
the strategic importance of the Kingdom and its capacity to influence regional politics. Looking 
at the views of Charmley and Louis, it is curious that both pay little attention to the strategic 
pragmatism underlying the shared British and American presence in Saudi Arabia. 
Nonetheless, the notion of Pax Britannica’s slow recession and the advent of Pax 
Americana remains a fixture in the subject’s historiography. A more recent work, W. Taylor 
Fain’s  American Ascendance and British Retreat in the Persian Gulf Region also builds on this 
theme, but pursues it to its most draconian and illogical conclusion. It is not only that in Fain’s 
view British officialdom viewed the United States with “trepidation”. He takes it one step further 
and provocatively claims: “The most important conflict in the Persian Gulf Region during the 
early 1940s had not been between the Allied and Axis powers, but rather between Britain and the 
United States for political dominance in Saudi Arabia”.29 By comparing the magnitude of Anglo-
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American rivalry in Saudi Arabia with the enmity that existed between the Allies and the Axis 
respectively, Fain’s line of thinking loses all sense of historical proportion.  
  From an American-centric perspective, Philip Baram’s The Department of State in the 
Middle East: 1919-1945 gives a more nuanced analysis and shows Saudi Arabia to have been an 
anomaly. Anglo-American relations in the Kingdom amounted to more than the British being 
pushed aside by a more powerful “youthful American interloper”. Baram argues that some 
members of the State Department saw it to be the other way around. They viewed their British 
colleagues as conniving to undermine the United States’ political position in Saudi Arabia.30 
Although Baram attests to the long-standing Anglo-Saudi relationship, he fails to appreciate the 
fact that American diplomacy at the time took many of its cues from years of British statecraft 
and experience in the region. Britain & Saudi Arabia 1925-1939 by Clive Leatherdale is the 
most complete work detailing the history while also offering an appraisal of Anglo-American 
relations in Saudi Arabia during the Second World War. Leatherdale describes it in dramatic 
fashion as a “struggle for supremacy” without, however, making any note of the multiple policy 
agreements struck between the allies in an effort to boost bilateral collaboration.
31
 
   Barry Rubin’s article ‘Anglo-American Relations in Saudi Arabia, 1941-1945’ treats the 
subject far more directly than most sources, but without emphasising the antagonistic element. 
The element of rivalry surrounding the wartime alliance, asserts Rubin, comprised “a certain 
amount of farce”.  According to Rubin, the British, in their desire to retain close relations with 
Washington, were generally unwilling to participate in the contest. Rubin separates himself from 
the rest of the historiography by placing greater emphasis on the role of Saudi Arabian officials, 
who he argues planted the seeds of Anglo-American discord.
 32
 He illustrates episodes in which 
Saudi Arabian officials were able to stoke British and American tensions by adeptly playing the 
two powers against each other. This was a particularly important point when it came to 
negotiating Anglo-American subsidies for the Kingdom in the spring of 1944. Nonetheless, 
Rubin’s approach neglects the far greater role that the Kingdom’s geopolitical significance had 
in shaping the Anglo-American relationship. 
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  The scholar who has most recently dealt with the topic directly is Simon Davis. 
Describing the relationship as a “Darwinistic paradigm”, his article ‘Keeping the Americans in 
Line: Britain, the United States and Saudi Arabia, 1939-1945’ and his recent study Contested 
Space: Anglo-American Relations in the Persian Gulf, 1939-1947 places Davis firmly at the 
extreme end of those works that accentuate the confrontational component of Anglo-American 
relations.
33
 In the chapters referring to Saudi Arabia in Contested Space, Davis’ work is 
principally concerned with economic factors. The thrust of his argument is that in ideological 
terms a larger socioeconomic battle was taking place in Saudi Arabia, pitting “neo-corporatist 
British guided development” against “American New Deal internationalism”.34 According to 
Davis, American authorities were “intolerant of any vestigial British primacy” and considered it 
to be on par with “totalitarianism” and “indigenous revolution”.35 But to make such an uneasy 
comparison, Davis overstates his case and exaggerates the reach of American power while 
completely ignoring the interdependent aspects of Anglo-American relations in the Kingdom.  
Although the subject matter of this thesis and the work by Davis respectively cover similar 
historical terrain, the arguments put forward are poles apart.  
*** 
  Due to the relatively diverse nature of the historiography, a group of works fall outside 
the traditional Anglo-American framework, while still contributing in significant ways to the 
literature. Two recent histories of Saudi-American relations, Thomas Lippman’s Inside the 
Mirage and Rachel Bronson’s Thicker than Oil both include sections dedicated to the Second 
World War period.
36
 However, they make no mention of the fact that the British legation in 
Jeddah served as the vital interlocutor for the United States. Especially in the early war years 
between 1941 and 1943, the British connection gave American officials new points of access to 
Ibn Saud and his inner-circle of advisors. By not giving the British role its due respect, a major 
historical dimension is missing from these two studies. As national histories go, Alexei 
Vassiliev’s The History of Saudi Arabia contains an entire chapter detailing the Kingdom’s 
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interaction with British and American officialdom during the Second War, but it offers no final 
comment on the state of Anglo-American relations.
37
  
  Although Donald Cameron Watt’s 1963 article ‘The Foreign Policy of Ibn Saud 1936-
1939’ is not focused on Anglo-American relations, it is still vitally important for this thesis.38 It 
lifts Saudi Arabia out of the shadows and puts the country’s wider strategic influence in the 
spotlight on the eve of the Second World War. Watt asserts that in his dealing with Britain, Italy 
and Germany in the late 1930s, Ibn Saud carefully manipulated western powers for his own 
advantage. Historians have subsequently used this characterization and applied it to their 
arguments about the wartime behaviour of Ibn Saud, believing that he handled the Americans 
and the British in the same way, fomenting inter-allied rivalry for his own ends.
39
 
  David Howarth’s biography of Ibn Saud, The Desert King offers an interpretation of the 
wartime alliance in Saudi Arabia that leads us to a polarizing theme within the subject’s 
historiography, one that sees the diplomatic cultures of Britain and the United States as being 
distinctly at odds with one another. In the chapter entitled Money and Dishonour, Howarth 
contends that because of America’s growing influence, Saudi Arabia was on the verge of “both 
spiritual and material” chaos by the end of the Second World War.40 The British writer, Robert 
Lacey, a man who likens the traditional Bedouin raid to be a “cross between Arthurian chivalry 
and County Cricket,” also goes to some lengths to suggest that British influence in Saudi Arabia 
was somehow of nobler sentiment. In his book The Kingdom, Lacey wonders if the Saudi Arabia 
that had once persevered through penurious conditions, helped along by the careful assistance of 
Britain, would be able to survive the new prosperity courtesy of the free spending Americans.
41
 
 The idea that the growing influence of the United States during the Second World War 
was morally inferior to that of Britain can be read between the lines of  the record left by British 
“men on the spot” who were intimately involved with the every-day running of Pax Britannica 
in the Middle East.
42
 These works show little sign of Churchill’s “evangelism” towards Anglo-
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American relations. They are more nostalgic for, and saddened by Britain’s lost place in the 
world.  John “Pasha” Glubb’s Britain and the Arabs is a prime example of this motif. In the 
chapter entitled “The Tragedy of Arabia”, he claims that Saudi Arabia’s “own peculiarly Arab 
culture was suddenly swept away by the flood of mechanized materialism” that came courtesy of 
the Americans.
43
 Harry St. John Bridger Philby’s Arabian Jubilee is another example of this 
view, but lays the change at Saudi Arabia’s door. While critical towards the dangers caused by 
American materialism, Philby is more philosophical, insisting that British and American officials 
shared a common challenge, that of trying to balance traditional Arab life with Western 
modernity.
44
 
  The most influential source amongst those American officials who wrote about Saudi 
Arabia is Colonel William Eddy’s 1953 monograph When FDR met Ibn Saud.45 Serving as the 
American minister to Saudi Arabia from 1944-1946, Eddy’s monograph is less of a historical 
work and more of a recollection of his duties as a translator during the meeting between 
Roosevelt and Ibn Saud of February 1945. It also contains some choice words for what he 
perceives as official British meddling when it came to the meeting.
46
 While extolling America’s 
enlightened view of Saudi Arabia, Eddy’s suggestion that Britain had imperial aims to subvert 
Saudi Arabia sovereignty lacks veracity since the Kingdom’s independence was a critical part of 
London’s Middle East policy.  
  Eddy’s protégé, Parker Hart, the American pro-Consul from 1943-1945 and later 
Washington’s ambassador to Saudi Arabia between 1961 and 1965, is another example of an 
American official who writes critically about his British colleagues. In his book, Saudi Arabia 
and the United States, the first chapter is dedicated to the war years and is entitled, ‘Troubled 
US-British Cooperation’. Writing more than 50 years after the actual events, Hart opens the 
chapter with the following observation: 
                                                                                                                                                       
Second World War, see Andrew Ryan, The Last of the Dragomans (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1951). Reader Bullard, 
E.C. Hodgkin (ed.) Two Kings in Arabia: Letters from Jeddah 1923-1925 and 1936-1939(Lebanon: Ithaca Press, 
1993).  
43
 John Glubb, Britain and the Arabs: Study of Fifty Years, 1908-1958 (London: Hodder Stoughton, 1958) p. 355. 
44
 St. John Philby, Arabia Jubilee (Britain, 1952) p. 236;  Also see Philby, Forty Years in the Wilderness (London: 
Robert Hale, 1957) Both are invaluable sources impressing upon the cultural effects that Britain and the United 
States had on Saudi Arabia.  
45
 William Eddy, When FDR Met Ibn Saud (New York: American Friends of the Middle East, 1953) p.43.  
46
 Eddy’s work made such an impression that, David Howarth - writing more than ten years after it was published - 
commented that Eddy wrote “sourly of the British with less reason than many of their critics.” Howarth, Desert 
King, page 207 * Colonel Eddy’s wife accused Howarth of calling her husband a liar. Seeley Mudd Library: 
William Eddy Papers. Box 8, ‘Howarth’s Book’ March 5, 1965. 
22 
 
 
“Three years into World War II, the government of Winston Churchill in war-
battered London might have been expected to welcome an economic as well as a 
military partner such as the United States in the Middle East, especially one with 
so little political ambition or concern in the area. Such was not the case”.47 
    
  Hart’s thesis of British perfidy and American innocence is questionable and to some 
degree biased. One of Britain’s prime motives was in fact to work with the United States as an 
economic and military partner in order to ensure regional stability. Furthermore, it would be 
naive to think that the United States - on the way to becoming a global power - did not have 
political motives in Saudi Arabia.  
 Examples of the memoir literature as outlined above hold importance in that they help to 
showcase the evolution of the subject’s historiography.48 A common theme shared by the texts is 
their varying degrees of national chauvinism and the stress they placed on the differences in style 
that characterised British and American diplomatic cultures. To say that British authorities in 
Saudi Arabia were cynical and conservative while their American counterparts were naive and 
lacking in subtlety is a misguided assessment as will be explored in this thesis. Although the 
memoir literature on the whole lacks depth, the high profile of the authors associated with it has 
allowed these works to achieve a definitive status. It is clear that the authors of these works have 
allowed themselves to be influenced by their sense of nationalism, and this has contributed to the 
divisive depiction of Anglo-American relations in Saudi Arabia during this period.  
  Finally, the subject of Saudi Arabian oil has tended to be dealt with in isolation rather 
than from within the broader framework of Anglo-American relations. While this thesis is not an 
examination of British and American oil policies in Saudi Arabia, it will draw on relevant studies 
that deal directly with the connection between oil and wartime strategy and national security.
49
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Out of these works, Aaron David Miller’s 1939-1949: Search for Security: Saudi Arabian Oil 
and American Foreign Policy and Mark Stoff’s Oil, War, and American Security: The Search for 
a National Policy on Foreign Oil, 1941-1947 are the best studies covering the American 
perspective.
 50
 Meanwhile, B.S. McBeth’s British Oil Policy, 1919-1939 is an invaluable source 
for understanding British oil concerns leading up to the Second World War.
51
 In particular, the 
works by Miller and Stoff to some extent deal with Anglo-American relations, but the focal point 
of these important studies remain concentrated on oil and are American-centric in perspective. 
 In this regard, the subject of oil has given the United States a disproportionate sense of 
the importance of its position in Saudi Arabian affairs. This situation is no less true in light of 
current day events. The notion that the “Special Relationship” between the United States and 
Saudi Arabia was somehow predestined has been further boosted in part by what Robert Vitalis 
has called “mythmaking on the Saudi oil frontier”.52 The formerly American-owned oil 
company, ARAMCO, has been accused of crafting its own narrative espousing the inevitability 
of the Saudi-American relationship through its powerful public relations network, including the 
company’s award-winning magazine, Aramco World. With the likes of the Nobel Prize winning 
author Wallace Stegner contributing articles such as “Discovery! The Story of Aramco Then”, 
“Arabists in the USA” and “Arabia the Beautiful”, the oil company has had a hand in burying 
the critical role played by Britain in the rise of Saudi Arabia.
53
 
  
To go as far as to concluding that ARAMCO acted solely as an agent of Washington and 
worked to reduce British power would however be an overstatement. As Irvine Anderson points 
out in Aramco, the United States and Saudi Arabia, the company did not function as an arm of 
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the United States government, but existed as a separate institution with its own bottom line.
54
 
Leading up to the Second World War, it was ARAMCO that had been dutifully committed to the 
development of Saudi Arabia, standing in sharp relief to the notable reluctance of the United 
States government at this stage. In many cases, ARAMCO had in fact sought to thwart the 
actions of Washington rather than London.
55
 With that being said, ARAMCO’s subsequent 
influence on the historiography has indirectly elevated the status of the Saudi-American 
relationship, while leaving the British role in the drama either downplayed or ignored.  
 
A Study of a Trying Relationship 
 
     The subject of Anglo-American relations in Saudi Arabia during the Second World War 
still remains fertile ground for those who want to link the allies’ relationship with the objective 
of the United States to replace Great Britain as the premier world power. With the onset of the 
decline of British power after the Second World War, there is a “determinist” tendency to believe 
that this shift in dominance was made clearly apparent to the main actors at the time. Building on 
the variety of historiography laid out above, this thesis makes two primary assertions. The first 
assertion is that one must depart from the depiction of Saudi Arabia as being solely a preserve 
for bilateral competition between the allies. Examined more closely, the centrepiece of Anglo-
American relations in the Kingdom from 1941 and 1945 was founded on interdependence, which 
functioned as an incentive for constructive engagement.  
 While the concept of interdependence in many respects captures the manner in which 
Anglo-American relations operated globally during the Second World War, it was particularly 
felt in many areas of the Middle East, a region where the interests of the two allies were 
increasingly entwined. This also applied to Saudi Arabia itself where interdependence functioned 
on a strategic and political level while also to a lesser, but still noteworthy extent, a commercial 
one. These different layers of interdependence served to bind Britain and the United States 
closely together in Saudi Arabia. Interdependence thus accounts for why in instances of bilateral 
                                               
54
 Anderson, Aramco, The United States and Saudi Arabia, pp.199-201. For a perspective of an Aramco employee at 
this time, see Thomas Barger, Out in the Blue: Letters from Arabia 1937-1940 (United States: Selwa Press, 2000).  
55
 I. Anderson, Aramco, p. 199. Policy pushed by the United States government including the Petroleum Reserves 
Corporation and the Anglo-American Petroleum Agreement were mainly viewed by ARAMCO as “government 
cartels” that directly threatened the lifeblood of the company. 
25 
 
discord, London and Washington frequently resorted to pursuing policies that sought to extend 
rather than curtail Anglo-American cooperation. By this logic, the key question for British and 
American officials with regard to Saudi Arabia would be how their respective countries could 
enhance each other’s geo-strategic position in process of pursuing their own national interests.   
  Throughout the war years, the Anglo-American experience in Saudi Arabia exposed the 
limits of both countries’ ability to act decisively as the dominant hegemonic force in the 
Kingdom. Each had its own set of deficiencies in the key fields of influence such as security, 
finance and statecraft. Fully aware of this state of affairs, key policymakers on both sides of the 
Atlantic came to a crucial realization. By merging the long-term experience of Britain with the 
ascendancy of American power in Saudi Arabia, the two allies could offset their individual 
strategic weaknesses. In other words, in unity there was strength, and the two powers could 
enhance their influence in Saudi Arabia, whereas individually they might fail. Once establishing 
that British and American power was marked by a semblance of parity, the interdependent 
qualities of Anglo-American relations in Saudi Arabia begins to emerge more clearly.
56
 
 This is not to suggest that British and American strategic, political and commercial 
interests were always symmetrical between 1941 and 1945. Indeed, the very idea of two 
countries interlocking their policies obviously comes with inherent tensions. Part of this study’s 
purpose, however, is to demonstrate that the interdependent structure underpinning Anglo-
American relations had a way of bridging national interests that at times seemed to be in direct 
competition. Nor were perceptions of interests fixed on either side, meaning that interests were 
far more malleable than they have often been portrayed to be. One of the clearest examples that 
illustrated this idea was the subtle reciprocity at play that aligned Britain’s continued political 
presence in Saudi Arabia with the safeguarding of American commercial stakes. Another case of 
what on the surface may have seemed to be a catalyst for competition, while in reality proving to 
be a motivation for cooperation, was the fact that Washington’s growing political involvement in 
the Kingdom cohered with London’s larger aim of adding an extra layer of security to its own 
strategic position in the Middle East. For Britain and the United States, these instances reveal 
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that the allies’ underlying interdependence in Saudi Arabia often meant that the diversity of their 
national interests could in fact be reconciled and potentially strengthened. 
 Seen from this perspective, interdependence is a useful term that puts into greater context 
the cooperative and competitive elements which informed, shaped and characterized the Anglo-
American relationship. By 1943 when the Axis threat became less of a concern in the Arabian 
Peninsula, the United States and Britain redoubled their efforts to coordinate policies in Saudi 
Arabia for the remainder of the war. However, each country favoured their own methods based 
on their own unique set of national interests, foreign policy cultures and domestic pressures. For 
these reasons, the on-going pursuit of cooperation proved frustrating and difficult at times. 
Nevertheless, this should not take away from the fact that the continued attempts on the part of 
both the United States and Britain to find a collaborative approach is a testament to the 
importance each attributed to the value of interdependence in its various forms. Viewed from 
within this prism, Saudi Arabia during the Second World War was considered a testing ground 
for wider Anglo-American cooperation, a type of cooperation that would ideally branch out and 
become a mainstay of the region’s geostrategic landscape.  
 The second main argument of this thesis is that throughout the entire period under 
consideration, Britain and the United States found a unity of purpose in valuing the Kingdom’s 
unique brand of strategic influence. While Saudi Arabia was not yet the power in material or 
military terms that it was later to become, it did stand out at this time as a beacon of stability 
under the rule of Ibn Saud. This was the case at a time when Allied interests in the Middle East 
were not only under attack by the Axis, but also by the region’s home-grown political turmoil. 
Saudi Arabia and its decision to remain neutral in the Second World War need not be perceived 
as an “immoral, short-sighted conception” as was once pointed out by John Foster Dulles.57 
Instead, Saudi Arabia’s neutrality was actively encouraged by British and American officials 
who took it to be a kind of “benevolent neutrality”, serving to cloak the Kingdom’s quiet 
assistance to the Allied cause.  
  The Anglo-American relationship in Saudi Arabia took shape against the backdrop of the 
emerging post-war liberal international order. It was an era when the British Empire was 
transformed into the British Commonwealth. It was also a time when American global strategy 
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was infused with an unmistakable strain of “New Deal internationalism”. This was no less the 
case in Saudi Arabia, with the independent Arab kingdom giving form to the Atlantic Charter’s 
declaration of “the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will 
live...”58 British and American officials knew that to a large extent their country’s interests 
hinged on Saudi Arabia remaining a sovereign Arab state and perhaps, more importantly, being 
perceived as such. Yet the allies at times differed in their interpretations of how to best protect 
the outward image of the Kingdom’s sovereignty. Any policy that made Saudi Arabia look like a 
client of the allies rather than their partner could jeopardize the legitimacy of the Al-Saud regime 
and by extension weaken those British and American interests that depended on it. Britain and 
the United States, in this respect, had to maintain a permanent balancing act that ultimately 
proved impossible to perpetually sustain. They not only had to pursue their own separate as well 
as mutual interests within the framework of the wartime alliance, but they also had to be mindful 
that any decisions that they came to would not infringe on Saudi Arabia's sovereignty. 
*** 
  To gain a more detailed understanding of these themes, it is important to consider why 
Saudi Arabia was a driving force in moulding Anglo American relations, not only within the 
Kingdom, but also throughout the Middle East in many decisive ways.
59
 In this respect, it is 
crucial to acknowledge that the Kingdom’s influence reached beyond its borders.60 On a geo-
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strategic level, the country’s location was well-suited. During the Second World War, Saudi 
Arabia – in the eyes of British and American authorities - emerged as a key geostrategic cross-
junction linking the Mediterranean, North African and Asian wartime theatres.  No one described 
the significance of Saudi Arabia’s location more succinctly than Ibn Saud himself, when on 
January 2, 1939 he wrote the following to British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain: “Our 
country is the important central point of a circular area of the world’s surface…”61 Centrally 
located between the key Allied supply routes, the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf and given the 
country’s vastness and its being one quarter of the size of the continental United States, Saudi 
Arabia in the minds of Allied war planners could have multiple uses, not least in terms of 
providing air routes and being a potential supply depot and staging post to launch future military 
operations. 
Coupled with the strategic importance of its location, the sui generic stature of Saudi 
Arabia within the Moslem and Arab world impacted greatly on British and American thinking in 
terms of the ongoing propaganda against the Axis powers. Although not reaching the heights of 
Caliphate, as the “Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques” of the Islamic faith, a large 
concentration of religious and political influence rested firmly with Ibn Saud. His appeal to 
millions of Moslems from Casablanca to Bandung might swing popular support to either the 
Allied, or the Axis cause.
62
 In this respect, the king played a vital role shaping Anglo-American 
relations in Saudi Arabia. At this stage in the Kingdom’s state development, for all intents and 
purposes, Ibn Saud was the Saudi Arabian Government. Although officials such as Sheik Yussef 
Yassin and Abdullah Suleimann held titles like Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of 
Finance, these men were not de facto in charge of the great offices of state. Instead, their role in 
government was to be part of a small coterie of officials who acted as the King’s Privy Council. 
Holding such absolute power, the British feted Ibn Saud and even nicknamed him “Napoleon of 
the Desert”. Not to be outdone, President Roosevelt - after meeting King Ibn Saud in person the 
first time in 1945 - boasted: “I learned more about that whole Jewish-Moslem problem by talking 
with Ibn Saud for five minutes than I could have learned in the exchange of two or three dozen 
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letters”. 63 In the words of Donald Cameron Watt, for British and American officials, Ibn Saud 
was “all things to all men”.64  
This combination of religious authority and political autonomy went hand in hand with 
Ibn Saud being regarded as a mainstay of regional stability. Since its founding, Saudi Arabia had 
principally been guided by a policy of non-revisionism, as is still largely the case today. But 
during the war, Britain and the United States wanted to mold Ibn Saud into a type of Allied-Arab 
arbiter. In this role, the King would position Saudi Arabia as a regional counterbalance against 
threats to Anglo-American interests whether these took the form of Axis intrigue, the rising tide 
of Arab nationalism or the hazard of Soviet encroachment in the Middle East.65 Conversely, Ibn 
Saud also looked to the allies in helping to secure his regime. His embrace of Pax Britannica 
leading up to and during the Second World War gave his country financial support and military 
protection, while the American entry into Saudi Arabian affairs would provide extra defensive 
safeguards, and just as importantly, money.
66
  
 Despite the country’s feudalistic portrayal, British and American officials both 
recognized that in some ways Saudi Arabia was strikingly modern as it was in line with the 
prevailing zeitgeist by virtue of its independence as a sovereign Arab nation.  Looking out of the 
window of his airplane when flying over Saudi Arabia on his return from the Tehran Conference 
in 1943, President Roosevelt told Frances Perkins, the Secretary of Labor that after the “damn 
war is over”, he and Eleanor would come back to Saudi Arabia and try to start an “operation like 
the TVA (Tennessee Valley Authority)”.67 Although Roosevelt’s own progressive views seem 
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visionary, they were equally a product of his old world sense of noblesse oblige: “the conviction 
that privileged Americans should take a part in relieving national and international ills”.68 
   Having the British and Americans play the stereotypical roles of the “reactionary” and 
the forward-thinking “progressive” power respectively does little to further our understanding of 
the relationship of the allies in Saudi Arabia. The attitudes of the two allies vis-a-vis Saudi 
Arabia and Ibn Saud were by no means static and often defied categorization. Sometimes, the 
Americans seized the notion that the Kingdom was too antiquated to change. At other stages, 
British officials would argue that policies constructed for Saudi Arabia should be more 
contemporary, worthy of the country’s dynamic status as a fully independent Arab state.  
  The diplomatic historian Gaddis Smith has suggested that what all American 
policymakers wanted to ask their British counterparts during the Second World War was: “What 
have you been planning for the more liberal post-war world, which is what this war is ultimately 
all about”? 69 Based on Smith’s hypothetical question, it is easy to fall into the trap of believing 
that in Saudi Arabia, the United States was looking toward a bright future, while Britain gazed 
back at past achievements, hoping the country would enjoy its pre-war status after the war. 
British officials in Saudi Arabia were in fact on the same page with their American colleagues. 
They too realized that in order to remain a relevant actor, they would need to institute policies 
within the framework of the liberal post-war international order that they had helped to create. 
  One of the salient features of British foreign policy during this era was the country’s 
search for security. Although by the end of the Second World War, 200,000 British troops 
presided over the Suez Canal zone - a stronghold that was roughly the size of Wales - the 
troubles of maintaining such a substantial military presence, coupled with economic woes at 
home, meant that the British Government could not carry on as the Middle East’s sole regional 
policeman.
70
 From London’s point of view, endorsing closer Anglo-American collaboration in 
Saudi Arabia was part of addressing this strategic problem. Having established a formative 
presence in the Kingdom, Washington could now take on some of the burden of meeting the 
many requirements of the Saudi Arabian Government, with British interests being by extension 
reinforced and protected. Moreover, Britain supporting the United States’ commitment to Saudi 
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Arabia was yet another measure to encourage the Americans not to revert back to policies of 
isolationism.  
  At the same time, suspicion existed on the British side with regard to Washington’s 
proposal that both countries should be equally committed to subsidizing the Kingdom, even after 
1944 when the Axis threat in the Middle East had virtually disappeared. With Britain no longer 
having the economic resources to match the amount of the subsidies that the much richer United 
States was providing, the Foreign Office started wondering if this largesse was meant to be an 
exclusionary ploy. However, a far greater concern amongst British officials was that the 
modernising thrust of American policy was moving too quickly, threatening to have negative 
repercussions on Saudi Arabian society and fatally undermining the country’s essential 
sovereignty. This could ultimately result in the destabilization of the Al-Saud regime as well as 
Britain’s Middle East Imperia. With these misgivings in mind, British policymakers in their final 
conclusion accepted the trajectory of American policy, believing it to be worth the price of the 
wider benefits of Anglo-American cooperation. 
 Lord Beloff, author of Britain’s Liberal Empire, once argued that Britain gave way to 
American power during the Second World War, but maintained that the United States failed to 
reproduce the order and stability that accompanied Pax Britannica.
71
 Developing further Beloff’s 
contention, the United States government - despite being a rising superpower - was less 
confident in ability to act in places that it was largely unfamiliar with, such as Saudi Arabia. 
After years of neglecting the Arab Kingdom, the State Department had only managed to 
establish a legation in the country in May 1942. In contrast, Britain’s long-standing historical 
links with Saudi Arabia had given London an unmatched advantage when it came to influencing 
the policies of the country.  
   In retrospect, one aspect of the allied relationship that deserves further attention is the 
incentive of the United States to develop an Anglo-American partnership in Saudi Arabia. While 
anxiety existed that working closely with Britain might lead to the United States being painted 
with an “imperial” brush, having access to British statecraft and agency was also considered 
instrumental in elevating American influence in the Kingdom. Even with regard to the perception 
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that Britain may try to take over the American monopoly on Saudi Arabian oil, nationalist 
outcries were brushed aside in favour of dealing with the issue from a point of inter-allied 
cooperation. In the end, a consensus emerged among a wide range of policymakers on the 
American side holding that the sustained British influence in Saudi Arabia contributed positively 
to American oil security. 
 Numerous studies still primarily point to those episodes showing British and American 
authorities in confrontation rather than in collaboration. One noted example of this dynamic is 
the announcement by the American minister to Saudi Arabia, Alexander Kirk. In the summer of 
1944 he feared that Saudi Arabia was turning into an active ideological battleground between 
American and British world systems competing for a “stable world order”. Although this fiery 
quotation is widely cited, it is equally misinterpreted.
72
 Kirk did not say that Anglo-American 
competition was unavoidable in Saudi Arabia. Rather, his statement served as a prescient 
warning to American officials, imploring them to work more closely with their British colleagues 
in order that avoidable misunderstandings would not lead to greater recriminations.  
Indeed, two months after Kirk’s assessment, the American legation advocated strongly 
saying that Saudi Arabia presented “the best test case for concrete cooperation with the British in 
the Middle East and we should succeed in making it work here”.73 In London, the head of the 
Near East Department (NED) at the Foreign Office, C.W. Baxter, also made the exact same 
point: “To some degree Anglo-American cooperation in Jedda has become a test of the 
possibility of Anglo-American cooperation in the Middle East as a whole”.74 The message in this 
context is clear: the belief that Anglo-American cooperation in Saudi Arabia actively contributed 
to the broader aim of promoting regional political and economic stability.  
It is also important to note that cooperation did not solely emerge as an unwilling 
wartime necessity. Indeed, more attention needs to be paid to the fact that British and American 
policymakers revamped their efforts to coordinate policies even after the Axis threat dissipated 
in 1943. This is illustrated by the compacts agreed to by the two wartime allies culminating in 
the Anglo-American 50-50 Agreement, the Anglo-American Oil Agreement and the Stettinius 
Declaration that were all concluded in 1944. The objective of the allies to align policies in Saudi 
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Arabia was in all probability overly ambitious. The United States’ desire to strengthen the Saudi 
Arabian government ran parallel to its efforts to solidify its own position in the Kingdom. The 
expansion of Washington’s interest in post-war Saudi Arabia delineated more clearly the chasm 
separating British and American policy priorities. However, one cannot downplay the fact that in 
many instances throughout this period in Saudi Arabia, the United States and Britain 
subordinated their own national agendas for one that was in fact Anglo-American in nature.
75
  
*** 
This thesis offers a new interpretation of the state of Anglo-American relations in Saudi 
Arabia during the period 1941-1945. As the historiographical review has shown, historians of 
Anglo-American relations have generally tended to characterize the relationship as one of rivalry 
and polarization. My thesis, however, departs from this view arguing that when closely 
examined, this period - while demonstrating the limits of bilateral cooperation - more crucially 
points to the fact that Britain and the United States viewed favourably the reciprocal benefits that 
would flow from integrating their policies in Saudi Arabia. Rather than a struggle for dominance, 
the unique value of Saudi Arabia’s regional influence encouraged the search for an Anglo-
American partnership, one that can be described as being built on the concept of strategic 
interdependence. 
  While instances of underlying national rivalry can be spotted wherever the wartime 
alliance functioned, the force of commonalities binding the allies should neither be discounted. 
William Eddy, arguably the point of origin of Anglophobic sentiment as far as the American 
contingent goes, could still firmly state that the British were a “...very brave people at war. We 
can thank God we are Anglo-Saxons”.76 It is this emphasis on a shared bond that invariably 
jumps to the forefront and reveals a more textured picture, standing in contrast to traditional 
depictions of Saudi Arabia as an arena in which power politics reigned supreme and British and 
American worldviews clashed.  
  Under these conditions, the Anglo-American relationship in Saudi Arabia began with the 
need for the two countries to work together in the struggle of the Second World War and 
subsequently evolved to include many other important issues. Even though cooperation ebbed 
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and flowed and did not always meet British and American expectations, the continuous 
diplomatic efforts of the allies to forge an Anglo-American partnership in Saudi Arabia were 
ongoing throughout the war. Consequently, Britain and the United States continuously sought to 
eliminate their differences, ever mindful that their partnership would be necessary as they looked 
ahead to an uncertain post-war world. The complex character of the Anglo-American relations in 
Saudi Arabia for this reason defies easy categorisation and will be the subject of closer scrutiny 
in the chapters to follow. 
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Chapter I         
Setting the Stage: Anglo-American Relations and Ibn Saud 
prior to 1941 
 Introduction 
   
  The origins of Anglo-American relations in Saudi Arabia can be found by charting the 
pathways through which British and American influence took hold in the Kingdom preceding 
1941. Before Britain and the United States began their collaborative involvement in Saudi Arabia 
during the Second World War, their experiences in the country had largely existed independently 
from one another, with the British being more heavily engaged than their American counterparts. 
In many respects, their attitudes toward Saudi Arabia matched the priority that each country had 
placed on the Middle Eastern region in general. For policymakers in London, the Middle East 
was one of the most important dimensions of British foreign relations. Throughout the region, 
Britain’s unrivalled network of military installations, diplomatic posts, and commercial holdings 
effectively amounted to an “informal” empire that secured London’s imperial link to India, 
Southeast Asia and the Antipodes. Britain, in turn, took a keen interest in the rise of Saudi power 
that was sweeping the Arabian Peninsula. Despite occasional political differences, the Anglo-
Saudi relationship, dating back to the beginning of the twentieth century, was one of the 
foundations upon which the established order was built.  
  In comparison, the United States Government in the years prior to the Second World War 
had little to do with Middle Eastern affairs, or for that matter, Saudi Arabia. Instead, non-
governmental actors worked as the main conduits that fostered a viable American presence in the 
region. In this respect, the success of personal diplomacy, philanthropy and private commercial 
ventures were indirect, yet powerful areas of American influence which helped formalize nascent 
Saudi-American relations. Although it is difficult to find common ground between Britain and 
the United States in terms of their experiences dealing with Saudi Arabia, their interests there 
were inextricably bound less to a country, but more specifically to a person, the founder of the 
Kingdom, Ibn Saud.  
 Another objective of this chapter is to explore the Saudi king’s reputation as a statesman, 
his position within the context of the international crisis leading up to 1941 and what this meant 
36 
 
for Britain and the United States. Both countries were acutely aware of the regional role played 
by Ibn Saud, a role also realized by the Axis powers. From the perspective of the Axis powers, 
particularly Germany and Italy, Saudi Arabia was one of the few Arab states not to be under the 
official sway of either the British or French Empires. In this respect, the Kingdom was an open 
opportunity for the Axis countries to project their respective influence into the Middle East; a 
region of the world where their influence still lacked prominence. As Seth Arsenian, the scholar 
who worked in the Office of War Information during the war, makes clear, “to Germany, Italy 
and Japan, the destruction of British and Allied Power in the Middle East, or the winning of their 
side of any of the Middle Eastern state would have immeasurably increased their chances for 
success”.77 Therefore, this chapter argues Anglo-American cooperation in Saudi Arabia was in 
part a reaction to block the revisionist powers from further forging diplomatic links with the 
Kingdom. Providing much-needed stability in a region beset by turmoil, Ibn Saud’s rule in Saudi 
Arabia, joined with his status as an independent Arab ruler, made him an ideal candidate for 
combating the flood of Axis propaganda that targeted an Arab population already sceptical of 
British and American motives. 
 
Britain, the Middle East and Saudi Arabia: Pre-Second World War 
 
  From the perspectives of British and American official thinking, each country was prone 
to believe that it was held in greater favour when compared to other nations. When it came to the 
Middle East, this prevailing sentiment of national “exceptionalism” tended to run especially 
high. Looking first at Britain, the Pax Britannica long-established in the Arab World came 
affixed with a popular mythology that generations of Britons had relished. Reflecting on the 
belief that Britain enjoyed an intrinsic connection with the region and its people, the historian 
Geoffrey Moorhouse writes: 
 
“Though it had never been part of her Empire, no other European country had 
ever had the same patronizing connection with the Arab countries of the Middle 
East, No one else’s history has produced such a long string of figures to compare 
with Burton, Doughty, Stanhope, Lawrence, Thomas, Stark, Philby or Thesiger: 
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men and women with a mystical and romantic feeling of kinship with the Bedouin 
and the desert”.78 
 
  In political terms, as well, British influence in the Middle East predominated. Nominally 
independent, Egypt was still essentially a holding of the British Empire, under the thumb of a 
large contingent of British troops stationed in the Suez Canal zone.
79
 Similarly, Palestine, the 
Hashemite Kingdoms of Transjordan, and Iraq, were League of Nations mandates that had been 
transformed into key pillars of Britain’s imperial defense strategy.80 Lastly, circling the Arabian 
periphery, the Crown Colony of Aden, the Trucial Coast and Kuwait had been bound by treaty to 
the British Government since 1839, 1853 and 1899 respectively.
81
    
  Given Saudi Arabia’s location in the heart of Britain’s “informal” Middle Eastern 
empire, Britain’s close relationship with Ibn Saud leading up to the Second World War was an 
established fact. Speaking to the British minister in 1939, Ibn Saud claimed that there were two 
kinds of relationships between countries. At one end, there was the “the relationship of fear, fear 
of subjugation for the conquered,” and at the other end of the spectrum, there were associations 
like the one between Britain and Saudi Arabia, “based on mutual interest and co-operation”.82  
The initial British response had been mixed when Ibn Saud started to consolidate his power in 
the Nejd in 1902. Those British officials who dealt with Ibn Saud directly viewed him 
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favourably, but the opinions of Percy Cox, Political Resident of the Persian Gulf, and later 
Captain William Shakespear, Political Resident of Kuwait, ultimately pertained to British 
security in India rather than the wider Middle East. For those back in Whitehall at the Foreign 
Office, Ibn Saud continued to be observed as a peripheral figure in Arabian politics, a significant 
step below his rival, the Hashemite Sharif Hussein of Mecca.
83
 Expressing the prevailing view 
during the First World War, D.G. Hogarth, the famous Arabist who was at the time working for 
the Arab Bureau, noted: “It should not be forgotten that of the two, the Sharif and Ibn Saud; Ibn 
Saud is… the less powerful potentate and far less able to influence the present general Eastern 
situation in our favour”.84 While the British Government finally ended up backing Hussein to 
lead the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire, it is worth remembering that concurrently 
Britain also saw the potential strategic dividends of improving relations with Ibn Saud. Under the 
terms of the Anglo-Saudi Treaty of 1915, London recognized Ibn Saud’s authority in the Nejd 
and promised to protect him from foreign threats, while also offering a yearly subsidy and 
deliveries of modern weaponry.
85
 In return for British assistance, Ibn Saud would exploit those 
Arab vilayets under Ottoman authority by waging battle against his Eastern Arabian rival, the 
House of Rashid, a tribe in alliance with the Porte. Years later, a similar quid pro quo would 
come into effect during the Second World War that saw British largesse exchanged for Ibn 
Saud’s support of Allied interests. 
 Courting Ibn Saud during the First World War in the long run proved to be more valuable 
strategy than London’s well-known alliance with the Sharif.86 As relations with the erratic 
Hussein deteriorated in the early 1920s, Ibn Saud began to emerge as the more reliable regional 
ally. In this respect, the decision made in September 1924 not to intercede in the war between the 
Sharif and Ibn Saud was evidence of Britain's tacit approval of the Al Saud gaining control over 
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the Hedjaz.
87
Almost three years later in May 1927, Britain concluded the Treaty of Jeddah with 
Ibn Saud, a benchmark moment in Anglo-Saudi relations which was characterized by relative 
political equality.
88
 Under the treaty’s terms and conditions, Britain recognized the complete 
independence of the Kingdom of Hedjaz, Nejd and the Dependencies hoping to eliminate any 
colonial resentment which with their inequalities had marred London’s diplomatic relations with 
surrounding Arab states.
 89
 In this way, Ibn Saud’s political independence distinguished him as a 
willing associate to British hegemony rather than a vassal subjugated by it. This emphasis on the 
issue of sovereignty as outlined in the Treaty of Jeddah would become a recurrent theme in 
British policymaking towards Saudi Arabia during the Second World War.  
  After the treaty was signed, Ibn Saud’s close cooperation with the “infidel” British led to 
internal unrest amongst his most hardcore Wahabbi followers, the Ikhwan.
90
 In 1929, Britain’s 
timely military support - armoured cars and planes courtesy of the Royal Air Force - allowed Ibn 
Saud to crush the attempted coup by the Ikhwan, which had up to that point posed the most 
serious threat to his regime.
91
 Nonetheless, amid the vexed world of Middle Eastern politics, 
Britain and Ibn Saud naturally ran into conflicts of interests in the interwar period. Issues like 
Britain’s relationship with the Hashemite kingdoms, Palestine and contested territorial claims in 
the Arabian Peninsula in the 1930s were at times areas of contention. But these examples do not 
diminish the reality that Anglo-Saudi relations throughout the decade remained active and 
close.
92
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The United States, the Middle East, Saudi Arabia: Pre-Second World War 
 
Given that the United States’ involvement in the Middle East up to the Second World 
War remained meagre, the historical narrative to some degree has been cast in quixotic fashion; 
much of it based on what Michael Oren calls a shibboleth of “power, faith and fantasy”.93 
Wartime officials like William Donovan, founder of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), 
valued a certain paradox in which American influence arose from a policy of non-interference. 
The United States, according to this point of view, was distinct from other countries such as 
Britain because its aims in the region went beyond the thirst for power.
94
 In full self-
congratulatory mode, Donovan confidently told the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1942: 
 
 “…American prestige and influence in the Near East is still probably as high as 
ever. This results from a realization by the peoples of the Near East that the US 
has no territorial or vested economic interests in the area. Furthermore, since 
actions speak louder than words, this widespread goodwill toward the US has 
become what might be described as a deep-seated conviction on the part of the 
peoples in this area, due mainly to a century of American Missionary educational 
and philanthropic efforts that have not been tarnished by material motive or 
interest. No other member of the United Nations is in such a position”.95 
   
  The historian Fawaz Gerges perfectly captures the belief of American officials from 
Donovan’s generation who took it for the granted that the United States “established dynamic 
and cordial relations with Arabs and Muslims, who viewed America as a progressive island amid 
European reaction”.96 If the United States having this sort of altruistic interest in the region was 
indeed the case, it is still difficult to pinpoint a specific and coherent American foreign policy in 
the Middle East before the Second World War. Overall, in the 1930s the diplomatic apparatus of 
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the United States functioned on a far more insular basis, grouped with other nations that - 
according to B.J.C. McKercher - were “regional powers with regional interests”.97 The United 
States did not possess a network of military bases or diplomatic stations in the Middle East like 
their British counterparts. The paucity of the official American presence can be judged by the 
fact that the State Department, as late as 1944, had only three officers who specialized in Middle 
Eastern languages.
98
 Against this backdrop, the few mainstays of interwar American policy, 
which in fact existed in the region, centred largely on commercial trade, monitoring the Arab-
Jewish conflict in Palestine and fostering what was then referred to as “Arab goodwill”.99   
  Looking at the origins of the Saudi-American relationship, when the United States 
Government was considering whether to formally recognize the Kingdom, Wallace Murray, the 
chief of the Near East Division of the State Department, was told by the well-known Arab-
American intellectual, Ahman Rihani, that “Ibn Saud might be regarded as the greatest Arab 
since Mohammed himself”.100 But before extending diplomatic recognition to “the Government 
of King Ibn Saud” in February 1931, it is noteworthy that Washington first asked permission 
from London to do so.
101
 Understood to be a British sphere of influence, therefore early 
American interest in Ibn Saud and the Kingdom came not from the strategic policy enacted by 
the State Department, but had rather been fostered by the “personal diplomacy” of an American 
citizen named Charles Crane.
102
A former diplomat during the Taft and Wilson administrations, 
as well as one of America’s premier philanthropists, Crane had been closely involved with Arab 
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affairs for decades.
103
 In the Arab world, he had a well-known public profile owing to his work 
on the Crane-King commission in 1919, an American commission that had been highly critical 
of British and French policies towards the Arab territories of the former Ottoman Empire.
 104
  
   Despite visiting Saudi Arabia on his own initiative, Crane emerged as a de facto 
representative of the United States. The role that Crane took on was a success in that he managed 
to forge a close personal bond with Ibn Saud. In Jeddah, Crane was given an audience with Ibn 
Saud. The two men discussed ways in which Saudi Arabia’s natural resources could be 
developed and put to commercial use.
 One of Crane’s engineers, Karl Twitchell, who years later 
would be one of the key individuals to help initiate Anglo-American cooperation in Saudi 
Arabia, was given the task of surveying the Hedjaz for water and mining deposits.
105
 Based on 
the work of his geological surveys, Twitchell was later hired by the California - Arabian 
Standard Oil Company (CASOC) to assist Lloyd Hamilton, the president of the company, in 
negotiating the purchase of oil concessions with Ibn Saud in 1933. Scholars led by Robert 
Vitalis, however, are sceptical of Crane’s motives, believing that his philanthropy was a means 
in which to gain the rights to explore oil deposits in Saudi Arabia.
106
 Thomas W. Lippman takes 
the opposite point of view, contending that Crane’s offer showed Ibn Saud that Americans were 
“willing to help him and asked nothing in return”.107 In reality, Charles Crane’s motives probably 
falls somewhere in-between these diametrically opposed interpretations. But undoubtedly, Crane 
played a crucial role in creating an American identity in Saudi Arabia that portrayed the United 
States as a distant and neutral benefactor.  
 Nevertheless, in the decade of the 1930s, the American government’s contact with Ibn 
Saud was limited. The fact that in 1936, the American Consul General in Alexandria Egypt was 
sent to Jeddah to report on the potential advantages of opening an American legation, and came 
away concluding “that the development of American interests (in Saudi Arabia) does not warrant 
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the establishment of any sort of official representation” highlights this disconnect between the 
two nations.
108
 The more important and influential relationship during this time was the one 
between the American oil company CASOC and Saudi Arabia. Aaron David Miller has pointed 
out that the subject of Middle Eastern oil in the 1930s was “primarily a story of the oilmen 
themselves - of risks, maverick companies and potential profit”.109 Given the United States’ 
status at the time as the world’s largest exporter of oil, the development of a source of 
commercially viable oil in Saudi Arabia in 1938 received relatively scant attention from officials 
back in Washington. As will be shown in Chapter V, only after 1943 would the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, Navy, Department of Interior and State Department link the CASOC oil concession 
directly to the United States’ long-term national security. The Division of Near Eastern Affairs 
(NEA) at the State Department undoubtedly followed the progress of the oil concessions, yet it 
would not be until 1939 - under looming war clouds - that an American official would 
recommend naming a diplomatic minister to Saudi Arabia.  
 
 Ibn Saud during the Early Years of the Second World War: 1939-1940  
 
Besides being the premier independent Arab statesman, Ibn Saud’s reputation leading up 
the Second World War grew from the fact that he had almost single-handedly formed a nation in 
a place whose nomadic population, said one historian, lived for centuries in a state of “barbaric 
independence”.110 When Ibn Saud emerged as the head of the Wahabbist tribal dynasty, the 
House of Saud, which remains the core political power structure of the modern day kingdom - 
the concept of the nation-state had not yet arrived in the territories constituting modern day Saudi 
Arabia. The area had been set apart from the rest of the Middle East by a combination of 
geographic remoteness, harsh climate, and religious singularity. The strong-willed people living 
there, the Bedouin, knew of no governmental authority. They existed within a small community 
of disparate autonomous families or tribal organizations, in which the ghazzu (the raid) was a 
way of life. Even at the height of the Age of Imperialism, the two great foreign powers of the 
region kept away from the Arabian hinterland. Britain maintained a policy of non-intervention in 
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the Arabian interior, while the Ottoman Empire - having laid claim to this domain since the reign 
of Salim I in the 16
th
 century - exercised little tangible control over the area and the local emirs 
who held sway there.
111
  
 Given these conditions, Ibn Saud’s triumph of forging a modern nation state appears all 
the more remarkable. Beginning with his capture of Riyadh in 1902, over the next thirty years, 
Ibn Saud - in a series of military campaigns, along with shrewd political manoeuvring – unified a 
land divided by significant geographic, ethnic and economic differences. Under his leadership, 
the territories of the Nejd, Qasim, Hasa, Ha’il, Hedjaz and Asir all became annexed into a single 
political entity that would come to be known as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
112
 Whereas his 
Wahabbi predecessors had once been infamous due to their “fundamentalist” views, Ibn Saud 
was notably moderate in outlook towards friend and foe alike.
113
 The British explorer and 
diplomat, Gertrude Bell, who had witnessed his rise to power first hand, spoke for many of her 
British contemporaries when she praised Ibn Saud’s sangfroid and called him a “statesman”, 
which to her was the “final word of commendation”.114 As the famed Arab historian Phillip Hitti 
noted, “not since the days of the Prophet” had the region enjoyed such stability, public order and 
a sense of cohesiveness as it did during this time, and it was all a result of Ibn Saud’s “Pax 
Saudica”. 
*** 
When the British War Cabinet received a “top secret” memorandum on May 20, 1940 
from the Foreign Office - five days before the Anglo-French evacuation at Dunkirk – concerning 
the effects that the Allied reversals in Europe were having on the populations of the Middle East, 
the King of Saudi Arabia was brought to attention. Before that, however, the memo first warned 
that in the Arab world, “doubt was…becoming more widespread in recent weeks that the Allies 
will not win the war”. The potential collapse of the Anglo-French military alliance meant that the 
Allied position in the Middle East would come under greater threat from the Germans, Italians, 
colonial Vichy and internal Arab unrest. Making matters even worse, the Anglo-American 
wartime alliance was still in its infancy as the United States remained effectively neutral, which 
                                               
111
 Troeller, The Birth of Saudi Arabia- Britain and the Rise of the House of Sa’ud, pp. 13-23.  
112
 For a recent account on Ibn Saud’s consolidation of power between 1902 and 1903, see, Madawi, Al-Rasheed, A 
History of Saudi Arabia, pp. 37-39, pp. 41-46, pp. 66-68. 
113
 For an insightful historical examination of Ibn Saud and Wahabbism through the eyes of British officialdom, see 
BL: IOR R/15/5/116.  ‘Ibn Saud’, T.C. Fowle (Bushire) to JC Walton (The India Office) May 26, 1937. 
114
 Gertrude Bell, The Arab War: Confidential Information for General Headquarters from Gertrude Bell (Great 
Britain: Golden Cockerel Press, 1940) p.29. 
45 
 
seemed to rule out any chance of American armed forces coming to Britain’s aid. For all of the 
strikes against the British strategic position in the Middle East, however, the report highlighted a 
major advantage: “Ibn Saud remains friendly to the Allies”.115  
 Over the course of the Second World War and in the years afterward, Ibn Saud’s loyalty 
to the Allied cause continued to be recognized by British and American officials. In his meeting 
with the Saudi Arabian king at Great Bitter Lake in February of 1945, President Roosevelt 
praised Ibn Saud: “At a time when we had hardly dreamt of victory…you kept the Arabs 
peaceful, when your hopes of Allied victory were slender. By associating yourself with us, you 
showed the Arabs the right road that God is one...”116 Like Roosevelt, in a similar sentimental 
vein, Churchill recalled: “My admiration for him (Ibn Saud) was deep because of his unfailing 
loyalty to us. He was always at his best in the darkest hours”.117 Examining the record, what 
scholars have found is that belying the president and prime minister’s rhetoric, Ibn Saud’s 
allegiance to Britain and the United States although strong, was not necessarily preordained or 
exclusive. 
    The historians Donald Cameron Watt and Lucasz Hirskowicz have detailed in full the 
growth of German-Saudi ties right up to the hostilities of September 1939. Both historians stress 
that the two countries shared a bond due to their sympathy for the Arab Rebellion in Palestine.
118
 
In 1937, Ibn Saud had sent Saudi representatives to meet with German officials to discuss 
purchasing 15,000 rifles, but this transaction was likely less related to Palestine’s struggle, and 
more to do with the King’s lasting goal of establishing a modern Saudi Arabian army.119 At the 
same time, Berlin began pursuing an active German commercial presence in Saudi Arabia. 
Companies such as Krupp and Siemens competed directly with British and American firms for 
infrastructure contracts handed out by Riyadh to install water supply systems, electricity and 
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telegraphs.
120
 Fostering relations with Saudi Arabia from the perspective of Berlin was part of a 
Middle East strategy to ensure that in any future Anglo-German confrontation, Arab leaders like 
Ibn Saud would be either compelled to support the Axis position or at least take a position of 
neutrality.
121
 
In January 1939, Germany became the first country not affiliated with the Hajj to install 
its own diplomatic representative in Jeddah. Minister Dr. Fritz Grohba’s arrival was deemed by 
British officials in both Jeddah and London as “an anti-British move on the part of the German 
Government”. 122 In the opinion of Fritz Grohba, beneath Saudi Arabia’s supposed friendship 
with Britain, something darker lurked, summed up by the Bedouin proverb: “Kiss your enemy, if 
you cannot kill him”.123 A German press report at the time of Grohba’s visit hailed the dawn of 
Saudi-German accord: 
 
“A new era in the relations between Ibn Saud and Germany starts just at the   
moment when the Empire of Ibn Saud, thanks to the vast petrol and gold 
discoveries in the Arabian Peninsular (sic), is heading towards a period of 
economic progress to which Germany thanks to her ever closer relations with 
Arabia will contribute to the full extent of her powers”.124  
 
  While Germany attempted to open up more channels with Saudi Arabia, the scholar 
Massimiliano Fiore claims that for years Italy had been “waging a war by proxy” against 
Britain’s hegemonic standing in the Arabian Peninsula.125 In his posture as “protector of Islam”, 
the Arabian Peninsula held a special allure for Mussolini in his drive to creating a new “Roman 
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Empire.”126 After the Abyssinian crisis of 1936, Italian and British lines of imperial 
communication came into greater conflict in the Red Sea.
127
 What made British officialdom 
concerned was Ibn Saud’s pragmatic approach towards Italian imperialism. Having been one of 
the first countries to recognize the Italian annexation of Abyssinia, Saudi Arabia also exported 
foodstuffs, sheep and camels to Italy.
128
 In the summer of 1939, Riyadh had received a shipment 
of Italian arms at a minimal rate, which they were allowed to pay for in nine instalments.
129
 
Fearing Italy’s growing influence, the British minister to Saudi Arabia, Reader Bullard, was 
frustrated that Italy was able to supply Saudi Arabia with over 80,000 pounds of materiel, at a 
time when London was making excuses to Ibn Saud that there was not a “...a chip of cartridges 
to spare”.130 
  As much as these examples of German and Italian manoeuvring were alarming, it was 
Japan’s attempt to establish a diplomatic legation in Jeddah that redirected American policy 
towards Saudi Arabia. In the 1930s, a commercial relationship had slowly been developing 
between Saudi Arabia and Japan.
 131
 As early as 1934, Japan had practically become the sole 
exporter of cotton piece goods in Saudi Arabia since Japanese items were fifty percent cheaper 
than British goods.
132
 In the spring and early summer of 1939, an official Japanese delegation 
went to Saudi Arabia with terms to purchase oil concessions that according to the American 
geologist, Karl Twitchell were “as tempting as they were fantastic”.133 On June 30, 1939, Cordell 
Hull informed the president that the Japanese were looking for an oil concession agreement 
lasting a “period of sixty years covering practically all of Saudi Arabia”.134 In Riyadh, Twitchell 
had advised Ibn Saud to turn down the Japanese offer, figuring it to be masking Japan’s true 
motives, which were to gain “territorial concessions” from Saudi Arabia. However, based on 
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local intelligence gathered by the British Foreign Office, it was known that Ibn Saud had 
demanded too high a price, and it was the Japanese who eventually rejected the transaction.
135
 
  As if Japan’s concession hunting and the role it played in the Saudi Arabian economy 
were not alarming enough, the fear that the Japanese were somehow working in-step with 
German and Italian interests raised serious concerns in Washington. In May 1939, director of 
CASOC, Patrick Lenahan, notified the American minister in Cairo, Judge Bert Fish, that coupled 
with Grohba’s visit and the Italian propagandizing in Jeddah, the latest Japanese diplomatic 
overtures clearly indicated that “the Empire of the Sun” was “jointly working with the Germans 
and Italians”. 136 Fish reported to the State Department that no less than Ibn Saud believed that 
the revisionist countries had territorial ambitions in Saudi Arabia.137 Only five months earlier, the 
Japanese Minister to Egypt, Ohno, had half-jokingly remarked to the British Ambassador, Lord 
Killearn: “With Yemen under Italian Influence- the Hedjaz (Saudi Arabia) under German 
Influence, we will be able to check the French and British in the Red Sea”.138 Concerned about 
the potential dangers posed by the future Axis powers infiltrating the Arabian Peninsula, on July 
26, 1939, the State Department decided to accredit the American minister to Egypt to Saudi 
Arabia as well.  Once notified of the State Department’s decision to make Minister Fish the first 
American diplomatic representative to Saudi Arabia, the president wrote to Cordell Hull, 
“Excellent Idea-OK FDR”. 139  
       *** 
On June 17, 1939, a Saudi Arabian emissary named Khalid al-Wud Garghani had been 
granted a personal audience with the German Chancellor, Adolf Hitler. On one level, the meeting 
resulted in diplomatic success from the Saudi Arabian perspective. With regard to Ibn Saud’s 
lasting determination to establish a standing Saudi Arabian army, the Reich offered Saudi Arabia 
a gift of 4000 rifles, 2000 cartridges for each piece and a future credit for arms valued up to 
125,000 pounds.
140
 Whether Ibn Saud was ready to fully commit his country to an alliance with 
Germany and turn against Britain is an entirely different matter. Saudi-German ties in this era 
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were a manifestation of one of Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy priorities. Establishing diplomatic 
contacts with countries outside the yoke of British influence was a way for a new state like Saudi 
Arabia to assert its sovereignty, not only to itself, but also to rest of the world. 
 In its aftermath, the Garghani mission turned into a valuable source of intelligence for 
British officials. Garghani reports were shared with the British minister to Saudi Arabia, Reader 
Bullard. Although known afterwards for his pro-Axis sympathies, Garghani in a cable held that 
the German people showed a “secret dissatisfaction with the policy of their Government and its 
declaration of enmity towards England”. If war was declared, German officials feared internal 
revolt against the Government.
141
 From this point forward Saudi Arabia distanced itself from the 
Reich. Once Britain declared war on Germany, Ibn Saud refused the establishment of a German 
legation in Jeddah, and would not let Grohba return to Saudi Arabian soil.
142
 Other factors 
weighing on Ibn Saud that summer might have been the fact that Lord Killearn had pressured 
Egyptian authorities to withhold the 750,000 dollars worth of Saudi Arabian money banked in 
Cairo if the king became an ally of Germany.
143
 
In the summer of 1940 when the fortunes of the Allies were at low ebb, events in Saudi 
Arabia were carefully watched. For instance, British Naval Intelligence kept a close monitor of 
all wireless communications between Riyadh and Germany. Because even though Ibn Saud’s 
position was clearly pro-Ally, the British legation in Jeddah knew that some of his key advisors 
were not. It was believed that Al-Garghani and Fuad Hamza, the Saudi minister to Vichy, 
continued to be in contact with German officials.
144
 Furthermore, British agents working for the 
Bahrain Petroleum Company identified the German educated Salah Islam, the radio station 
announcer for the Saudi Arabian Government, as a local distributor of Axis propaganda.
145
 
 In July 1940, the American Vice Consul in Cairo, Raymond Hare cabled Washington, 
going so far to say that Saudi Arabia had turned pro-Axis. Hare told his colleagues that an 
American informant who visited the Kingdom on behest of British Overseas Airways 
Corporation had “gained the impression that King Ibn Saud is pro- German in sympathy and that 
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he might even enter the war against Great Britain”.146 However, it was hard to question Ibn 
Saud’s allegiance after Saudi authorities worked alongside British officials to arrest St. John 
Philby, the King’s long time western advisor on August 25, 1940. This was a major coup for the 
new British minister to Saudi Arabia, Hugh Stonehewer-Bird, who had complained that Philby, 
for years the bête noire of the British establishment, had been “openly indulging in disloyal and 
defeatist talk in both Allied & Neutral company...”147 Under restraint by Defence of India Rules 
Act, Philby was picked up in Karachi before he left for the United States on an Anti/British and 
pro-isolationist lecture tour.
148
  
At a time when the Allied grip on the Middle East was in the balance, regardless of 
earlier reports, London still considered Saudi Arabia to be a country friendly to British interests. 
In October 1940, British airbases in Habbinaya, oil installations in Mosul and Kirkuk and the 
Baghdad-Haifa road were being threatened by Arab nationalists with pro-Axis sympathies.
149
 
With this in mind, Lord Wavell, who as Commander-in-Chief of British forces in the Middle 
East, reasoned that the construction of the new Amman to Kuwait route would be safer if it went 
through Saudi Arabia rather than the 900 miles through unfriendly Iraqi hinterland. Wavell was 
backed by the British Ambassador to Iraq, Basil Newton, who also saw the advantages of Britain 
shifting its focus to Saudi Arabia when it came to regional strategy. “Ibn Saud,” said Newton, 
“fears the support which we at present give to Iraq…he must wish that some of the money which 
we have spent on the development of Iraq as now with the Baghdad-Haifa Road could have 
accrued to Saudi (Arabia)”.150 That same month, London ordered Colonel Gerald De Gaury, an 
army specialist in Arab tribal related matters, to Riyadh to take stock of Ibn Saud’s views on the 
war. He came away with the sense that the King had no intention of re-orientating Saudi 
Arabia’s foreign policy in favour of the Axis. In fact, De Gaury requested to be withdrawn early 
from his mission after he found the King’s support for the Allied cause “entirely satisfactory”. 
He later briefed the American officials in Cairo, praising Ibn Saud as “absolutely first-class” and 
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“the perfect intelligence officer” with a firm eye on all local intrigues taking place in his 
Kingdom.
151
  
 Still, historians like David Howarth, put forward the argument that Ibn Saud acted less 
than heroically in the face of the Axis menace. “Even the least critical of his admirers,” states 
Howarth, “could not have found anything glorious in his conduct in Hitler’s war. He simply did 
nothing”.152 Robert Lacey takes a similar line asserting that that the king excelled as a statesman 
during the Second World War in his “advances towards Hitler and Mussolini, behind the back of 
his British and American friends”.153 Yet, accepting Ibn Saud’s behavior during this time as self 
serving and disingenuous lacks subtlety and fails to take into account a number of issues. Firstly, 
the man in charge of Britain’s engagement with Saudi Arabia during the 1930s, George Rendell, 
strongly opposed such a notion. He observed years later that it was “misleading and 
mischievous” to say that Ibn Saud viewed Britain and the United States no differently than Nazi 
Germany and Mussolini’s Italy. In the case of Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy, Rendell contended 
that “obviously any weak country (Saudi Arabia), jealous of its independence, will to some 
extent play off its potential enemies against each other”.154 
  Secondly, Britain and later the United States perceived the underlying meaning behind 
Ibn Saud’s actions and saw it in a positive light. What will be discussed more fully in chapter II, 
the stance of neutrality taken by Ibn Saud was in actuality a form of “benevolent neutrality” 
which leaned heavily toward the wartime alliance rather than the Axis. Furthermore, if Ibn Saud 
had decided to fall into line and join the Allied cause as an ill-equipped belligerent, he would be 
perceived as an Allied stooge. He would lose all credibility with many of his co-religionists, the 
same people that British and American governments sought to influence through him. Under the 
banner of neutrality, however, Ibn Saud as one of the rare independent Arab leaders appeared 
resolute and influential. The King shrewdly understood the value of appearances. British and 
American officials used this awareness, and considered it to be of paramount importance in the 
battle of propaganda that was so critical during the Second World War.
155
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 Indeed, drawing Ibn Saud into the Anglo-American orbit was part of further engraving 
the distinctions between the friends of the Allies and their “pagan” Axis adversaries. Explaining 
how the King separated Saudi theocracy from the authoritarianism associated with fascism, 
Reader Bullard wrote to the Foreign Office: “To him (Ibn Saud) there is a fundamental 
difference between the theocracy of Saudi Arabia and the despotism, tempered neither by the 
fear of God nor readiness to listen to human advice, of a man like Hitler”.156 Looking back to 
that fateful day, September 1, 1939, the Ministry of Information in London stressed the 
significance of Saudi Arabia in the conflict that lay ahead, or more precisely the influential reach 
of Ibn Saud:  
 
“The main lesson to be learnt from the experiences of 1914-1918 is the importance of 
gaining the sympathy and help of the Leaders in each region and working as far as 
possible through them. Arabia is as whole, still largely tribal and there is little 
enlightened and independent opinion amongst the masses. What Ibn Saud thinks, for 
instance, the rest of the Nejd and the Hejaz thinks too”.157 
    
  This point would be particularly relevant when it came to the Allies’ delicate position 
regarding Palestine. Despite the assurances provided by the British Government’s White Paper 
of 1939, an Allied victory ensured the creation of some form of a Jewish state in Palestine 
against the will of the local Arab majority. At this time, the German wireless station, The Voice 
of Free-Arabism reached Saudi Arabian listeners and gave full expression to Axis support for 
Arab nationalism and Arab aspirations in Palestine. 
158
 The British Legation became alarmed at 
the inroads that German propaganda had made with regard to the poorer segments of the Saudi 
Arabian population. Although in his recent study, Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World, Jeffrey 
Herf claims that Ibn Saud welcomed the content of Berlin’s message, the king’s personal 
intervention in muzzling the influential Ulema of Mecca, who were reported to be “solidly pro-
German,” was greatly appreciated by British officials.159 Six weeks after Britain declared war on 
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Germany, Bullard reported to the Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, that “having taken up an 
attitude of neutrality so benevolent towards the Allies, it is natural that Ibn Saud should desire 
that Palestine should cease to be a cause of irritation to the Arab world”.160 As an indication of 
things to come, Bullard’s words augur what would draw the wartime alliance further into the 
Kingdom’s affairs; transforming Ibn Saud’s influence and “benevolent neutrality” into a viable 
strategic asset.  
 
Conclusion  
 
  This chapter’s aim has been to present the different approaches taken by Britain and the 
United States in their evolving relations with Ibn Saud before 1941. These histories are 
instructive for understanding how the wartime alliance carried out its policies towards Saudi 
Arabia in the years to come. Britain’s hegemonic rise in the Middle East ran parallel with Ibn 
Saud’s consolidation of his own power in the Arabian Peninsula. The lessons that can be drawn 
from this era are that unlike the British Government’s attitude towards other Arab states, it did 
not act in an imperious manner towards Ibn Saud. Instead, the prevailing trend observed in 
Anglo-Saudi relations can be considered the opposite; a strategic partnership noted for its mutual 
respect. British power indirectly facilitated and strengthened Ibn Saud’s rule, while the Saudi 
Arabian King’s moderate leadership contributed to the stability of Pax Britannica. Conversely, 
before the Second World War, on a formal level between governments, the relationship between 
the United States and Saudi Arabia had been minimal, but the contacts made with Ibn Saud by 
individual American nationals in the 1930s, such as Charles Crane and the oil company CASOC 
helped cement an association between the two nations.  
 When the Second World War arrived in 1939, Ibn Saud by virtue of his independent 
position appeared as the premier Arab leader. Indeed, the Allies and the Axis realized that the 
“Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques” could be a major asset when it came to the propaganda 
war that was being waged between the two sides. Although Germany and Italy made a 
substantial bid to gain Ibn Saud’s friendship, in the critical early stages of the Second World 
War, the King decided to distance his kingdom from the enticements of the Axis. He realized 
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that Saudi Arabia could be a more influential presence in the region’s dangerous political climate 
by remaining officially neutral, whilst at the same time tacitly siding with Britain and her allies. 
The advantageous exchange apparent in Anglo-Saudi relations, the unofficial, behind-the-scenes 
personal contact marking Saudi-American relations and Ibn Saud’s position of “benevolent 
neutrality” towards the Allies, would all at once emerge in 1941 as key pillars of the early phase 
of Anglo-American cooperation in Saudi Arabia. 
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Chapter II         
 Anglo-American Relations in Saudi Arabia 1941 
Introduction 
 
    In the spring of 1941, it can be said that Anglo-American cooperation in Saudi Arabia 
began in earnest. For months, British and American interests relating to the Kingdom converged 
as Axis influence in the Middle East grew in scale. From the perspective of British and American 
officials, Ibn Saud shared the allies’ interest in keeping the Axis powers at bay. The weight given 
to Saudi Arabia in terms of allied strategy was, however, at odds with the country’s anaemic 
economic state at the time. Wartime conditions had a crippling effect on the Saudi Arabian 
economy, undercutting the institution that generated the Kingdom’s greatest source of income, 
the Hajj. “Since the rise of Islam”, Philip Hitti noted, “the Hajj formed the principal link between 
Arabia and the other outer world”. In 1941, this to a great extent still rang true in cultural, 
political and economic terms.
161
 Up to this point in history, the Hajj kept the Saudi Arabian 
Government solvent, but the dangers of wartime travel severely curtailed the pilgrimage, thereby 
shrinking the revenue raised from it. Unless Riyadh received financial aid to offset this situation, 
Ibn Saud’s own authority could be undermined, and his position as an important regional ally 
could be lost. Moreover, if Britain or the United States did not act promptly, an even darker 
scenario might come to pass: the Axis powers would fill the void by coming to Saudi Arabia’s 
aid.   
   When the White House and the State Department considered offering Lend-Lease aid to 
Saudi Arabia, it appeared logical to policymakers that the provision of subsidies to a country 
located in the heart of Pax Britannica would naturally need the logistical assistance of the 
British. When questions arose as to whether Lend Lease aid overstepped the wartime neutrality 
of both Saudi Arabia and the United States, British and American officials found indirect ways to 
effectively support Ibn Saud, which at this early stage in 1941 already showcased the 
interdependent workings of Anglo-American relations. The British Government came to the aid 
of the Roosevelt administration by offering a series of subsidies to Ibn Saud that politically 
Washington could not grant. The United States’ official position of wartime neutrality made 
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American policy in Saudi Arabia non-committal. Thus, for their part achieving American policy 
aims was to a large extent left to the Foreign Office in London. Later in the autumn of 1941, the 
two allies however reversed roles. An American agricultural mission that was to be dispatched to 
Saudi Arabia was approved by Washington, a move that dovetailed neatly with the British policy 
aim of strengthening the Al-Saud regime. London saw the value of the United States becoming 
more actively involved in Saudi Arabia in order that the country would not be stigmatized as 
being a creature of British Imperialism. Additionally, in order to protect the Kingdom’s wartime 
neutrality, it was far less contentious for a fellow neutral state such as the United States to set up 
a mission on Saudi Arabian soil than for a belligerent power such as Britain to do so.   
Along with strategic interdependence playing a significant role in making Anglo-
American cooperation a valuable commodity in Saudi Arabia, this chapter focuses on two other 
notable themes which illustrate how the wartime alliance’s actions in that country evolved and 
functioned. The Second World War necessitated British and American policymakers to carefully 
involve themselves in Saudi Arabia, making sure not to undermine a major aspect of the 
Kingdom’s strategic value in the form of its inestimable sovereign status. The last theme, which 
also runs as a red line throughout the rest of this thesis, pertains to the fact that wartime strategy 
had an overriding influence on Anglo-American relations in Saudi Arabia. Thus, formerly 
separate British and American agendas in Saudi Arabia in 1941 merged into a shared Anglo-
American approach, hinging on the desire to align Ibn Saud firmly within the Allied camp of 
nations.  
 
The Hajj and the Wartime Economic Woes of Saudi Arabia 
 
While Britain and the United States were drawn to Ibn Saud’s independent leadership in 
the early years of the Second World War, the structural weakness of Saudi Arabia’s economy 
jeopardized it. When the New York Times reported on Bert Fish’s appointment as the first 
American minister to Saudi Arabia in 1939, the newspaper observed, “dates and Arab clocks” 
kept the country’s economy afloat. 162 Saudi Arabia had no industry, according to the scholar 
Michael Stoff, except for the “manufacture of ornamental swords and knives, rudimentary 
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leather making and some rug weaving”. 163 Furthermore, with virtually no agricultural sector, the 
Saudi Arabian government depended on acquiring cheap foodstuffs such as rice, wheat, sugar, 
tea and textiles from the country’s primary trading partner, the Government of India, which by 
extension meant the British Empire.
 164
 Nothing in Saudi Arabia resembled a financial system of 
a modern state. The historian Phillip Khoury claims that during this time “there was no real 
differentiation between public and private purses” although the Government had in place a 
poorly structured state exchequer, bait-al-mal. Speaking about the Kingdom’s finances, one 
British official wrote that Saudi Arabia was “not unlike the England of King Charles II, with the 
pleasing difference that the King does not have to ask parliament for money”.165 Yet unlike the 
English king, who had the bankroll to live an extravagant life style, at the start of the Second 
World War, economic hardship marked Ibn Saud’s rule.   
 More than anything else, the annual Hajj balanced the books for the Saudi Arabian 
treasury. When Ibn Saud was still an Amir of the Nejd in the early 1920s, his annual revenue 
hovered near a total of 100,000 pounds. After he conquered the commercially rich Hedjaz 
territory where the Islamic Holy Cities were located, Ibn Saud’s wealth rose to between four to 
five million pounds. This substantial income boost gave the Al-Saud the economic clout to 
initiate a complicated system of patronage that helped incorporate its authority throughout the 
rest of the Arabian Peninsula.
166
 On the back of revenues from the Hajj, tribal sheiks were 
subsidized with monies and gifts in return for their allegiance to the Al-Saud. According to Hafiz 
Wahba, the Saudi Arabian Ambassador to London, Ibn Saud housed over 10,000 permanent 
guests in Riyadh during the 1930s, including chieftains, prisoners and Bedouins.
167
  
At the onset of the Second World War, the Hajj was now adversely affected by 
deteriorating travel conditions worldwide. Starting in 1939, Ibn Saud became deeply concerned 
over the damaging impact that German propaganda was having on the Hajj. German wireless 
stations broadcasted false claims that the British Government had forbidden Indians to make the 
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pilgrimage because of an Allied quarantine set up in the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea.
168
 The 
annual number of pilgrims making the journey to Mecca fell by 4/5
th
 in the first two years of the 
war.
169
 Being one of the nation’s few generators of wealth, a now reduced Hajj meant that the 
Saudi Arabian Government had little foreign exchange at its disposal to purchase basic food 
imports. As one report from the British legation in Jeddah observed, the Hajj anchored the 
country’s overall stability: “If there is no pilgrimage, the Hejaz starves and becomes even more 
discontented than usual”.170  
 With wartime conditions now making the passage to Mecca and Medina more 
problematic than ever, the Saudi Arabian Government faced another challenge. A severe 
drought, which began in 1939, was still affecting the entire Nejd region and the eastern part of 
the country.
171
 Local transport ground to a halt, while grazing pastures all but perished. Writing 
in his diary about the drought, H.R.P. Dickson, now the British Political Agent of Kuwait, 
reported that 200 miles south of Hail “...sheep and camels which have died of starvation are 
being regularly eaten by the hungry everywhere, though forbidden by religion”.172Having no 
modern state infrastructure, Saudi Arabia and its dispersed populations depended on a single 
supply route stretching 1000 miles of vast desert separating the Red Sea and Persian Gulf.
173
 
Taking in all these considerations, the Hajj helped to keep Saudi Arabia stable and by extension 
bolstered the Allied presence in the Middle East.  
*** 
 Before the British and American governments stepped in and began subsidizing Saudi 
Arabia, the American oil company CASOC had already acted. When hostilities broke out in the 
autumn of 1939, CASOC loaned the Saudi Arabian government $1,500,000, followed by 
approximately $4,000,000 in 1940, which constituted the country’s annual budget. The loan 
provided by CASOC was to be repaid by the Saudi Arabian government through revenue 
accrued from future oil discoveries. As CASOC was still not ready to take full responsibility for 
subsidizing Saudi Arabia at this stage, the company went on to limit the total loan for 1941 to 
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US$3,500,000.
174
 With the 1941 budget almost entirely composed of loans, from the Allies’ 
vantage point, it might seemed that this state of financial dependency would subsume Saudi 
Arabia and damage Ibn Saud’s image as a self-reliant and sovereign leader. Such a scenario 
would have the correlative effect of undermining the king’s capacity to play a substantial role in 
regional affairs.   
 However, as the Kingdom struggled financially, the British Government - the only body 
that possessed the institutional capacity to make a true difference at the time - came to the 
conclusion that the situation in Saudi Arabia needed to be effectively addressed. After meeting 
with one of Ibn Saud’s closest advisors, Sheik Yussef Yassin, Gerald De Gaury gave a telling 
description to the Foreign Office of how the Saudi Arabian Government believed it could fix the 
country’s financial problems by playing up the Kingdom’s serviceability to the Allied cause. 
Spelling out what he believed to be Yassin’s thought process, De Gaury wrote, “I believe that it 
is his (Yassin’s) intention to plant in our minds something like the following idea”: 
 
“Iraq is unreliable, the French are mismanaging things in Syria, Palestine is 
troublesome. The only strong man, Ibn Saud, the “friend of Britain” who can put 
this right and bring the Arab States into line, so that they can make a stand 
against our enemies is powerless because he has no modern army and insufficient 
money. If we give him 1 ½ million pounds a year and some modern equipment he 
would save the day for us when the time comes”.  175 
 
 
   Given this analysis, it is no surprise then that the size of the subsidy given by De Gaury 
covered the Saudi Arabian Government’s deficit for the upcoming year.176 In 1940, London 
offered 300,000 pounds sterling and more importantly 10,000,000 newly minted riyals at a face 
value close to $3 million dollars.
177
Minting riyals was crucial in combating the currency 
hoarding that was taking place throughout Saudi Arabia at the time. As shown in the previous 
chapter, the experiences of the previous war in several respects served as a very similar model 
for Anglo-Saudi relations in the Second World War. With this historical precedent firmly 
established, British largesse in exchange for Ibn Saud’s tacit sympathy for Allied interests was a 
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compelling quid pro quo. But in 1941, Saudi Arabia’s budget would have a deficit of 
$6,000,000, even with the combination of British funds and CASOC loans.
178
 With this inimical 
economic situation having become a fact in the Kingdom, and Britain being under the strain of 
financing the costs of fighting a global war, the time had come for the United States Government 
to act decisively in Saudi Arabia.  
 
US Involvement, Karl Twitchell and Anglo-American Relations in Saudi Arabia 
 
  Surveying the strategic relationship that was budding between Britain and the United 
States in early 1941, David Reynolds writes that “the cords that bound the two countries were 
becoming thicker, more tangled and more secure”.179 In secret, over the course of two months 
stretching from January 29
th
 to March 29
th,
 British and American war planners convened in 
Washington to discuss strategic priorities and contingency plans relating to overall Allied 
strategy. These ‘American-British Conversations’ - also known as the ABC talks - had confirmed 
that by the spring of 1941 Anglo-American relations had fully become a global affair.
180
 This by 
extension meant that in the fight to secure Allied standing in the Middle East the unfolding 
financial crisis in Saudi Arabia had transformed into an Anglo-American dilemma. 
Yet, the historical narrative dealing with the earliest stages of wartime Anglo-American 
cooperation centring on 1941 has been mainly built on studies concentrating on the subject of 
Middle East oil.
181
 Barry Rubin, one of the few historians who have singularly focused on 
Anglo-American relations in the Kingdom at this juncture, claims that the impulse that drew the 
allies together was the fact that “London was trying to increase American political involvement 
in Saudi Arabia against the will of the State Department and the White House”.182 Rubin’s 
observations bring to mind a broader theme dealt with in the historiography of the wartime 
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alliance; the underlying resentment felt by Americans over having to indirectly fight for Britain’s 
imperial interests.
183
  
  However, the argument that the State Department and the White House should allegedly 
have been completely opposed to involvement in Saudi Arabia is an unconvincing one. With 
regard to the former, the State Department did not have a singular stance, but rather held multiple 
strands of thinking given the institution’s bifurcated structure. In fact, the officials who headed 
the NEA, which was responsible for American relations with Saudi Arabia, Wallace Murray - 
chief since 1929 - and his deputies Paul Alling and Gordon Merriam pressed for closer 
coordination with their British counterparts. Indeed, one sees at this early stage in the war that 
American policymakers matched British officials in terms of the weight that they attached to the 
argument that Ibn Saud was  a crucial player for the Allied cause in the Middle East, thereby 
setting the stage for further exploring commonalities. In the spring of 1941, at time when the 
entire Allied position in the Middle East hung in the balance, speaking to the Assistant Secretary 
of State, Adolf Berle, Murray maintained that Britain and the United States had to act quickly 
and decisively in Saudi Arabia.
184
  
   With regard to the White House’s interest in joining Britain in subsidising Saudi Arabia 
in 1941, it had been American oilmen who worked outside of Wallace Murray’s NEA that 
piqued the president’s attention. The most notable one, James Andrew Moffett, was a well-
known oil industry insider and a prominent New Dealer, who had also been a personal friend of 
Roosevelt for decades.
185
 In April 1941, working on behalf of CASOC, Moffett appealed directly 
to the president for him to consider having the United States Government subsidize Ibn Saud’s 
regime. If the Ibn Saud’s regime collapsed due to Saudi Arabia’s ongoing economic trouble, in 
Moffett’s mind, such a scenario could mean that “perhaps the entire Arab world will be thrown 
into chaos”.186  
  Moffett also emphasized to Roosevelt the wider strategic implications that came with 
assisting the Arab leader. Such an approach meant that in the future, the United States and 
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Britain could count on the Saudi Arabian king with regard to the Palestine issue and obtain his 
influential political support for the creation of a post-war Jewish state. This came at a time when 
the American minister in Palestine, George Wadsworth, concluded that 4/5 of the Arab populace 
wished for an Axis victory, with Germany continuing to do everything in its power to exploit the 
schism.
187
 On top of the concerns mentioned above, Moffett also stressed the fact that supplying 
Saudi Arabia with funds went hand in hand with protecting the American petroleum interests that 
were anchored in that country. With Lend Lease having been enacted a month earlier, Moffett 
pressed the president to use this existing legislation to offer a helping hand to the Saudi Arabian 
King on March 11, 1941.
188
  
  However, it is the overlooked role of another American, Karl Twitchell, who was at this 
point working outside of the State Department, which should be studied more closely when 
analysing the early years of Anglo-American cooperation in Saudi Arabia. Being the geologist 
who once led Charles Crane’s survey of the Hejaz, Twitchell was one of the early American 
pioneers to settle in Saudi Arabia.
189
 By 1941, he worked as a consultant for the American 
Smelting and Refining Company (formerly known as the Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate), a 
company owned by both American and British business interests.
190
 At this stage, Twitchell can 
be best described as a quasi-official of the American government, who - like J.A. Moffett - was 
able to jump back and forth between government and the private sector, thereby blurring the line 
between his personal business interests and what was in the national interest of the United 
States.
191
  
  The contributions that Twitchell would make in terms of facilitating Anglo-American 
cooperation were based on him having become a fixture of the expatriate community in Jeddah 
during the decade preceding the war.
192
 During this time he had also gained the trust of Saudi 
Arabian officials through his privileged relationship with Ibn Saud. 
193
 Whether it was true or 
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not, Twitchell had often been told by the King that he was not considered a “foreigner”.194 
What’s more, Twitchell’s interaction with Ibn Saud’s inner circle served him well in his dealings 
with members of the British legation in Jeddah. He had become a close confidant of the British 
minister to Saudi Arabia in 1941, Hugh Stonehewer-Bird, as well as Gerald De Gaury and 
Brigadier General Stephen Longrigg.
195
 Speaking of Stonehewer-Bird, Twitchell would write in 
his diary: “If all English abroad were like him there would be no-anti British feeling”.196 
Likewise, his British counterparts considered him to be a rare American, who was truly 
knowledgeable in the affairs of the Saudi Arabian government. Given his breadth of experience, 
Twitchell proceeded to become a leading “point man” for the United States government, and in 
the process, he helped to transform Saudi Arabia into an Anglo-American issue.  
  In Karl Twitchell’s mind, the time had come for Washington to follow Britain’s example 
and offer support to Ibn Saud. Having returned to the United States in May 1941, Twitchell in 
the coming months would use his own version of shuttle diplomacy to make the case that the 
United States should follow Britain’s lead by supporting the Arab king. Travelling from his 
home in Long Island to Washington, Twitchell on his own accord met with the Lend-Lease 
supporter, Senator Warren Austin, the Vice-President Henry Wallace and Henry Field, the famed 
“Anthropologist to the President,” all well-known personalities whom he felt could rally the 
American government’s support behind the Kingdom.197 It was Field, who told Twitchell at a 
luncheon that same month that Roosevelt had personally expressed a great interest in the current 
situation in Saudi Arabia.
198
  
  On May 14, 1941, Twitchell – still acting as a private citizen – met with Gordon 
Merriam, a State Department official working at the NEA, who would go on to cover Saudi 
Arabia throughout the Second World War. They discussed the ongoing political trouble in the 
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Middle East, and the two men were in agreement about “the present importance of keeping King 
Ibn Saud pro-British or at least neutral”.199 That month, British forces alongside Pasha Glubb’s 
Arab Legion were fighting in Iraq to stamp out a pro-Axis coup led by the Arab nationalist 
Rashid Ali- Gaylani.
200
 At the same time, on a wider scale, the entire British position in the 
region was under further duress after Erwin Rommel’s Afrika Korps had pushed British forces 
out of Libya and were preparing to invade Egypt.
201
  
  Considering options that would help ease the strained British war effort in the Middle 
East, Twitchell put forward an idea to the effect that the United States government should 
bankroll Ibn Saud, which would provide a degree of additional insurance as regards preserving 
the king’s friendly attitude toward the Allies. At first, Twitchell proposed granting a subsidy to 
an excess of 10,000,000 gold dollars to Saudi Arabia along with funds for an agricultural mission 
that would be organized by the State Department.
202
 The idea of an agricultural mission 
originated from Ibn Saud himself, who had discussed the issue personally with Twitchell back in 
August 1940.
203
 For the time being, Twitchell saw the mission clearly in terms of wartime 
strategy, believing that it “might be very beneficial in terms of nullifying German efforts” in 
Saudi Arabia, while providing further proof to Arab peoples of Allied beneficence.
204
 
  The week preceding Merriam’s request for a second meeting with Twitchell on May 26, 
1941 was a contentious one in Anglo-American relations. Negotiations over the terms of the 
Lend-Lease programme had gone poorly as the iconoclastic style of John Maynard Keynes - 
representing the views of the British Treasury - had not meshed well with that of his American 
colleagues.
205
Against this testy political backdrop, although the State Department was 
“favourable” to some type of loan being offered to Saudi Arabia, Merriam let Twitchell know 
that it would be politically advantageous if “the British should increase their subsidy showing 
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evidence of concern before USA govt. would make loan”.206 Such a move would hush those 
American critics who felt that London was mischievously drawing the United States into another 
one of Britain’s “imperial” problems.  
 On the next day, May 27, 1941, Twitchell, now with the backing of the State Department, 
made a visit to the British Embassy. He knew first hand that logistically speaking the only way 
that American assistance to Saudi Arabia could be put into effect was by working in 
collaboration with British authorities. Neville Butler, the British Counsellor, gave Twitchell a 
warm welcome. On this occasion, Butler found an American who virtually echoed his own 
sentiments. Twitchell told him that “Ibn Saud was leader of 200,000,000 Moslems and 
80,000,000 being in India...”, and if this mass of people stretching from the Maghreb to China 
“...turned pro-Axis they could do immense harm”.207Attesting to this evidence, the recent Iraqi 
revolt, thought to be the handiwork of a pro-Axis underground that operated in the country, had 
still been fresh in everyone’s mind. Considering the troubles experienced by the Allies in the 
Middle East, the provision of additional aid for Ibn Saud was considered vital. 
  But even in the face of these compelling reasons for providing aid, Butler insisted that 
Twitchell should further justify why Ibn Saud sought out these “simple presents”. Providing the 
king with direct financial aid, Twitchell argued, would allow for “regular government (Saudi 
Arabian Government) maintenance” and the extra amounts of cash would “keep down any 
internal disturbance fomented by Germans, plus policing Transjordan, Irak, Kuwait frontiers and 
Yemen borders where the Italians were working hard to make trouble between Imam Yahia and 
Ibn Saud”.208 Rapidly gaining confidence in his role as a pseudo-diplomat, Twitchell tactfully, 
but forcibly, presented his request to Butler. If the United States Government was to issue a loan 
and fund an agricultural mission, the pertinent question was whether the British Government 
would augment their own subsidy, an act that would show American sceptics why it was 
important to help a far-off kingdom in the Arabian Peninsula. Butler listened and gave his word 
that he would forward a message to the Foreign Office explaining the American request. To 
show good faith, Butler would go on to share the content of the cable with Gordon Merriam at 
the State Department.
209
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British and American Efforts to Aid Saudi Arabia: June to September 1941 
 
  Efforts to expand American aid to Saudi Arabia continued to move forward in the 
summer of 1941. In Jeddah, the British minister Hugh Stonehewer-Bird was pleased to see the 
United States’ new focus on the Kingdom, knowing that an American intervention would 
alleviate the tension of Ibn Saud being solely dependent on British handouts.
210
 In this respect, 
the United States had an opportunity to play a pivotal part serving as a buffer between Pax 
Saudia and Pax Britannica. The entry of the United States onto the Saudi Arabian political stage 
from Stonehewer-Bird’s perspective created a win-win game for all three parties involved. The 
United States could build up its association with Ibn Saud, while from London’s view, greater 
American involvement helped to dispel concerns in the Arab world that Britain harboured 
unilateral imperialist designs on the Kingdom. Meanwhile, by diversifying its relations with 
another power such as the United States, Saudi Arabia could keep its pretences of sovereignty 
and independence on which its legitimacy rested. On June 4, 1941, Stonehewer-Bird informed 
Lloyd Hamilton of CASOC that London was committed to lending Ibn Saud an extra 200,000 
pounds in the upcoming year.
211
 
  Back in Washington, a week later, on June 11, 1941, Twitchell met with James Moffett. 
According to Twitchell’s diary, Moffett claimed that Harry Hopkins told him that a decision 
from the White House on Saudi Arabia would come in “48 hours”, and that he “could short 
circuit and rush this matter as the president said go ahead”. The American aid, according to 
Hopkins, would likely consist of an estimated cash loan of $4 million, with US$2 million 
earmarked for goods and equipment and $50,000 a year for the cost of the Agricultural mission. 
212
 At the end of two days, Moffett still had no news from the White House, but even a week 
later, Moffett was still confident enough to insist to his colleagues that the president had given 
the “green light”. He had been told that Jesse Jones, the Secretary of Commerce and Federal 
Loan Administrator, was pushing it through the bureaucratic machine.
213
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 Later that June, Alexander Kirk, whose duties as United States minister in Egypt also 
covered Saudi Arabia, received a formal request from Riyadh for American assistance. In his 
cable to the State Department, Kirk urged greater American action, stating that “the importance 
of insuring the sympathy of the Arab world at this time cannot be too strongly emphasized and 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the logical field for American endeavour in that regard”.214 The 
Saudi Arabian question reached a crescendo, on July 1, 1941, when the British Ambassador to 
the United States, Lord Halifax, who was accompanied by Neville Butler, met to exchange views 
with Cordell Hull. During their discussion, Hull made the suggestion that Britain should increase 
its financial assistance to Ibn Saud upfront, while the State Department would quietly support the 
Kingdom behind the scenes. In considering Hull’s plan, Halifax knew that having the United 
States Government intervening in the affairs of Saudi Arabia - no matter how little – served as a 
stepping stone towards London’s larger objective of loosening Washington’s neutrality until 
British and American wartime foreign policies would speak with one clear Allied voice. Indeed, 
Lord Halifax went as far as to suggest to Hull that any financial assistance given to Ibn Saud 
should be equally shared, an early harbinger to the 1944 Anglo-American Agreement, which 
constituted the highpoint of London and Washington’s collaboration in Saudi Arabia.215  
 A day after the discussion between Hull and Halifax, Neville Butler had a face-to-face 
meeting with Wallace Murray to discuss in further detail arrangements to assist the Kingdom. 
Butler informed his American colleague that British authorities in India were prepared to mint 
ten million coined riyals worth 1.58 million pounds that would be allocated for the Saudi 
Arabian Government. He needed to show Murray that this policy was “further evidence of the 
desire of the British Government to assist the King”.216 Recognizing the troubles stemming from 
the issue of neutrality Butler advised that it might be in Washington’s best interest to purchase 
Saudi Arabian petroleum in order to raise the Kingdom’s revenue, rather than going ahead with 
the politically contentious policy of doling out subsidies or loans.
217
 On that score, Butler’s 
recommendation is further evidence that wartime exigency trumped any concerns held by the 
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United States Government in terms of getting more tangibly involved in the Saudi Arabian oil 
business. However, no matter how small it may have been in scale, the United States purchasing 
oil was still deemed politically as well as practically unfeasible due to the fact that the oil near 
Dhahran contained too much sulphur for American warships and aircraft.
218
 Nevertheless, Butler 
trusted that the United States Government would still “see its way clear and offer financial 
assistance to Saudi Arabia putting aside the issue of neutrality”.219  The stakes were too great for 
Britain or the United States to think that the problems in Saudi Arabia could be cordoned off 
from the rest of the region. It was time, Butler implored, for the State Department to show that 
Ibn Saud did not just have British friends, but that the King “could also count on his American 
friends across the Atlantic.”220  
  However, the Americans were now guilty of dragging their feet on configuring a policy 
that would help Ibn Saud’s besieged regime. The reason for this had to do with the United States’ 
fragile position of neutrality. No matter how clearly American policy supported Britain, as David 
Reynolds has noted, the United States was still at “war in masquerade” against the Axis. 221 
Maintaining the illusion of wartime neutrality to combat isolationist critics at home bled into all 
facets of American policymaking.
222
This was why on July 18, 1941, President Roosevelt 
concluded that coming to the aid of Saudi Arabia “…was a little far afield for us!”, and hoped 
that instead, the British would continue to “take care of the King”.223 Running alongside the 
Saudi Arabian question, the act of keeping the United States neutral was such a political force 
that the following month Congress was able to re-enact the Selective Service Act by a slim 
margin of only one vote.
224
 How would the State Department convince those on Capitol Hill of 
Saudi Arabia’s linkage to American national security, when many of these Congressmen and 
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Senators fought tooth and nail against Lend-Lease appropriations for Britain, a country that was 
arguably fighting the United States’ war?  
  Hemmed in by the political obstacles of trying to conceal the country’s growing 
involvement in the Second World War, on August 22, 1941, it was finally made official that 
Lend-lease aid for Saudi Arabia would not be granted.
225
 The scholar Lloyd C. Gardner has gone 
to great lengths to show that Washington sought to use Lend-Lease as a diplomatic weapon in 
the Kingdom. He refers to it as a “wedge” built specifically to separate Ibn Saud from the 
existing British sphere of influence.
226
 Simon Davis makes a similar point stating that in the 
midst of debating whether to provide aid to Saudi Arabia or not, the United States’ relationship 
with Britain grew into a sense of “emerging American unease”.227 Such assessments once again 
underplay the show of mutual Anglo-American cooperation, which infused the issue from the 
beginning, while disregarding the overriding political factors that eventually scuppered the plans 
to make Lend-Lease available in Saudi Arabia. 
*** 
Karl Twitchell, the man on the American side who had advocated so forcefully for Ibn 
Saud, was given a murky explanation for the administration’s decision to turn down aid for Saudi 
Arabia. He was told by Paul Alling that - along with the concerns related to preserving American 
neutrality - the president and Secretary Hull had agreed that the Kingdom had not been integral 
in the same way that American interests were in the cases of China and Latin America.
228
 On one 
level, Hull’s argument rang true given that China was at war against Japan and in light of the 
geographic proximity of Latin America to the United States. But once examined more carefully, 
the Secretary of State remained sceptical of British motives. As Warren Kimball once remarked, 
“Hull never accepted the fact that Britain could be short of dollars while still operating a vast 
colonial and economic empire”.229 Sceptical of the imperial gloss of British policy, Hull 
therefore played his part in advising the president that direct American aid for Saudi Arabia was 
unnecessary and should remain a province of Britain.   
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  With Lend-Lease aid for Saudi Arabia being deemed politically unworkable, Karl 
Twitchell felt for his part that the  “requirements of King Ibn Saud should be given to him by the 
British Government out of the $425 million loan being made to Britain by USA”. Using British 
agency worked as an effective diplomatic tool, helping to streamline American policy in Saudi 
Arabia. Foremost, the recurrent issue of aid for Saudi Arabia running against American 
neutrality would turn into a moot point. Secondly, from a pragmatic point of view, it made 
practical sense for the United States to play a role behind the scenes, especially in areas in which 
the United States Government lacked experience.“The British”, Wallace Murray observed in 
August 1941, “have a long background in the field of political loans, and are used to advancing 
money without any great expectations of getting it back, whereas the United States does not have 
any tradition of this sort”.230 Consequently, an Anglo-American arrangement arose in which 
Britain - a country that had liquidated 1.5 billion dollars of her overseas assets during 1940-1941 
– would be overseeing the task of supplying subsidies to the financially depleted Kingdom.231 
  The negative side of relying on Britain from the American perspective was that London 
might use their own Lend-Lease aid as a springboard to topple U.S. oil interests in Saudi Arabia. 
Many American oilmen, including Lloyd Hamilton, general manager of CASOC, believed it to 
be naive to think that Britain’s future policy towards the Kingdom emanated only from wartime 
emergency. Already, the British Government held no qualms as regards to using its political 
influence to protect a range of national investments within Saudi Arabia, most notably Gellatly 
Hankey, the premier shipping company, but also the American Smelting and Refining Company 
in which Britons held a substantial financial stake.
232
 At any rate, a day before Washington’s 
rejection of Saudi Arabian aid came to light, the British Government delivered the Eden White 
Paper, virtually a binding Anglo-American agreement, which gave assurances that: “HMG have 
(has) not applied and will not apply any Lend-Lease materials in such a way as to enable their 
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exporters to enter new markets or to extend their export trade at the expense of the United 
States” .233  
  In the end, American officials who dealt with Saudi Arabia continued to be of two minds. 
For instance, from one angle, it was critical that Ibn Saud receive immediate financial assistance. 
But from another perspective, if Britain solely took charge of subsidization, would American 
interests in Saudi Arabia suffer as a result? An awkward situation might arise in which Britain - 
on the back of American largesse no less - would be the beneficiary of a disproportionate amount 
of credit for assisting the beleaguered Arab country. Therefore, direct British assistance needed 
to be followed by a show of American commitment to Saudi Arabia. Should this fail to 
materialise, Karl Twitchell forewarned that American prestige inside the Kingdom would end up 
being worth “nil”.234  
 
The United States Agricultural Mission to Saudi Arabia  
   
In September of 1941, recent Axis successes on the battlefield put Saudi Arabia back into 
the strategic spotlight. The Germans’ “Kiev” offensive had raised the spectre of a Russian 
military collapse, and with the Third Reich pushing eastward, the British historian Ashley 
Jackson has commented that during this touch –and –go period, “Britain’s Middle Eastern 
strategic jigsaw appeared to be threatened”.235 After hearing about Allied reversals, Karl 
Twitchell wrote in his diary that this turn of events gave the Axis a greater hand in forcing Ibn 
Saud to declare “jihad and stir up Moslems to make trouble in India and Egypt”.236  Britain’s 
commitment to subsidizing Ibn Saud was effective for the time being, but the United States’ 
refusal of Lend-Lease terms necessitated some sort of display of commitment to win back the 
king’s trust.  Thinking of countermeasures that “may offset or neutralize” Saudi Arabian 
disappointment,” Twitchell returned to a key part of his original scheme, stating that: 
“...everything should be done to make a firm offer of a (agricultural) mission”.237 That summer, 
the United States Government were also planning to send missions to the Iranian Government as 
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well as the Kingdom of Afghanistan in a bid to reduce Axis influence in those countries.
238
 
Keeping in mind these wartime considerations, the NEA’s Paul Alling agreed with Twitchell. 
Writing to his superior Sumner Welles, Alling argued that during this difficult period of Allied 
losses, it was vital to “overcome any feeling he [Ibn Saud] may have that we are abandoning him 
completely”. An agricultural mission organized and led by American officials was believed to be 
one step in the right direction towards repairing frayed feelings between the allies over the Lend-
Lease rebuff. 
239
 
  What is important to grasp is that the new proposal for sponsoring an agricultural mission 
complemented the British subsidization policy, while also having a higher purpose. The mission 
needed to be an extension of the State Department’s desire to foster closer Saudi Arabian ties 
after the loan debacle.
 240
 Speaking of the agricultural mission’s goal, Adolf Berle wrote to Karl 
Twitchell: 
 
“The (State) Department is convinced that the personal relationships which the 
Mission’s personnel establish with SA officials and individuals in civil life can 
play an important part in the success which the Department sincerely trusts will 
attend the Mission’s work, and believes that these relationships should be 
carefully cultivated”.241 
 
After acquiring the influential support of Berle, the agricultural mission began to take 
shape. On September 18,
 
1941 in Washington, Karl Twitchell met with a group of American 
officials from the agricultural sectors of the government, which included members of the Office 
of Indian Affairs, Department of Interior, Office of Foreign Agriculture Relations, Department of 
Agriculture and the Bureau of Plant Industry. A consensus had been reached between these 
bodies that appropriations for such a venture could be covered under the umbrella of 
“Emergency Funds Available for the President”. Backed by presidential approval, the 
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Department of Agriculture was granted fifty thousand dollars, and Twitchell in return for his 
efforts was given the important task of supervising the mission.
242
 
   The project, located fifty eight miles south from Riyadh in Al Kharj, amounted to three 
American officials teaching Saudi Arabians to grow staple crops like dates, wheat, alfalfa and 
green vegetables.
 243
 In addition, Twitchell’s team would help form the Al-Saud regime’s own 
agricultural department in which American advisors would work with their Saudi Arabian 
counterparts on such skills as animal husbandry, irrigation practices, and even basket weaving 
and photography.
244
 In this respect, the agricultural mission addressed an immediate wartime 
predicament. If Saudi Arabia could be agriculturally self-sufficient, valuable wartime shipping 
space that was normally taken up by food-stuff imports sent to Saudi Arabia would be made 
available.
245
 The agricultural mission further accomplished its goal of agitating the Axis powers. 
Italy’s propaganda machine in the Middle East, Radio Badi, claimed that the Americans wanted 
to attain more influence over Ibn Saud than the British, while wireless reports from Berlin 
reminded Arab listeners that the “Mission was sent by President Roosevelt who is maintained in 
power by Jewish Capitalists”.246 With the exception of materials from the United States being 
sporadically delayed as well as Twitchell’s deputy, F.G. Hamilton, contracting a bad case of 
malaria, the American Agricultural mission was overall deemed a diplomatic success.
247
 
 From the vantage point of Anglo-American relations, British officials in Washington 
were pleased by the prospect of an agricultural mission. Hugh Stonehewer Bird had relayed a 
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message to Twitchell back in June that he “thoroughly approved of the proposed Mission” that 
focused on “agriculture, water development, and roads” as a means of strengthening the Allied 
position in the Kingdom.
248
 On September 20, 1941, the British Foreign Office had requested to 
the NEA that the United States Government should do everything in its power to “keep the 
operation going”.249 At its core, British officialdom did not see the agricultural mission as a 
threat to their long-term interests in Saudi Arabia, but as a timely wartime measure which also 
chipped away at American neutrality.  
  Looking at the mission more broadly, Al Kharj represented a clear departure from the 
pre-war international system in which colonialism and “gunboat diplomacy” were the diplomatic 
norm.
250
 Long before the French demographer Alfred Sauvy coined the term “the Third World” 
in 1952, Saudi Arabia during the Second World War fit the profile of a developing country.
251
 
Simply by helping the Saudi Arabian Government to develop the country’s “agricultural and 
water resources”, the United States circumvented its neutrality constraints and fulfilled its aim of  
demonstrating its commitment to the Kingdom, Paul Alling pointed out to Sumner Welles, a 
noted  proponent of this form of intervention.
252
 In fact, Karl Twitchell had with Ibn Saud’s 
consent arranged for one of the most high profile journalists in the world, Edgar Snow, to visit 
Al-Kharj, so he could report and see first-hand this new kind of diplomacy in action.
253
The 
American scholar Daniel J. Boorstin would later term this kind of statecraft “Samaritan 
Diplomacy”.254At the time, writing to President Roosevelt, Karl Twitchell came up with a 
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different name, referring to the United States Agricultural Mission as an example of a “very far 
reaching branch of practical diplomacy”.255 
 Regardless of the accusations made by the Axis, eschewing imperial pretence was a 
pivotal part of strategic thinking that went into formulating the agricultural mission. In hindsight, 
the future American minister to Saudi Arabia, Colonel William Eddy, would write in June 1945 
that the mission had been successful because the United States had ultimately allowed it to 
become “an enterprise of the Saudi Arabian Government, sponsored and protected by the King, 
with personnel ultimately responsible to him”.256 Eddy’s rationale for being “hands off” was not 
solely an American idea, but also reflected the traditional considerations of British policymakers 
who had for years successfully protected British interests through engaging with Saudi Arabian 
officials instead of lording over them.
257
  
  Despite Britain’s designation as an imperial power, it should be remembered that in 1940 
Parliament enacted the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940, a forward thinking 
measure described by one scholar as a catalyst for multilateral institutions like the United 
Nations' specialized agencies, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund.
258
 Later in 
1943, as will be shown in chapter VI, the British Council of Anglo-Arab cultural relations would 
organize a branch of the British Council in Saudi Arabia tasked with passing on the many virtues 
of modern Britain.
259
 Rather than dividing the two allies, initiatives akin to the agricultural 
mission often represented a similar thrust of thinking when it came to the way that British and 
American diplomats viewed Saudi Arabia during the Second World War. 
 
 Anglo-American Relations and Saudi Arabia: Autumn 1941  
 
The United States’ growing involvement in Saudi Arabia matched the expansion of 
American activity in the Middle East region as a whole. In October 1941, American 
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policymakers edged closer to war by planning a regional military command centre later to be 
known as United States of America Forces in the Middle East (USAFIME) in Cairo, headed by 
General R.L. Maxwell.
260
 Like the agricultural mission in Saudi Arabia, the scheme adhered to 
the United States’ position of neutrality, while indirectly supporting the British policy in the 
region. Following the debate that surrounded the Lend-Lease question and the agricultural 
mission, American officials at this time re-evaluated its early collaboration with the British in 
Saudi Arabia. On one hand, with the wartime alliance coming to fruition in 1941, Britain and the 
United States working in closer conjunction had successfully bolstered the Al-Saud regime. Yet, 
on the other hand, the American decision to allow Britain to take full control of the provision of 
subsidies came with possible repercussions. The consistency and commitment that the British 
Government had shown in Saudi Arabia was greatly appreciated by Ibn Saud, to the point where 
it might give the British an insurmountable advantage as a competitor in the future.   
In a memorandum that circulated within the State Department in October 1941, Gordon 
Merriam, warned that “the possibility must be squarely faced that if the British, alone and by 
themselves, get Ibn Saud through his present difficulties they may seek a future recompense at 
the expense of American interests in that country”.261Indeed, according to the American minister 
in Cairo, Alexander Kirk, Ibn Saud was so angered by Washington’s decision to refuse direct aid 
to Saudi Arabia that he almost rejected having an American agricultural mission sent to Saudi 
Arabia.
262
 To understand the United States’ role in Saudi Arabia, Merriam stressed how Ibn 
Saud’s relationship with the British government in some respects played into American hands. 
An unsaid strategic quid pro quo kept Anglo-Saudi relations balanced; there was a Rubicon that 
Ibn Saud would not cross. Allowing the British government to gain a strong foothold in the 
country was not an option as it might risk creating the inevitable perception of Saudi Arabia 
falling under British control. Despite the trouble over Lend-Lease aid, Merriam argued that 
American involvement in Saudi Arabia helped Ibn Saud counteract the excesses of British 
power. Similarly, Merriam considered this to be the reason why the Saudi Arabian king had 
welcomed the idea of financial assistance coming from the United States and had granted oil 
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concessions to an “an American company” rather than a British one in the 1930s. 263 However, 
Merriam seems to either ignore, or to be unaware of the fact that in 1936 the king had in fact 
awarded oil concessions to a subsidiary of the British owned Iraq Petroleum Company in the 
Hedjaz and Asir provinces, albeit no oil had been found.
264
    
Nevertheless, what Merriam fails to further point out is the fact that assuring Saudi 
Arabian independence had always been a key aim of British foreign policy. Now more than ever, 
British officials appreciated the projective power of a sovereign Arab state that was friendly 
toward the Allies, without inducing the perception that the Saudis were under the sway of the 
British in the region. This is why news of the United States playing a greater role in Saudi 
Arabian affairs had been greeted warmly by the British Legation in Jeddah precisely because 
such an event would curtail the image of Ibn Saud being a dependent of London. Likewise, Ibn 
Saud knew that after dealing with the British government over the past forty years, London held 
no real designs of incorporating his kingdom into the British Empire. British policymakers were 
far more concerned with implementing policies that would do everything to dispel this myth.  
Certainly, Merriam gave credit to Britain’s political influence over the Kingdom, but he 
makes no mention of the dominant financial position that it had attained. Regardless of 
CASOC’s growth potential, British capital dwarfed American investment. Long established 
British trading houses, such as Gellatly & Hankey and Mackenzie Gray & Company were the 
main importing channels that kept Saudi Arabian finances functioning.
265
 Moreover, British 
agency in the form of the Government of India still remained Saudi Arabia’s greatest trading 
partner.
266
 It is also worth remembering that year after year, Delhi organized the travel logistics 
of the Hajj, providing the bulk of steamers that were responsible for the safe passage of pilgrims 
from the Asian subcontinent, a service that only British knowhow could supply.
267
 Thus, deeply 
embedded in Merriam’s somewhat imperfect analysis, one can spot some of the apprehension 
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and misunderstanding that would later make itself manifest in with regard to Anglo-American 
relations in Saudi Arabia during the latter war years. 
With the United States still having no diplomatic mission in Jeddah, during that same 
eventful October, the American legation in Cairo led by Alexander Kirk met with a team of 
British officials who were based in Saudi Arabia to discuss the current situation in the Kingdom. 
This group included Hugh Stonehewer-Bird, his Vice Consul, the Arabist, John Wall, and 
Colonel Charles De Gaury. The State Department at this time was not in the same league as the 
British Foreign Office when it came to monitoring events in Saudi Arabia. This was one of the 
reasons why the United States would collaborate so closely with Britain during the Second 
World War.  
American officials listened carefully as the British contingent shared with them a glimpse 
of what was going on in the Kingdom. Firstly, Stonehewer-Bird informed the Americans that for 
the upcoming year of 1942, the British government would likely raise the subsidies earmarked 
for the Kingdom because of the continuing decline in the revenue generated by the Hajj. The 
King had recently told the British minister that: 
 
“Great Britain is my friend and always has been. Great Britain is the friend of the 
Arabs and has so shown itself in the past. The Arab countries need a powerful 
European friend and Great Britain is undoubtedly preferable to any other country 
to fill that role. Therefore it is the duty and in the interest of all Arabs (Syrians, 
Iraqis and Palestinians) not to embarrass the British Government in any way in 
the prosecution of the war”.268 
  
  American officials who were observing the situation in Saudi Arabia did not regard the 
British minister’s statement to mean that Ibn Saud was exclusively under British influence. 
Wallace Murray relayed this impression to high-ranking policymakers like Adolf Berle and 
Sumner Welles who took this as positive news as they were pleased to hear of the King’s 
allegiance to the Allies’ regional interests vis-a vis the Axis powers. Stonehewer-Bird further 
made clear that in Saudi Arabia, despite having advisors that were sympathetic to the Axis cause, 
Ibn Saud’s opinion was the only one that mattered. The King was an independent and well 
informed leader. He had a team of people whose only job was to listen to radio broadcasts and 
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transcribe them so he would be up to speed on world events. When Ibn Saud learned from these 
reports that Nazi Germany had invaded the Soviet Union, he believed the Germans violated the 
Arab rules of friendship by attacking a country in which they were bound to by treaty. This 
betrayal had a tremendous impact on Ibn Saud and convinced Saudi Arabian officials, who may 
have formerly been leaning towards the Axis that Germany was not to be trusted. If this was the 
way that Germany dealt with the Soviets, what type of aggression would the Germans mete out 
to a struggling and emerging state like Saudi Arabia?
 269
 The message therefore was that Ibn 
Saud was a man of his word, someone whom the wartime alliance could trust and vice versa. It 
was this strongly held belief that helped form the contours of the Anglo-American relations in 
1942. 
 
 Conclusion 
 
The early Anglo-American relationship was guided by the strategic premise that by 
helping the Al-Saud regime to remain economically solvent, the Allies would contribute to the 
larger objective of keeping Axis influence at bay, not just in the Arabian Peninsula, but also in 
the wider Middle East. In 1941, it can be argued that Saudi Arabia evolved into an Anglo-
American concern as a result of British and American officials realizing that their interests in 
that country were interdependent. Rather than seeing American interest in Saudi Arabia as a 
prospective threat, British authorities viewed it more as a strategic opportunity. Expectations that 
the United States would go ahead and subsidize Ibn Saud directly fit neatly within the Anglo-
Saudi paradigm based on the perception of Britain not acting as a domineering power in its 
dealings with the Kingdom. Moreover, the rise of United States’ influence in Saudi Arabia 
should be measured alongside the broader motivations of British wartime diplomacy, designed to 
harness American power precisely at a time when the European war was becoming global. By 
this token, American involvement in the Kingdom, from finding ways to finance the Saudi 
Arabian Government to offering an agricultural mission, was helped along and coordinated with 
the assistance of British officials based in Washington, London and Jeddah.  
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But the Roosevelt administration’s decision to scrap a plan to finance Ibn Saud directly 
was not a symbol of American indifference to Saudi Arabia, nor to its British ally. In 1941, Ibn 
Saud’s kingdom had not yet fully crystallized into becoming a beacon of American influence in 
the Middle East. It remained politically crucial for the administration to maintain its wartime 
neutrality, and without the proper official agency inside the country, the State Department wisely 
deferred to the British to take control of the financial emergency faced by Saudi Arabia. In a 
province that had primarily been a British sphere of influence, this made perfect political and 
strategic sense. Britain - with all of its intimate knowledge of the Middle East - could assist the 
process of getting the United States Government involved in Saudi Arabia in a more operative 
manner, a stratagem most notably held by Karl Twitchell, the unsung figure who laid the 
foundations for closer Anglo-American cooperation in the Kingdom. Likewise, Twitchell’s 
efforts to establish an American agricultural mission, a policy that gave priority to what he called 
“practical diplomacy”, would in the upcoming years greatly influence how the United States and 
Britain would fashion their policies with regard to Saudi Arabia. 
Despite the two allies successfully keeping Axis propaganda at bay in Saudi Arabia, 
overall, studies of the subject have treated 1941 as an afterthought, or have used this period to 
give greater context to their explanations as to why discord and antagonism overtook the two 
allies in the latter years of the war. Certainly, evidence of Britain and the United States holding 
different perspectives over the extent of influence that they wielded inside the Kingdom foretold 
areas of future conflict. It might be said that the propensity of American officials to believe that 
their country possessed a singular connection with Saudi Arabia as an “anti-imperial power” did 
not bode particularly well for preserving inter-allied cohesion. Yet, for the time being, these 
slight fissures gave way to a mutual emphasis of the British and American governments reaching 
for a far greater goal of making sure that Ibn Saud and Saudi Arabia remained firmly within the 
Allied fold. With the Second World War expanding in scope after December 7, 1941, the next 
chapter will show Anglo-American collaboration in Saudi Arabia entering into a new phase 
during which the two countries would be more tightly bound together than ever before.   
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Chapter III            
Anglo-American Relations in Saudi Arabia: Wartime Strategy 
1942 
Introduction 
Donning traditional Arab dress, the American minister to Saudi Arabia, Alexander Kirk, 
presented his diplomatic credentials to King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud at the royal encampment in 
Dhurma on May 12, 1942.
270
 After an exchange of pleasantries, the topic of discussion quickly 
turned towards the ongoing war. The American minister confidently reassured Ibn Saud that the 
United States and their ally, the British Government, were determined to “eliminate the 
destructive forces of Hitlerism”.271 Although neutral, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia had a role to 
play in the fight to turn back the Axis tide in the Middle East. A period of time that has generally 
been discounted by historians, this chapter examines how and why Anglo-American relations in 
Saudi Arabia in 1942 grew more interdependent by way of the Kingdom assuming a new level of 
geostrategic importance in the conflict.
272
    
On the surface, there were episodes that seem to fit with the “competitive” leitmotif of 
the subject’s historiography, particularly the debate over which one of the allies should defend 
Saudi Arabia’s oil installations.273 Certainly, a substantial part of the argument stemmed from the 
fact that both Britain and the United States were reluctant to deal with a scenario in which the 
German army was at the doorstep of the Persian Gulf. But in this case, much of the inter-allied 
tension arose from a source different than the frictions associated with national rivalry. Both 
                                               
270
 The city of Dhurma was located about a one hour drive from the Saudi Arabian capital of Riyadh.  
271
 NARA: RG 84, Stack Area 350, Row 55, Compartment 1, Shelf  02-3, Entry 2410, Box 1, Egypt Cairo Embassy 
1936-1955. ‘Memorandum of Remarks of the Minister on the Presentation of Diplomatic Letters’, Cairo to State 
Department, May 11, 1942.  
272
 Much like the historiography covering 1941, scholars of Anglo-American in Saudi Arabia have tended to 
overlook 1942 and start their studies in 1943. For semi-full accounts see, Davis, Contested Space, pp.105-112. & 
Miller, Search for Security, pp.56-61. Davis gives background to what he perceives as a heated Anglo-American 
argument with regards to the controversies over subsidizing Saudi Arabia; a feature that this thesis will examine 
more fully in Chapter 5. Miller’s study intersects with Anglo-American relations, but only through the prism of oil, 
which this thesis will further analyze in chapter 4. Other works that touch upon Anglo-American relations in Saudi 
Arabia during 1942, include, Anderson, Aramco, the United States and Saudi Arabia, pp. 42-47 and Rubin, ‘Anglo-
American Relations in Saudi Arabia: 1941-1945’, pp. 255-256. 
273
 Daniel Silverfarb offers the most in-depth analysis at this one key feature of Anglo-American relations in 1942 
that has been largely omitted by historians. See Daniel Silverfarb, ‘Britain, the US and Securing Saudi-Arab 
Oilfields in 1942’ The Historical Journal, Volume 26, No. 3 (September, 1983) p. 719-726. 
82 
 
countries were quick to realize that protecting the oilfields through a show of force might 
engender resentment amongst the local population. Moreover, as a further detriment to British 
and American interests, such activities would cast into doubt Ibn Saud’s legitimacy as an 
independent ruler. Once again, officials from both countries found themselves undertaking a 
precarious balancing act, simultaneously wanting to increase their involvement in Saudi Arabia 
without abrogating the Kingdom’s sovereignty in the process.  
 Similar concerns were also present when the two allies envisaged that air routes over 
Saudi Arabia could augment Allied supply lines to Asia and the Soviet Union. In this instance, 
after the failure of the United States to obtain access to air routes, inter-allied cooperation proved 
to be pivotal. As a result of the collaborative diplomatic efforts of British minister Hugh 
Stonehewer-Bird and the recently arrived American charge d’affaires, James Moose, air routes 
and landing rights in Saudi Arabia were acquired. What is most telling about this episode is that 
Ibn Saud only decided to grant air-routes once the issue became a joint Anglo-American 
concern. Often overlooked, this prime example of Anglo-American partnership set an important 
precedent. It highlights that despite obstacles, London and Washington had come to see that a 
unified Anglo-American front worked far more effectively as a tool of diplomacy than trying to 
implement British and American policies unilaterally. 
   
 Saudi Arabian Oilfields: A Question of British or American Influence  
 
  At the start of 1942, Hugh Stonehewer-Bird had confidently cabled the Foreign Office to 
say that regardless of Allied reverses, Ibn Saud was “wholeheartedly on our side”.274 An Arabic 
proverb says that “the beauty of a man, lies in the eloquence of his tongue,” and Ibn Saud 
undeniably had a way of using his picaresque Bedouin idioms to assuage any British or 
American anxieties over where his loyalty may lie.
275
 Ibn Saud likened Hitler to: 
 
“A man who has stuffed himself with much and varied food (the countries of 
Europe) in the belief that he will derive great strength from his meals. But he has 
swallowed, not nourishing food, but a number of vipers and scorpions and whilst 
they tear at his vitals, the lions, Britain, America, Russia, attack him”.276 
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  Earlier in November 1941, in a top secret and lengthy telegram between Ibn Saud and his 
Minister to Vichy France, Fuad Hamza, the King censured his minister for communicating with 
Nazi authorities, warning him that “were we to write to Hitler, cajoling him, we would do as you 
desire and renounce our present acts, and we would become liars, and the proof against us would 
become manifest”.277 Saudi Arabia declaring war on the Axis, however, was an entirely different 
matter for Ibn Saud. He was acutely aware of his country’s own military limitations. At the end 
of 1940, Saudi Arabian armed forces numbered between 1,000-1,500 trained troops, with an 
addition of 70,000 irregulars. These men were comprised entirely of Arab Bedouins, who were 
no longer the battle-tested warriors they once were when they were fighting for the Al-Saud in 
the 1920s.
278
 Along with this, Saudi Arabia, despite being situated between the Red Sea and the 
Persian Gulf, had no navy.
279
  
Earlier, London had briefly entertained the idea of establishing a formal military alliance 
with Ibn Saud in late 1939 and early 1940. Although Saudi Arabia’s entry into the war 
guaranteed access to the Red Sea port city of Jeddah, a detail pressed by the Admiralty, the 
dominating view emanating from London, which was not without merit given the state of the 
Kingdom’s military, was that having Saudi Arabia as a full-fledged belligerent was more of a 
strategic liability than an asset.
280
 The British Middle East Command, then led by General 
Archibald Wavell, expressed  concern over Saudi Arabia joining the Allies: “If Ibn Saud entered 
the war on our side, we could not guarantee protection against Italian attacks by sea or air with 
the means at present”.281 Saudi Arabia’s neutrality in this respect functioned as the country’s best 
form of military defence.   
Taking in all of these considerations, in February 1942, the Foreign Office delivered a 
report to the British War Cabinet claiming that for Ibn Saud, “it is neither in his interest nor in 
that of His Majesty’s Government for him to adhere to the Twenty-Six Power Pact and to declare 
war on the Axis”.282The King’s decision not to declare war made strategic sense and fit neatly 
with the underlying rationale that had always guided British policy towards the Kingdom. 
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Stonehewer-Bird had written to the Foreign Office that if Saudi Arabia was forced to join the 
Allies, Ibn Saud’s credibility as an independent Arab statesman would be lost: 
 
“It would be interpreted not only be our enemies, but his enemies in the Moslem 
world as proof that he was merely the tool of the British who had betrayed Islam 
and exposed the Holy Land to danger in British interests only... Instead of an 
unwilling ally we have a willing and grateful friend who will use his whole 
influence on our side”.283 
 
   In this respect, Ibn Saud´s “whole influence” came into play once more in the early 
summer of 1942 when evidence of the war reaching the Arabian Peninsula was as ample as it 
was distressing. The possibility was not overstated when the British defeat at Tobruk in June of 
1942 is taken into consideration. Describing the loss, the British war correspondent Alan 
Moorehead simply wrote: “It was defeat as complete as may be”.284 If Axis forces attained 
control of both shores of the Mediterranean, all Allied shipping to port entries in the Nile Delta, 
Persian Gulf, India and Red Sea would be forced to travel the long route around the Cape of 
Good Hope to port entries. As the German Army reached the foot of the Caspian Sea, and the 
Japanese seized the Nicobar and Andaman Islands off the coast of India, Saudi Arabia lay 
dangerously centred between the two Axis armies.
285
 Looking back at this dangerous period, the 
American Ambassador at the Court of St. James, John G. Winant, wrote: 
 
“…the picture of Germany joining hands with Japan on the shores of the Indian 
Ocean, advancing through Spain and Gibraltar to Dakar, closing the 
Mediterranean, cutting off the Middle East oil, and severing Britain’s life line to 
India and Australasia...would not have been a pleasant one for us or Russia”.286 
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  The capture of Tobruk and the German attack on the Baku oil fields in the Caucasus that 
same month reinforced the view offered by Winant.
287
 That year, according to the United States 
Government’s Enemy Oil Committee (EOC), a group made up of an array of military-related 
departments, the Axis ground forces consumed 5.3 million tons of petroleum products in total, 
with seventy-four percent of it being spent at the Eastern Front.
288
 From the viewpoint of Allied 
war planners, the new CASOC oil refinery at Ras Tanura near Dhahran, in the eastern part of 
Saudi Arabia, was regarded as insurance if the British-run refineries at Bahrain and Abadan were 
“put out of action”.289Moreover, a German takeover of the Baku oilfields meant that the Soviet 
Union would lose nearly 90% of its fuel resources.
290
 It was beginning to dawn on the Allies that 
Saudi Arabia might truly loom as the next vital source for oil. 
With the United States now able to freely act as an Allied belligerent power in 1942, the 
wartime alliance debated over how best to defend the Saudi Arabian oilfields. Although Saudi 
Arabia was nestled within the realm of Pax Britannica, the United States Government had a role 
to play given the fact that the CASOC oil concessions were tied to approximately 160,000 
American stockholders. 
291
A year previously Max Thornburg, an executive for a subsidiary of 
CASOC- the Bahrain Petroleum Company (BPC) - and later an oil consultant to the State 
Department who would play a major role in the development of wartime American oil policy, 
had raised a worrying hypothetical question with the Secretary of War, Henry Stimson.
 292
 If the 
Axis did indeed march into Saudi Arabia, which country would be responsible for demolishing 
the oil installations before they became a war prize for the Axis? Stimson replied that there was 
“no urgent reason” to destroy any of the installations, but if it became necessary, the sole action 
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and responsibility fell on the British Government as Saudi Arabia was located in the Middle 
East.
293
   
A year later as the threat of the German army became more real, Washington took its cue 
from Stimson’s original judgement. Although it held no clearly demarcated boundaries, the 
Middle East traditionally existed as a broad geographic space referring to the corridor of land 
and sea stretching from Gibraltar to Karachi.
294
 More so than any other location in the world, the 
Middle East was the imperial lifeline of Britain as it housed the Empire’s oil reserves and linked 
supplies and communications with India, Britain’s Southeast Asian Empire, and the Antipodes 
Dominions. In other words, during the Second World War, the Middle East was a yardstick in 
measuring the reach of British influence. Hence, the onus fell on Britain to protect Saudi 
Arabia’s oilfields which by extension meant watching out for American interests as well. 
Backed by the support of President Roosevelt and Cordell Hull, Admiral Ernest King and 
Chief of Staff, George Marshall sent a message to the British Joint Chiefs of Staff on August 13, 
1942, stating that the matter needed to “be referred to the British Joint Chiefs of Staff for 
appropriate action, “since these installations are in an area of British strategic responsibility”.295 
As a credible enemy target that required protection, especially against the threat of low-level 
bombing, the Americans were depending on the British to send a battery of anti aircraft artillery 
to be used for the defence of the CASOC oil facilities in Dhahran, Aziz Ayah and Ras Tanura.
296
  
Although CASOC was American owned, British authorities were already involved in 
protecting the company’s branch of operations in Bahrein, a business holding that was 
incorporated in Britain. The installations there had a fair amount of British personnel, who 
according to CASOC executive William Lenahan, were “sleeping with British uniforms under 
their bunks, ready to put them on and carry out demolitions as British soldiers at an instant’s 
notice”.297 Saudi Arabia was an altogether different matter, however. The Kingdom was a 
sovereign nation, officially neutral and did not have any special military treaty relations with the 
British Government. Over the past year, British forces had experience in dealing with the 
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political fallout from a series of controversial oil denial programmes in Iraq, Iran and Burma.
298
 
These denials were successful in that they kept Britain’s enemies from acquiring this oil, but the 
programme also had the negative consequence of creating a stir of anti-British sentiment and 
nationalist unrest within those countries.
299
 Given these mixed results, Sir Vivian Dykes, the 
Chief Combined Secretary of the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington, could not acquiesce 
to the American request:  
 
“In light of the relative importance and vulnerability of the works, the War Office 
regrets that no specific protection from British Anti-aircraft resources can be 
afforded to these oil installations, in addition to the protection given by the 
general air defense plans of the area”.300 
 
  Instead of London offering to help Washington, the British Chiefs of Staff let it be known 
that they would welcome an American anti-aircraft detachment in Dhahran that would be put in 
place with a “self contained unit of not more than 100 strong, with its own guns, and sufficient 
transport for moving supplies from the coast”. The Saudi Arabian Government, said Dykes, had 
agreed in principle to the plan of establishing an anti-aircraft detachment that would be manned 
by American personnel on the condition that they would train Saudi Arabians to use the 
equipment.
301
 Speaking in the name of the Joint Staff planners of the United States, General 
Albert C. Wedemeyer, future author of the Victory Plan, put a halt to the British proposition.
302
 
Stating that these actions went beyond the ambit of the American military, Wedemeyer 
contended that if the United States did go ahead and supply a small unit of troops, it would result 
in an “undesirable dispersion of strength”.303 
  Viewed within the context of the summer of 1942, a period of time when the Allies were 
collectively on their back heels, the obvious concern of being militarily overstretched does not 
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fully explain why Britain and the United States were so eager to pass off the responsibilities of 
defending the Kingdom’s oil.304 For one thing, the potential importance of having control over 
what was to become the most powerful commodity in the post-war world was still not fully 
realized by the two allies.
305
 Furthermore, as the historian Daniel Silverfarb has noted, plans to 
safeguard Saudi Arabian oil fields were further “complicated by Ibn Saud’s insistence on 
remaining neutral and his refusal to declare war”. 306 This is entirely true, but what Silverfarb 
misses in his analysis is that all parties involved agreed on the priority of Saudi Arabia remaining 
neutral, which fed into another dilemma facing British and American officials. How would the 
Saudi population, known for its xenophobia, react to Allied troops being stationed within the 
Kingdom’s territory?  
  Rashid Ali’s coup the previous year had foreshadowed as to what could be the potential 
outcome. A group of CASOC employees of Arab origin had left their posts to fight against the 
British in Iraq. This demonstration of resistance had given pause to American officials who 
wondered if Ibn Saud’s willingness to work with the Allies was also shared by his countrymen. 
Paul Alling, the deputy chief of the NEA, observed at the time: “Ibn Saud had in ordinary times, 
only slight control of tribesmen in the Eastern part of his territories and that, in face of such an 
emergency as now existed, he might well lose control of them altogether”.307 For London “to 
meet their military responsibility” of protecting Saudi Arabia, Alling realized that the very 
presence of British forces might inadvertently destabilize a regime that was friendly to the Allied 
cause.
308
 But in reality, it was not just the arrival of British servicemen that might inflame the 
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Saudi populace, but the presence of any foreign troops could be viewed as an infringement on 
the Kingdom’s sovereignty and cause unrest. Even as British and American officials went back 
and forth on the issue in Washington, British minister Hugh Stonehewer-Bird and the recently 
arrived American charge d’ affaires in Jeddah, James Moose, were in full agreement. Their view 
was that any Allied military personnel entering Saudi Arabia, should be avoided as much as 
possible, to ensure that there would be no cause for alarm in Riyadh.
309
 
 Regardless, for Paul Alling it still made better political sense for Ibn Saud  to rely on the 
“anti-imperial” United States to “guard oil installations, manage anti-aircraft guns and to give 
instruction for their usage”.310Agreeing with this view was F.W. Oligher of CASOC, who had 
argued from the beginning that since Americans “were the most popular of foreigners in Saudi 
Arabia,” it was only natural that the Americans should man the equipment and undertake all 
training.
311
 Oligher would not be the last American to make this point and consequently such 
views put a strain on the Anglo-American partnership in Saudi Arabia.
312
 In the end, however, 
reaching a final decision over who would defend Saudi Arabian oilfields never had to be made. 
The final British victory at the battle of El Alamein in November 1942 had put a stop to the Axis 
advance in the Middle East. But the delicate factors pertaining to the oilfield issue, mainly the 
preservation of the Kingdom’s neutrality, would continually influence the trajectory of Anglo-
American relations in Saudi Arabia.   
 
Saudi Arabian Air Routes: Searching For an Anglo-American Solution 
 
 Running alongside the oilfield controversy was another issue; the Anglo-American 
attempt to acquire air routes over Saudi Arabia highlighted the fact that British and American 
war planners reached a new level of partnership in the Middle East to stem the Axis tide. It was 
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here in 1942, the historian James Holland noted, that the two wartime allies were becoming 
versed in collaboration to create the “strongest military alliance in history”.313 Beyond the 
improving degree of Anglo-American cooperation displayed in the region, the air routes question 
brought into sharper focus once again the tensions associated with the concepts of “spheres of 
influence” and “areas of responsibility”. The very process of securing air rights in times of war 
also strengthened the civil aviation industry of a country in a time of peace. By its nature, air 
routes and airfields were contentious issues because they touched upon one nation’s influence 
and power.  
  As early as 1941, the State Department was cognizant that Britain’s substantial influence 
in Saudi Arabia greatly affected the air routes issue. That same year, Ibn Saud denied a Pan 
American Airways request for experimental trans-Arabian flights. Many believed that this 
decision owed to the King being pressured by British authorities seeking to protect Britain’s own 
civil aviation industry.
314
 Pan American Airways at this time had been requested by the United 
States Government to organize the top secret Airport Development Program, which called for the 
construction of a global network of American airfields.
315
 Britain, though, had a similar idea in 
place for the centrally located Saudi Arabia. In October 1940, Basil Newton, British Ambassador 
to Iraq, had envisioned Saudi Arabia playing a featured role in Britain’s emerging imperial air 
network. Newton, speaking to the Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, attested that: 
 
“Saudi Arabia’s value for air command may be incalculably great now that the  
Atlantic and Pacific have already been spanned by air-lines. We should acquire 
an additional and shorter line of communication between Australia, New Zealand, 
India, Burma, Hong Kong and Palestine and the Mediterranean, Britain, Canada 
and America on the other”.316 
 
  But in 1942, national competition between Britain and the United States over aviation 
took a backseat to the exigencies of war as the focus turned to Saudi Arabia and its relation to 
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Allied supply lines. Saudi Arabia was located in the middle of the Khartoum-Karachi supply 
route, a key byway through which Allied aircraft and other war materiel was shipped to the Far 
East.  The importance of Saudi Arabian airspace had also grown considerably in the aftermath of 
Operation Barbarossa in the summer 1941.
317
 Shortly afterwards, a new Allied supply route had 
quickly formed in the Persian Gulf through which aid was shipped to the Soviet Union from 
Basra and up through Russian Turkistan.
318
  
  The War Department in Washington subscribed to a view that an air route across Saudi 
Arabia, possibly an airfield set up near Jeddah, would add a vital link in the chain for the supply 
route from Khartoum to Karachi, allowing for a securer alternative route than the present one 
that went via Cairo. Moreover, if the Allies were able to fly over Saudi Arabian territory, it could 
be a prime route to ship heavy bombers to the Soviet Union.
319
 As the Secretary of War, Henry 
Stimson acknowledged: “The importance of securing an air route across Central Arabia lies in 
the fact that a direct route from Khartoum across Central Arabia to Basra, a point for delivery of 
aircraft ferried to the USSR is 713 miles shorter than the present route from Cairo, Lydda and 
Habbaniyah”. The distance of the Khartoum-Karachi route would thus be “materially reduced” 
for supplies heading to the Far East theatre if an air route crossing over Saudi Arabia could be 
established. 
320
 If the United States therefore desired air rights, Stimson was of the opinion that 
Anglo-American cooperation would be paramount. In April 1942, he had told the State 
Department: 
“it is felt that any agreement with the Government of Saudi Arabia for the 
installation, operation and defense of air staging fields in that country should be 
negotiated by the United Kingdom,” and that the British Chiefs of staff should 
“take the action to that end”.321 
 
  Because of this clear demarcation, Stimson recommended that the British Chiefs of Staff 
should map out specific air routes and prospects for airfields.
322
 In the summer of 1942, British 
military aircraft did not fly over Saudi Arabian soil, but instead kept to a flight route along the 
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periphery of Saudi Arabia’s northern border between Sharjah and Bahrain.323 In February, 
concern over Axis submarines in the Indian Ocean had led the Admiralty to seek routes and 
landing fields from Jeddah to Kuwait and Basra. But again, the War Cabinet Chief of Staff 
Committee, put a stop to the idea, believing it would put needless political pressure on Ibn Saud 
and would put at risk the Kingdom’s neutrality.324  
  Yet, from London’s vantage point, the incentive of collaborating with the United States 
on the air rights issue was threefold. Firstly, on an economic level, the Americans would be more 
willing to lend a hand in Britain’s constant struggle to obtain the dollar exchanges needed to pay 
for the supplies.
325
 The wartime economic restrictions of countries attached to the sterling bloc, 
particularly the Government of India, had made it difficult for the Saudi Arabian Government to 
obtain sovereign coins, driving up the general cost of living in the Kingdom. Greater American 
involvement in Saudi Arabia’s economic sphere, it was hoped, might help remedy the 
situation.
326
 Secondly, in political terms, Britain’s ability to work closely with the United States 
in Saudi Arabia was a tremendous propaganda victory. The State Department considered that it 
would dispel the “unfair criticism that (the) British are using the country’s present distress 
merely as a means of increasing political control over Arab countries”.327 Lastly, and arguably 
most importantly, the British in their approach to Saudi Arabia were trying to encourage, not 
discourage American activity in the Middle East, registering that American influence would be 
as Barry Rubin has attested, “an inevitable feature of the post-war world”.328 Therefore, the air 
rights issue turned into a litmus test that would answer the question as to whether Anglo-
American partnership in Saudi Arabia suitably conformed to the interests of both countries.  
*** 
  In February 1942, the American minister to Saudi Arabia, Alexander Kirk sent a cable to 
the State Department from Cairo, stressing that the British taking the strategic initiative in Saudi 
Arabia was resulting in the “indirect protection to American interests”. Here in Saudi Arabia, 
Kirk advised, all future American aid should work in tandem with British efforts “without 
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affecting British leadership or complicating steps already taken”.329 However, like the 
deliberations on defending the oil installations, some of Kirk’s colleagues, such as the Assistant 
Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, became equally concerned about the ramifications of being 
so closely identified with British actions that were inadvertently imperial in tone. To place this 
within a wider context, the airfield question ran concurrently with the news that Corregidor had 
bravely surrendered after a four month siege against an overwhelming Japanese force.
330
 Even 
those American officials, who were anglophiles like Karl Twitchell, were comfortable with 
making the point that the Philippines had held out longer than Singapore because of the latter’s 
long term resentment toward British colonialism.
331
 With the anti-colonial zeitgeist in full swing, 
the dominant American view at the time was that the United States was probably in a better 
position to seek out air routes from the Saudis than an imperial power like Britain. At this time, 
Sumner Welles wrote Alexander Kirk about the pros and cons of using British assistance: 
 
 “…In view of the important political factors which would undoubtedly occur to 
the Saudi Arabs in connection with a proposed British military establishment in 
their country, the question arises whether, if the plan for obtaining airfields is to 
have a reasonable chance of success, should it not be put forward and worked out 
purely and simply as a United States project?”332 
 
  Recognizing British liabilities is not to deny, though, that a large segment of the State 
Department sought to expand Anglo-American cooperation. The aforementioned experience of 
the British in the region was necessary for the mission to be accomplished. But initial 
apprehension over a British military presence unfurling in Saudi Arabia led the United States to 
attempt to strike out on its own with regard to the air-route issue.  
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  Simon Davis has summed up the United States Government’s dealings with the Kingdom 
during this time as demonstrating “American inhibition”. 333 Yet, the air routes issue was an 
example illustrating that Americans would be pro-active. Although he now headed the American 
Agricultural Mission, Karl Twitchell continued to use his own personal diplomacy to forward 
American interests. Making no promises, he told members of the American Air-Corps Ferry 
Command (AACFC) based in Cairo that he could persuade the King to give permission for an 
airfield to be constructed in the centre of the country, either in Riyadh or at Fort Duwadamie.
334
 
After meeting with Ibn Saud in February 1942, Twitchell announced that the king was open to 
the idea of allowing the United States to construct air routes and airfields, but only as long as the 
Americans left the mechanical equipment behind as a “present” to the Saudi Arabian 
Government.
335
  
  After Twitchell laid the foundations, that spring Alexander Kirk was given orders to 
ascertain whether Ibn Saud would grant the use of air-routes and airfields in his country.
336
 Kirk 
arrived in Jeddah on May 11, 1942 to open up a new permanent American legation, a signal to 
both Ibn Saud and London that Washington now took its engagement in Saudi Arabia seriously. 
There, he met with the Saudi Arabian Finance Minister, Shaikh Abdullah Suleiman, who 
according to Kirk was ready to “volunteer the statement that there was no objection to the flight 
of United States planes over Saudi Arabia or even the establishment of an airport”.337 At first, 
Kirk was pleased by Suleiman’s initial response, but then the American minister made the 
mistake of overstepping his charge. In a moment of candour, he let it slip that the crux of the air 
rights issue had to do with the “speedy transfer of aircraft to points from which they could be 
used most effectively in striking against the forces of the Axis”. 338  
  Originally, Karl Twitchell had warned the State Department that if the subject of air 
routes was broached in any other way than head on, the Saudis would feel dishonoured. By now, 
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it was too late as Kirk had erroneously delivered a mixed message. If Suleiman heard Kirk 
correctly, the request for air routes for Allied supplies had morphed into the establishment of 
bases on Saudi Arabian soil for the purpose of launching attacks against Axis forces. This made 
Saudi Arabian officials reconsider the American request and its effect on their country’s position 
of “benevolent neutrality”. Indeed, shortly afterwards,  Ibn Saud’s son, Prince Faisal would 
complain to Kirk that American airfields located in Saudi Arabia meant for military usage 
“might constitute an invitation for certain other countries to attack, a contingency which would 
be particularly serious in the case of countries unable to resist such aggression”.339  
  Two weeks later, Kirk met with Suleiman once more and after hearing about Faisal’s 
earlier response, the American minister’s queries this time were more specific and less 
ambitious. Seeking the King’s approval, Kirk asked if the United States would be able “to fly 
planes non-stop across Saudi Arabia on specified routes from Khartoum to Basra and from 
Khartoum to Bahrain, avoiding the restricted area in the Hejaz.” Instead of air bases, the United 
States Government sought “forced landing fields”. After his previous obfuscation, it is not 
surprising that Suleiman was “cordial”, yet “not particularly responsive” during his talks with 
Kirk. Without a concrete answer to his latest request from either Suleiman or the King, Kirk 
returned to his post in Cairo empty-handed. Later, Kirk tried to explain away his clumsy 
handling of the situation by blaming other issues like procuring rice supplies from the 
Government of India that “occupied his (Ibn Saud) mind to the exclusion of others”.340 However, 
what had initially been thought to be a well-conceived plan meant to activate a formal American 
presence in Saudi Arabia, Kirk’s mission in the end revealed the true limitations of American 
influence and the essentiality of British diplomatic assistance. 
 
Hugh Stonehewer-Bird and James Moose: Agents of Anglo-American Cooperation 
   
   Because there was still no official American diplomatic or intelligence presence in 
Kingdom, the United States would have to depend more on their wartime ally when it came 
gaining access to air routes. All four of His Majesty’s Governments’ ambassadors to Saudi 
Arabia during the Second World War- Reader Bullard, Hugh Stonehewer-Bird, Stanley Jordan 
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and Laurence Grafftey-Smith - the “last of the Dragomans”- had all served in the dominions of 
the former Ottoman Empire and had previously held diplomatic posts in Arabia, dating back as 
far as 1920.
341
 Rather than viewing Britain’s superior position in the Kingdom as a threat, 
American officials would begin to use it as an asset. This point would be made visibly clear after 
James Moose took his post as the new American charge d’affaires in Jeddah.  
  In the wake of the recent American diplomatic failure, Moose, dined at the British 
legation with Hugh Stonehewer-Bird. This was one of those informal occasions that allowed for 
frankness, and this informality and openness brought results. The serious business of the push for 
air rights was discussed, and the effort quickly transformed and became Anglo-American in 
character.
 342
 Fluent in both Arabic and Farsi on top of possessing a photographic memory, James 
Moose - the highest-ranking American official on the ground - like Twitchell before him, 
became the unlikely architect of American policy in Saudi Arabia.
343
 Moose’s British colleague, 
Stonehewer-Bird was appointed Minister in January 1940 and was in many respects the 
personification of British power in the Kingdom. As the State Department had noted, all 
assistance to Saudi Arabia was directly controlled by the British minister in Jeddah. In the eyes 
of Saudi Arabian officials, he was not just a diplomat, but the man who controlled the purse 
strings of Britain’s wartime subsidies.  
Shortly after their dinner engagement, Stonehewer-Bird and Moose recommended to 
their superiors in London and Washington that a “joint or parallel action by the American and 
British in Jeddah” would be fully commensurate with obtaining rights to Saudi Arabian air-
routes. In the opinion of James Moose, the earlier lukewarm response from Suleiman was a 
result of a “lack of British support at the outset”.344 Appreciating the need for change in order to 
remedy the failure of the American financial aid package in 1941 and the unresolved air-routes 
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issue, Moose grew more convinced that the answer lay in the collective influence of both the 
British and American governments.  
According to Aaron David Miller, American officials in 1942 “recognized the necessity 
of cooperating with Great Britain for the benefit of the allied cause,” but he also claims that 
many officials “became staunch advocates of safeguarding interests which they believed were 
more national in character”. 345 It can equally be argued that rather than being an impediment, the 
alliance with Britain in Saudi Arabia helped secure immediate American interests. With London 
already supplying Ibn Saud with monies, foodstuffs and other essentials, greater cooperation 
with the British on the air routes could repair the political damage caused by the Americans 
mixed diplomatic efforts of the previous year. At this time in Cairo, on a higher policy-making 
level, Alexander Kirk and Britain’s Minister of State in the Middle East, Richard Casey, both 
agreed that gaining access to air routes in Saudi Arabia called for joint Anglo-American course 
of action.
346
  
So on July 25, 1942, Stonehewer-Bird and Moose met with Suleimann to request that he 
inform Ibn Saud that the air-routes were no longer an American request, but had turned into an 
Anglo-American necessity. Shortly thereafter, Stonehewer-Bird and Moose received an answer 
back from Suleimann. This time, Ibn Saud granted the request, giving permission for his 
“friends”, the British, to use nonstop trans-Arabian flights for the Khartoum and Basra supply 
route. If Britain did not object, the Americans could also be included in the arrangement. Three 
days later under the “desert moonlight”, seventeen kilometres from Mecca, a setting described by 
the American charge d affaires as more “worthy of conspirators, rather than of foreign service 
officers”, Moose met Suleiman and his cohort, Najib Sahla.347 The four men sought to clarify the 
extent to which the request made to the King over air-routes had been conveyed as a joint Anglo-
American venture, or whether it had in fact been presented as separate British and American 
requests. The Saudi Arabian officials became noticeably evasive. Suleiman told Moose that the 
air-route issue was first brought to the attention of the King informally, but that it had not been 
taken seriously until it was regarded to be a joint Anglo-American request.
348
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Noting Ibn Saud’s choice of words, “his friends, the British”, Moose naturally inferred 
that granting the British air-routes was “a manifestation of gratitude for past favors and for 
present assistance”.349 That same month, London announced that for the upcoming year of 1943 
it was preparing to raise its subsidy to over four million pounds, which constituted close to 80% 
of the Saudi Arabian Government’s yearly budget.350 British policies in Saudi Arabia were 
therefore a blueprint for the Americans to use to construct their own sway of influence that 
would extend into the future. The Anglo-Saudi relationship had not been built upon grand 
declarations or even shared ideologies. It rather was an affiliation conceived in a “practical way”. 
To assure landing rights, Moose ultimately believed that to raise the United States’ profile in the 
Kingdom, the United States needed to once again offer more assistance to Ibn Saud. In short, 
advising the NEA back in Washington, Moose wrote that the “the King would have liked some 
similar assistance from the American Government in order that he could then refer to “his 
friends, the Americans”.351As will be laid out in the upcoming chapters, the United States took 
this lesson to heart; a lesson that would have significant consequences on the Anglo-American 
relationship. 
*** 
While the joint Anglo-American approach opened the door to acquiring air-routes, the 
complexities of preserving Saudi Arabian neutrality would end up delaying it. The obscure 
assurances that had been made by Shaikh Suleimann had yet to come to full fruition, forcing 
both Moose and Stonehewer-Bird to raise the subject with Shaikh Yussef Yassin, the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs. Yassin has been regarded by British and American officials at the time and 
historians alike, as a provocateur when it came to sowing discord among the Americans, the 
British, and Ibn Saud. Back in 1942, James Moose considered Yassin to be a troublemaker, 
“obstructive…irritating…and often appears to create difficulties so he will be able to acquire 
merit in the King’s eyes by solving them afterwards”.352 Although the mere involvement of 
Yassin in the air routes issue complicated matters, as a member of Ibn Saud’s Privy Council, it 
was within his purview to discuss the specifics of the Anglo-American plans. How many planes 
were to be flown over Saudi Arabia? How far would they pass by and miss the Ikhwan 
                                               
349
 NARA: RG 84, Stack 350 6 Shelf 05-06, Entry 2412, Box 5. Moose to Cairo & State Department, July 29, 1942. 
350
 PRO: FO 371 31448 E 41/14/117/25. Foreign Office to Stonehewer-Bird, July 19, 1942. Also see, Davis, 
Contested Space, pp. 107-108. 
351
 NARA: RG 84, Stack 350 6 Shelf 05-06, Entry 2412, Box 5. Moose to State Department, July 29, 1942. 
352
 NARA: RG 84, Stack 350 6, Shelf 05-06, Entry 2412, Box 5. Moose to State, September 20, 1942. 
99 
 
settlements? And most importantly, how would the Anglo-American air routes affect Saudi 
Arabian neutrality once it became known by Axis propagandists? These questions were all 
relevant when during the summer of 1942 radio broadcasts from Berlin had ominously called 
attention to “American activities” in Saudi Arabia. As a result, pro-Axis advisers amongst the 
King’s own entourage, Khalid Al Gargani and Beshir, were kept out of the loop regarding the 
Allied air routes request. 
353
 With all of these existing risks, Moose surmised that it was “fairly 
closely to fact,” that the mixed signals and delaying tactics being employed by Suleimann and 
Yassin must reflect the cautionary attitude of Ibn Saud.
354
 
  But finally, on August 29, 1942, the King assented to the Anglo-American request. Given 
his position as the “Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques”, Ibn Saud demanded “utmost secrecy” 
for the air-routes and held that flights must not “prejudice their interests nor those of the 
Arabs”.355 The Anglo-American flight path would have to avoid the “Holy Land”, not just 
Medina and Mecca, but also the larger area defined by Omar ibn Khattab, the Second Caliph, 
that stretched to the Nejd in the eastern part of the country. Explaining the reasons behind the 
government’s cautious stance, Yassin made clear to both Moose and Stonehewer-Bird that the 
King had to balance the requirements of Britain and the United States with the knowledge that 
“agitation and dismay would be created among Moslems both in Arabia and elsewhere if they 
were to learn that British or American planes, or both, were permitted to fly over Saudi 
Arabia”.356 Hearing of this news, Paul Alling fully agreed with the position of Saudi Arabia, 
stating that it was best for the Allies to be “out of sight, out of mind”.357 As Saudi Arabia’s 
neutrality underpinned the country’s sovereignty, British and American officials along with Ibn 
Saud were unified in their efforts of making sure that the Allies’ activities in the Kingdom would 
remain clandestine. 
In the end, the air routes over Saudi Arabia, including “emergency landing rights”, came 
into being on October 6, 1942.  British and American aircraft were given permission to fly over 
northern and southern parts of Saudi Arabia, avoiding the Hedjaz. The Middle East expert, 
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Elizabeth Monroe, who at the time worked in the Ministry of Information, stressed to the British 
Political Intelligence Department that “at Ibn Saud’s request, this concession will not be made 
public: should the news leak out, he would be compelled to deny that he granted permission”.358 
To ensure Saudi Arabia’s own plausible deniability, Yassin had earlier demanded assurances 
from Stonehewer-Bird and Moose that an apology would be made if the violation of Saudi air 
space was made public.
359
 If the national identity of the plane was obscured and unable to be 
seen, Stonehewer-Bird wryly noted, no protest would be necessary. However, if planes were 
clearly seen to be American, for example, Saudi Arabian officials could subsequently “protest” 
to the British legation where they would then be informed that no British planes were present 
and, vice versa, they would complain to the American legation if seeing British planes. What this 
seemingly anecdotal story – the use of disinformation to deny public knowledge of the air routes 
- perfectly captures is the extent to which Anglo-American cooperation was tied to Ibn Saud and 
the preservation of Saudi Arabia’s neutrality.  
   After it had been made official that air-routes had been acquired, Hugh Stonehewer-Bird, 
reporting to the Foreign Office spoke glowingly of Anglo-American cooperation as it 
“demonstrated the wisdom of the joint action”.360 The abiding lesson gained by this approach, 
however, might have been more fundamentally felt on the American side. Looking back over the 
events of the summer, the American minister Alexander Kirk would expand on the earlier 
assessment of his colleague James Moose. From Cairo, he cabled the State Department and 
explained the way that British subsidies, totalling three million pounds a year, had accounted for 
the disparity in British and American influence in Saudi Arabia. For the time being, said Kirk, 
the Saudi Arabian Government was left with a large deficit of 750,000 pounds per year.
361
 It was 
unlikely that the British would raise their already generous subsidy. Although British subsidies 
came indirectly from American Lend-Lease aid, it was still not perceived in Saudi Arabia as 
direct American aid. Would filling the gap in Saudi Arabia’s finances in 1943 make amends for 
the reneging of direct American aid in 1941?  
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Certainly British policy in Saudi Arabia made an impact on American thinking.  Their 
outcomes over the past two years had been a master class for the Americans, showing how 
London used money and influence to gain their political objectives, which were at this point still 
commensurate with Washington. Rather than taking the view of Britain as a competitor, who the 
United States needed to outdo, Kirk advised that the United States needed to bring more to the 
table if Anglo-American cooperation was going to fully ensure American interests.
 362
 His 
proposal presages in the end one of the subject’s most important episodes, the United States and 
Britain working to find a solution to share equally the subsidy earmarked for the Saudi Arabian 
Government in 1944. But during this interim period when American policy-makers were still 
working out the extent to which the United States government should be involved in the affairs 
of Saudi Arabia, Washington still felt compelled to work closely with their wartime ally.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 This chapter has shown that in 1942, as the Second World War was unfolding, issues 
that were rooted in Allied wartime strategy such as the protection of Saudi Arabia’s oil fields and 
the acquisition of air routes were key developments in the formation of the Anglo-American 
relationship in the Kingdom. These relatively neglected episodes are illuminating because they 
do not cast the wartime allies as being constant rivals in Saudi Arabia. Indeed, when it came to 
guarding the oilfields, rather than fighting over who would lead such a mission - a direct 
indication of hegemony - winning this particular competition meant not being the power in 
charge. In part, the explanation as to why the wartime alliance acted cautiously because of fears 
that an Anglo-American military presence in Saudi Arabia would be perceived as an occupation, 
possibly jeopardizing Al-Saud’s regime independent credibility. Maintaining the guise of Saudi 
Arabian neutrality also attached itself to the search for air routes over Saudi Arabia that would 
help open up Allied supply lines. Secrecy was required so there could be no conjecture that Ibn 
Saud was under the thumb of either the United States or Britain. Indeed, there was a tendency in 
1942 of the two powers being wary of being perceived as in any way steering Saudi Arabian 
politics with this trend lasting throughout the entire war.  
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Although the subject of air routes and aviation would later be a cause of inter-allied 
tension, for the moment, the successful acquisition of Allied air-routes showed the potential of 
the two powers working in tandem as allies.
363
 The teamwork shown by Hugh Stonehewer-Bird 
and James Moose on the ground validated the view that a combined British and American 
diplomatic effort could ensure the foreign policy aims of both countries. In fact, the two men 
would set such a promising example of Anglo-American cooperation that Washington and 
London would go on to believe that a good rapport between British and American diplomats in 
Saudi Arabia could mitigate political or strategic differences, a notion that was not always found 
to be true as will be seen in the following chapters. 
  Nevertheless, this was an instructive period during which the United States witnessed 
how the clout of British diplomacy could function as a fast track to gaining influence in Saudi 
Arabia. Conversely, from London’s perspective, working side by side with the Americans had 
been a wartime policy aim, but it also allowed British officials to have a handle in the 
construction of United States Government’s nascent policy in the Kingdom. Heading into 1943, 
what can therefore be observed is an Anglo-American relationship not being dragged down by 
national rivalry, but one that was evolving into being mutually cooperative in structure.   
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Chapter IV            
Anglo-American Relations and Ibn Saud outside of Saudi 
Arabia, 1943 
 
Introduction 
 
  After Britain had turned back the Germans and won the decisive Battle of El Alamein in 
November 1942, Ibn Saud sent a message to London “offering [his] sincerest congratulations on 
the magnificent success of the Eighth Army”.364 Despite the upswing in fortune, by 1943, British 
power was ultimately giving way to their wartime ally, the United States.
 365
 Indeed, the 
hierarchical complexion of Anglo-American relations over the past year had undergone a 
transformation. Powered by its unrivalled financial and material wealth, the United States war 
machine during the Second World War now dwarfed that of friends and foes alike as it became 
the backbone of the Allied war effort. As the historian Warren Kimball noted, in 1943, when 
British strategists relented to the United States’ insistence of an Allied assault in Western 
Europe, the wartime alliance began to function squarely on “American terms”.366 For the rest of 
the Second World War, this shift would also make itself manifest in Saudi Arabia even as the 
Anglo-American relations in the Kingdom were becoming more intertwined.  
Reflecting the new assertiveness in American diplomacy, on June 12, 1943, the American 
Ambassador in London, John G. Winant informed Winston Churchill that Lieutenant Colonel 
Harold Hoskins would be sent to interview Ibn Saud to explore the possibility of a Jewish-Arab 
rapprochement in Palestine.
367
 While the Hoskins Mission has been deemed relevant to the 
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history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, its significance to Anglo-American relations in Saudi Arabia 
at this time has largely been lost on historians.
368
 
Although starting out as an American idea, the fact that British and American policies 
were languishing in Palestine - motivated by the concept of strategic interdependence - the 
Hoskins Mission quickly transformed into an Anglo-American initiative. Plans for using Ibn 
Saud as a broker to address the Palestinian question would eventually cause inter-allied tensions, 
but rather than dividing the United States and Britain along nationalistic lines, the issue caused 
internal divisions within the respective governments. Those in the highest echelons of power, the 
White House and Downing Street respectively, supported the mission, while the branches of the 
State Department and Foreign Office that followed Saudi Arabia on an everyday basis were 
sceptical. In the end, the Hoskins Mission failed in its main objective: attempting to reach a 
solution to the Palestine question with Saudi Arabia’s help. The sceptics were proven correct 
recognizing the overriding paradox that had always been tied to the notion of Ibn Saud’s 
“benevolent neutrality.” This implied that it was more important that the Saudi Arabian King 
maintained his political credibility as an independent Arab leader, rather than pressing him to act 
as some sort of Anglo-American pro-consul. The episode re-emphasizes that Ibn Saud’s 
influence in the Second World War could at times be enigmatic, manifesting its full potential 
only when it appeared to be free of British and American interference.  
To fill the void hitherto left in the historiography of Anglo-American relations in Saudi 
Arabia, this chapter analyzes the Hoskins Mission to show that one needs to look beyond the 
Kingdom’s borders to gain a better appreciation of the way that the Anglo-American relationship 
within the country operated.  
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Ibn Saud as Anglo-American Pro Consul in Palestine 
    
When 250,415 German and Italian soldiers laid down their arms on May 12, 1943 at the 
Battle of Tunis, marking the end of the Axis’ military campaign in the Middle East, it left British 
and American policy makers freer to concentrate more fully on the wider political issues in the 
region.
369
 As the Second World War entered its fifth calendar year, Ibn Saud continued to give 
his tacit support to British and American wartime objectives. The question now arose as to 
whether the Saudi Arabian king could go one step further and help to solve one of the Allies’ 
most troublesome political conundrums; the question of Palestine. When it came to the issue, a 
certain amount of gallows humour hung in the air amongst British and American officialdom. 
Harry Eyres of the Foreign Office’s Near East Department remarked that in Palestine, his 
American colleagues at the State Department were “just hoping that in course of time something 
will turn up to solve the Jewish-Arab problem…not unlike HMG”. 370 On the other side of the 
Atlantic, in May of 1943, even the staunch Anglophobe, General Patrick Hurley could inform 
President Roosevelt in good faith that the United States and Great Britain had “kindred 
problems” in the Middle East, and that both countries must “come together and share equally in 
the final decision for or against the establishment of a Jewish Political state...”371 Once again 
John Bull and Uncle Sam were “mixed up together”, but this time they found themselves 
entangled in the Gordian knot that is still intact almost 70 years later. 
The British Government which had dealt directly with Palestine since the days of 
Palmerston, still adhered to the controversial White Paper of May 1939, a measure designed to 
appeal to Britain’s imperial interests in the Arab world.372 In this context, Palestine functioned 
for London as a strategic lynchpin, protecting, in the words of the Commanders-in-Chief 
Committee in the Middle East, “the maintenance of sea, land and air communications throughout 
the Middle East and the safeguarding of our oil supplies which are vital to the British 
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Empire”.373But British rule in Palestine, which in the days of Allenby’s triumphant entrance into 
the Holy City in 1917 was a force to be reckoned with, had devolved into a rule that, by 1943, 
lacked confidence.
374
 The historian D.K. Fieldhouse noted years later that the Mandate was 
“arguably…the greatest failure in the whole history of British imperial rule”.375 The violent 
combination of Zionist extremism in Palestine during the 1940s and the Arab Revolt in the 
previous decade had struck at the heart Britain’s will to rule as a Great Power.376  
   From the American standpoint, Evan M. Wilson, a State Department official who 
served in Egypt during the Second World War, recalled that 1943 was the first year that the 
United States truly “adopted a definite line of policy” in Palestine.377 Up to that point, American 
policy remained largely in the shadows; sometimes critical, but never intending to take over the 
burden of mandatory leadership in Palestine.
378
 But  after the highly publicized Biltmore 
Conference (May 9-11, 1942), in which Zionists delegates demanded a “Jewish Commonwealth” 
in Palestine, the fulcrum of worldwide Zionist activity swung from London to New York, and by 
doing so, Washington became progressively more involved in the issue.
379
 Returning from his 
diplomatic visit to the Middle East in 1943, which included a stop in Saudi Arabia, Roosevelt’s 
special envoy, Patrick Hurley, warned the president that because of the Zionists’ growing 
network of support in the United States, the Arab population was quickly turning against 
Americans as there was a “well defined opinion prevailing that the United States, and not Great 
Britain, is insisting on establishing a sovereign Jewish state”.380 
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The historian Philip Baram has gone as far to assert that at this stage in the Second World 
War, Ibn Saud was “probably the major reason” for the State Department’s coolness towards 
Zionism with respect to Palestine.
381
 In this regard, it is arguable that Arab resentment acquired a 
human face in the United States only when Ibn Saud had cabled the president in 1943 
complaining about Zionist political activities taking place there. On May 26, 1943, Roosevelt 
responded to Ibn Saud’s concerns, outlining to him the highly interpretive “full consultation 
formula”, which stated “that no decision altering the basic situation of Palestine should be 
reached without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews”.382 Believing that Ibn Saud’s 
influence reached Palestine, it bears noting that this message marked the beginning of the 
president using the Saudi king as an intermediary to communicate his views with the rest of Arab 
world.
383
  
*** 
  The scholars Samuel Halperin and Irvin Oder have asserted that, “for a time during 1939-
1943, Ibn Saud was the key figure in a plan which seemed to offer the possibility of a negotiated 
settlement [in Palestine]”.384 The origins of the idea of capitalizing on Ibn Saud’s political 
influence with regard to Palestine had been the brainchild of none other than the King’s close 
advisor, the controversial Briton, St. John Philby. In October 1939, Philby told Chaim Weizmann 
- the president of the World Zionist Organization - that for the sum of twenty million pounds 
provided by British, American, or Jewish sources, the King of Saudi Arabia would in return 
actively support a Jewish state in Palestine, including the relocation of the Arab population to 
neighbouring Arab states.
385
 Philby had conveyed to Weizmann that a solution in Palestine 
“could be achieved under Ibn Saud alone”.386 In the end, this plan never came to fruition, and 
scholars since have contested that it was likely that Ibn Saud was unaware of the substance of 
Philby’s actions and his discussions with Weizmann. 387 Shortly after this exchange, due to his 
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increasingly strident anti-British sympathies, Philby eventually became persona non grata in 
Saudi Arabia.
 388
  Nevertheless, Philby’s efforts were soon followed up by those of the American 
oilman James Moffett, who put forward a similar plan in April 1941, this time to President 
Roosevelt directly. As covered in chapter II, in return for helping to subsidize the faltering Saudi 
Arabian economy, Moffett hinted that the King would willingly assent to a future Jewish State in 
Palestine.  
  There were British and American authorities at the time who thought the opposite. As far 
back as June 1938, Reader Bullard in his position as British minister in Jeddah had been 
unequivocal in his view “that no bribe would buy the support of Ibn Saud for the proposal to 
partition Palestine”.389 Also holding a similar opinion was the Undersecretary of State, Adolf 
Berle, and NEA chief, Wallace Murray, who believed that Moffett’s quid pro quo, had been 
reckless and bound to stir up trouble. Murray later claimed that placing Ibn Saud at the front of a 
firestorm issue like Palestine would be a major political blunder as the King would “lose face 
with his co-religionists in the neighbouring Arab countries”.390Although the schemes proposed 
by Philby and Moffett were audacious and ill-conceived, as ideas they died hard. They held 
currency because such plans exposed the ethnocentric prejudices of the time. There existed a 
widespread belief that “Oriental” potentates like Ibn Saud were far more susceptible to the lure 
of Baksheesh; a bribe.
391
 Certainly Ibn Saud’s position of “benevolent neutrality” towards the 
Allies to some degree had materialized on account of Anglo-American political support and 
subsidies. In view of this, the rationale went - that for the right price - the Desert King might 
consent to Jewish migration to Palestine?
392
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  This perception remained a prevalent force when on March 3, 1943, leading Zionists 
figures, including Moshe Shertok (also known as Moshe Sharett, the future second Prime 
Minister of Israel) and Chaim Weizmann met with NEA officials in Washington.
393
 Shertok 
summed up the view of his Jewish colleague, stating that he believed Ibn Saud to be “most 
important Arab alive”, and that it should therefore at least be explored if the King would be 
interested in such an arrangement that mirrored Philby and Moffett’s earlier schemes.394    
  However, the NEA continued to have little faith in the plan to involve Ibn Saud in 
Palestine and its views were best encapsulated by officials stationed in Jeddah. Harold Shullaw, 
the Charge D’affaires, claimed that the three pillars of Ibn Saud’s rule could be traced back to 
Islam, Arabism and his friendship with the British Government. The first two pillars, stated 
Shullaw, would always trump British friendship. Moreover, to be regarded as leader of the Arab 
world, Ibn Saud could never agree to the establishment of a Jewish- controlled state in 
Palestine.
395
 The American minister to Saudi Arabia, James Moose also sent a strongly worded 
cable to Washington, warning that if such a proposal came into being, “the King will not be 
happy to have to choose between prejudicing his position in the Moslem world or [sic] refusing 
the proposals of his friends.”396 
  Regardless of their astute analysis, by the summer NEA officials would be kept out of the 
decision-making process. In June 1943, Under-Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, met with 
Weizmann to tell him that the White House supported the idea of working with Ibn Saud”.397 
According to Welles, the president believed that Ibn Saud was “purchasable”.398Later that same 
month, Roosevelt informed Welles to “prepare the ground”, for the plan as long as it had the full 
consent of Winston Churchill.
399
 As the First Lord of the Admiralty in 1939, Churchill had been 
made aware of the Philby proposal through his close relationship with Weizmann, a relationship 
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dating back to the First World War.
 400
 On his trip to Washington that spring, Weizmann inferred 
that the Ibn Saud scheme had behind-the-scenes support coming from London, to the point 
where the State Department referred to the plan as “Mr. Churchill’s idea”.401 Like Roosevelt, 
Churchill had recognized that domestically, Zionism had widespread political support.
402
 Sumner 
Welles, therefore, sent a message to the American Ambassador in London, John G. Winant, 
stating that “the President believes that the time has come when an approach should be made to 
Ibn Saud with a view to seeing whether any basis for a settlement can be found”.403 On June 7, 
1943, President Roosevelt wrote a personal letter to Ibn Saud, which included instructions for 
Lieutenant Colonel Harold Hoskins to discuss “in my name certain specific matters of mutual 
interest”.404 
 
Harold Hoskins and Anglo-American Relations in Saudi Arabia 
   
  In the long line of Roosevelt’s own personal diplomatic envoys, Harold Boies Hoskins 
did not typify the conventional “grey suits” at the State Department.405 Born and raised in Beirut 
to Presbyterian missionary parents, he came from a stock of Americans, who according to Von 
Joseph L. Grabill believed that the United States government had a duty to “organize...the old 
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world”.406Speaking Arabic fluently, Hoskins had served as a Middle East expert at the 1919 Paris 
Peace Conference. In 1941, Hoskins was sent on a fact finding mission to the Middle East on 
behalf of the Office of War Information to survey Arab attitudes toward the war.
407
 The 
following year, he met with British officials in Cairo to discuss ways to better coordinate OSS-
SOE operations in the region.
408
 Independently wealthy and already close friends with Roosevelt 
and Sumner Welles, Hoskins felt at home within the elite circles of American power. Through 
his personal relationships, he managed to serve as the Department liaison to the White House and 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Although he was a de facto non-careerist Foreign Service Officer (FSO), 
Hoskins reputedly tired easily of what he perceived to be the timidity of some of his NEA 
colleagues. Nevertheless: “In terms of status, long-term influence, and intensity of personal 
involvement,” observed the scholar Philip Baram, Hoskins was at the centre of forging American 
policy in the Middle East.
409
  
  On June 14, 1943, Anthony Eden informed Ambassador Winant that although the British 
Government was “naturally anxious not to awaken wide public controversy”, the very fact that 
President Roosevelt fully supported the mission meant that they had “not the slightest 
objection…to send Lieutenant Colonel Hoskins to see Ibn Saud”.410 The views of Eden’s 
colleagues at the Colonial Office were similar to those of the former Chief Secretary to the 
Government of Palestine, William Battershill, who opined that “if any American is to visit Ibn 
Saud for the purpose of discussing the Palestine problem with him I should think Colonel 
Hoskins is as good a choice as can be made.”411 In his comprehensive The Department of State in 
the Middle East-1919-1945, Baram stresses the Anglophobic bias of American officials. He 
characterized Hoskins as being “anti-British”, but his British counterparts did not think 
so.
412
After meeting Hoskins in Cairo during his earlier mission to the Middle East in 1942, 
British minister of state, Richard Casey, reported that he “made a good impression on me and 
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showed every sign of wishing to co-operate”.413 Months later in March 1943, a Foreign Office 
report described Hoskins no less a “high minded Arabophile, fundamentally friendly and not 
anti-British”.414 What troubled Hoskins the most were not his relations with British authorities in 
this context, but his own misgivings about the mission.   
 Interestingly, Roosevelt had selected an envoy who believed that Ibn Saud had a limited 
role to play in Palestine. Placing the King in front of public scrutiny in such a fashion, Hoskins 
this time concurred with previous points made by his NEA colleagues. He felt that his mission 
ran the risk of showing Ibn Saud as other-worldly in the sense of an arcane Arab chieftain out of 
step with the modern world.
415
 Hoskins’ thoughts in this respect were also in line with those of 
the British and the head of the Foreign Office’s Near East Department there, C.W. Baxter, who 
opined:  
“Ibn Saud should be kept completely out of all Mediterranean problems since he 
was not profoundly interested in them and did not get on particularly well with 
the Jewish State and would only complicate matters by allowing himself to be 
drawn in. He was getting on very amicably at the moment with his both British 
and American officials and nothing should be done to upset his happy 
arrangement”.416  
 
  Since backing away from the recommendations of the 1936-1937 Peel Commission, a 
trend in British policymaking had been to craft a pro-Arab policy in Palestine precisely to bolster 
Britain’s imperial position in the Middle East, which could be accomplished mainly through 
winning the friendship of Arab leaders like Ibn Saud.
417
 Now, British authorities would be 
backing a plan that would ask the Saudi Arabian king to approve a policy that was overtly pro-
Zionist. Moreover, it also meant that London would have to deal with the loud protests coming 
from their Hashemite allies in Jordan and Iraq, who would never accede to a Saudi-led 
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Palestinian solution on behalf of all Arabs.
418
 Although the British Government was anxious to 
reach a lasting settlement in Palestine, the Colonial Secretary Oliver Stanley argued that it was a 
mistake for the British Government to “press” Ibn Saud to “do anything which might make it 
more difficult for him to retain the prestige and respect which he now enjoys in the Arab 
World”.419 However, taking into consideration the need to promote Anglo-American unity, the 
Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden ended up reluctantly accepting the Hoskins Mission, but only 
as long it adhered to two specific corollaries. The first was that “no suggestions involving 
territorial alterations in other Arab countries should be put forward to him (Ibn Saud)”. The 
second and final point was that “his conversations should be purely exploratory in nature and 
should not in any way prejudice the interests of other Arab countries; and the visit should be 
carried out as unobtrusively as possible”.420  
   But what would in the end prove to be the greatest roadblock of turning Ibn Saud into an 
Allied pro-consul was the sheer conviction of the King’s own sentiments over Palestine. As early 
as May 1941 Sir Vivian Gabriel, former intelligence officer in the Middle East, British Air 
Mission representative and British attaché in Washington DC,  had warned that Chaim 
Weizmann’s Zionist politicking in the United States was causing, “unfortunate repercussions” in 
Saudi Arabia with Ibn Saud.
421
 In 1943, when Life Magazine published an extensive profile on 
Ibn Saud, it seemed to validate the King’s arrival on the international stage, but the primary gist 
of the article had been his public condemnation over the Allied treatment of Palestine.
422
 British 
officials had already received a disturbing report in 1943 compiled by Saudi officials revealing 
that the King had shared with the American envoy, Patrick Hurley, that he “hated Jews more 
than anyone”. 423 His complete opposition to Zionism was a prominent aspect of Ibn Saud’s own 
iconography, something that for those who were pushing Hoskins’ mission seemed to have 
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clearly underestimated. As the British Foreign Office official R.M.A Hankey would bluntly point 
out afterwards: “Anyone who thinks Ibn Saud will look at this hair brained scheme after what he 
has said about it (Palestine) must be quite cracked”.424 In this respect, once again, the United 
States and British Governments were forced to confront the obvious ambiguities of Ibn Saud’s 
influence. Paradoxically, the political prestige that resulted from his position as independent 
Arab statesman and defender of Islam were the very aspects of Ibn Saud’s private and public 
feelings and image, which would prevent him from taking on the role that the White House and 
Downing Street had envisioned for him in Palestine.  
 Leading up to Hoskins’ meeting with Ibn Saud, in July of 1943, the political atmosphere 
was intense as Zionist pressure had put a stop to a joint Anglo-American statement on Palestine, 
which further outlined President Roosevelt’s “full consultation” formula.425 The fear that the 
United States Government had become too associated with Zionist interests was at this time 
expressed by the British High Commissioner in Palestine, Sir Harold MacMichael. He cautioned 
that it would be “undesirable that any member of the British Legation should accompany him 
(Hoskins) to Riyadh, or interpret at his audiences”, and that the presence of a British official 
would associate HMG so closely with what is intended to be a purely American 
initiative…”426As a nephew of Lord Curzon and an expert on British rule in Anglo-Sudan, 
MacMichael was concerned about the Hoskins Mission disturbing Britain’s informal empire in 
the Middle East.
427
 Nevertheless, with the Palestine issue reverberating as a source for so much 
rancour, London nevertheless gave instructions to MacMichael to work with the Americans and 
to do “everything possible to facilitate Colonel Hoskins’ mission”.428 From this point of view, a 
larger balance sheet was being considered by British officials, measuring Allied solidarity 
against issues that added up in Saudi Arabia to quite a few concerns that had wider ramifications 
throughout the Middle East.  What must be remembered, however, is that despite the fact of 
MacMichael’s protestations and Britain’s understandable apprehension, the Hoskins’ inquiry 
would be undertaken as a joint effort, a scheme that involved Anglo-American co-action. 
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*** 
  Arriving in Saudi Arabia in the beginning of August, Harold Hoskins was left with the 
difficult task of arranging a meeting between Ibn Saud and Chaim Weizmann, or a representative 
of the Jewish Agency.
429
 In a display of Anglo-American unity, the British legation’s best 
Arabist, John Wall, helped Hoskins with drafting the American envoy’s controversial request. 
Despite the level of disquietude in both the lower strata of the State Department and the Foreign 
Office, the Hoskins mission had transformed into a dual Anglo-American effort. Presented to the 
Saudi Arabian King on August 11, 1943, the letter drawn up by Hoskins and Wall stated that 
both the British and the American Government’s policies concerning Palestine was “to postpone 
as far as possible until the Axis has been defeated…the many territorial boundary problems that 
exist” and that the “most pressing objective is to win the war”.430 To limit the possible offense 
caused by any suggestion that Ibn Saud had any knowledge of the  Philby Plan, Hoskins let it be 
known that both “Mr. Churchill and President Roosevelt would be derelict in their duties if they 
overlooked any plan…before the end of the war to a friendly and peaceful solution of the 
Palestine problem…”431  
  Coming as no surprise to Hoskins, when he spoke to Ibn Saud face to face without an 
interpreter, the Saudi Arabian King let it be known to the American envoy that any scheme 
reminiscent of the Philby plan of 1939, would be considered a “criminal affront” that would 
make him a “traitor against [his] religion and country”.432 The notion of assuming the mantle of 
Caliphate in the context of Second World War geopolitics meant little to Ibn Saud; “a loud voice 
with an empty belly,” said the king.433 Instead of discussing Palestine, Ibn Saud shifted the topic 
to more local matters, ones that he believed to be of greater importance. These included how the 
United States and Britain intended to address Saudi Arabia’s currency troubles and raise the 
Government’s income from the Hajj.434 Using the influence of Ibn Saud for the purpose of 
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forwarding Allied interests evidently had its limits. Hoskins was correct in thinking that Ibn Saud 
would be unwilling to trade in his political legitimacy as an independent Arab leader for an ill-
conceived Anglo-American scheme that might possibly sow the seeds of his own downfall. In 
this respect, one gets the sense that Hoskins’ principal motive for trekking all the way to Saudi 
Arabia was to confirm his own shrewd assessment of the situation. After returning home from a 
mission, Hoskins emphatically wrote to his colleagues at the State Department on August 31, 
1943: “I am convinced that there never was any possibility of acceptance (of the plan) and there 
is none today”.435 
  Regarding Anglo-American relations, the lesson drawn from the mission by Hoskins was 
that it confirmed to him that in the Middle East, far from usurping Britain as the premier regional 
power, the United States would at least for the foreseeable future need to depend on its wartime 
ally. On his return from Saudi Arabia in September, Hoskins made several recommendations on 
this score to the president.
436
 Regardless of his mission’s failure, Hoskins wanted to make clear 
to Roosevelt that no country possessed the experience or the administrators “required to handle 
the exceptionally difficult job of governing Palestine” quite like the British Government.437 
When it came to drawing up policy involving individual Arab countries like Saudi Arabia, 
Hoskins stressed that the United States should emulate British authorities.  The Kingdom should 
be viewed through a regional prism, taking into account “Muslim attitudes in neighbouring 
Middle Eastern states as well as North Africa, India and even Russia and China”. 438 Despite the 
wartime rise of American power, Hoskins’ final piece of advice emphasized Britain’s experience 
in the region and the two countries’ strategic interdependence, leading him to recommend that 
the United States should seek an “agreement on joint Anglo-American policy to be applied in 
[the] Middle East…”439 
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  Later that same year in November 1943, Hoskins would again cross the Atlantic to meet 
with key members of the British policymaking establishment in London.
440
 He first had a prickly 
parley with the Undersecretary of State for the Foreign Office, Sir Maurice Peterson, discussing 
the former’s meeting with Ibn Saud. Peterson informed Hoskins that: “HMG certainly had no 
wish to contest the American desire to play a greater part than hitherto in the Middle East”, but 
he had also made it very clear that the United States would be venturing into a territory of the 
world that was unmistakably a British domain.
441
 In the Middle East, Peterson asserted that there 
was “already a political regime in that part of the world built by HMG”. Peterson continued: “it 
had worked well during the war except for the Iraqi revolt…we would not wish to scrap it”.442 
Peterson was critical towards Hoskins’ mission and Washington’s contradictory Middle East 
policies in general. He was annoyed by the way the Americans were putting pressure on British 
authorities to allow more Jewish immigration into Palestine, while at the same time preparing to 
equip Ibn Saud with arms, which might be used for “cutting Jewish and British throats in 
Palestine”.443Although there was no evidence that weapons purchased by American aid were 
being funnelled into Palestine from Saudi Arabia, Peterson’s acerbic comments illustrate how the 
question of Ibn Saud’s regional influence could quickly lead to discord between the two wartime 
allies.   
 Hoskins did not completely disagree with his British counterpart. He was painfully aware 
of the fact that the hasty and misguided attempt to insert Ibn Saud into the Palestine equation had 
been the cause of some friction between the two allies. But even though a majority of British 
officials were sceptical of the mission, the members of HMG that Hoskins met with were 
nonetheless enthusiastic about the possibilities of greater Anglo-American cooperation. There 
was a growing realization that crisis points such as Palestine drained British resources and could 
no longer be put aside by endless royal commissions. What was needed was further American 
participation to shore up Britain’s flagging regional power. Hoskins went on to have a friendly 
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meeting with Richard Law, Minister of State and Churchill’s Parliamentary Private Secretary, 
who afterwards spoke for many British officials at the time, when he told the prime minister that 
“it would be a tremendous advantage to us to invoke the Americans as association in our policy 
towards Palestine”.444 Another British official, Colonial Secretary Oliver Stanley, consoled 
Hoskins, telling him that the “plan of using Ibn Saud was one that had come from the prime 
minister” and his mission had been useful in that it finally “cleared up the matter”.445   
Before heading back to the United States, Hoskins met with Anthony Eden allowing him the 
chance to explain that with regard to the Anglo-American relationship in the Middle East, 
American activities in the region could be thought of in terms of “a junior partnership, but 
definitely of a partnership”.446 In the larger context, the lasting effect of the Hoskins Mission had 
shown British and American policymakers that working in concert, be it Palestine or in Saudi 
Arabia, held the promise of promoting the long-term national interests of both parties. As will be 
seen in the upcoming chapters, Saudi Arabia therefore increasingly became the cornerstone of an 
Anglo-American diplomatic approach in the Middle East.  
 
Conclusion 
 
  The story of Anglo-American relations in Saudi Arabia cannot be fully told without 
investigating the Hoskins Mission and the proposal to place Ibn Saud at the heart of the Palestine 
problem.
447
 There are three key observations that can be made about this episode which explain 
how the wartime alliance operated in the Kingdom. Firstly, the Hoskins Mission shows the 
extent to which the conduct of the wartime alliance with regard to Ibn Saud was interwoven with 
Allied interests that stretched well beyond the Kingdom. The second important observation to 
take from the Mission was that Ibn Saud’s prestige and persona carried only so much weight.  
The Hoskins Mission exposed the enigma of Saudi Arabia’s “benevolent neutrality”. Asking the 
King, whom the journalist Drew Pearson described in 1943 as the “most powerful of the Arabs”, 
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to support the creation of a Jewish State in Palestine under a cagey quid pro quo would have  
forced Ibn Saud into an untenable political position.
 448
 On a policymaking level, the Foreign 
Office and the State Department shared a similar view. Involving the King in such a daring 
scheme would only succeed in jeopardizing regional stability. Certainly, Ibn Saud had a political 
role to play in the region, but being the Arab arbiter in Palestine was not one of them. From this 
perspective, seeking to exert the extraterritorial influence of Ibn Saud, which had originally 
drawn the two powers to Saudi Arabia, in reality turned out to be decidedly double-edged. 
  The third and final point is that although the Hoskins Mission failed to solve the political 
crisis in Palestine, it underscored the interdependent facets of Anglo-American relations in Saudi 
Arabia. However, as the United States rose from its junior partner status, relations between the 
two wartime allies in Saudi Arabia were becoming more formalized, and also more complex. 
Following the military victories that had largely swept away the Axis threat in the Middle East, 
Britain and the United States now had to jointly construct a bilateral partnership without the 
overriding consideration of wartime exigency. The next chapter analyzes Anglo-American 
relations inside the Kingdom in the context of this change and will examine conditions on the 
ground, where British and American officials faced the sizeable challenge of constructing a 
partnership that balanced the separate national interests of the two countries. 
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Chapter V            
Anglo-American Relations inside Saudi Arabia, 1943 to 1944 
 
Introduction 
 
   The initial stages of the Anglo-American relationship in Saudi Arabia were built on the 
need to procure the influence of Ibn Saud. With his influence having expanded all the way to 
Palestine in 1943, that same year British and American policymakers were now faced with two 
crucial issues pertaining to the domestic sphere of Saudi Arabia, issues which would also raise 
questions of hegemonic rivalry between Britain and the United States. This chapter sets out to 
examine what one scholar has labelled Washington’s “crude diplomacy,” a set of initiatives 
designed to consolidate American oil interests in the Kingdom. The United States’ decision to 
grant Lend-Lease aid to Ibn Saud and establish the Petroleum Reserves Corporation (PRC) at 
different points of time strained Anglo-American relations. Yet, the chapter also considers other 
controversies pertaining to the oil question that were far more contested, most notably the turf 
wars between American officials in Washington and the government’s heated battle with the 
American oil industry. In fact, contrary to conventional wisdom, authorities in Washington and 
London were largely united in their belief that it took close collaboration to bring order to the 
“frontier” that was the Middle East oil bonanza.449 Saudi Arabian oil would be instrumental in 
bringing about the ambitious Anglo-American Oil Agreement in the summer of 1944, a measure 
calling for the coordination of British and American oil policies in the region. 
The Anglo-American debate that surfaced over how to fix Saudi Arabia’s broken 
finances was a much more contentious issue between the allies. British and American officials 
had been trying to answer this question since 1941. The time had now come for action, and both 
parties were committed to implementing a plan to address the problem in earnest. Both powers 
agreed that the Saudi Arabian Government needed to mend the country’s currency system, and 
brought to the forefront the thorny question of who would oversee these reforms.  Another 
economic concern which was interrelated, was the fact that the British, who had been the major 
provider of wartime subsidies, were now sensing that this expansion of largesse was 
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inadvertently undermining the stability of Ibn Saud’s sovereign rule. The new British minister in 
Jeddah, Stanley Jordan, adamantly argued that subsides had mutated into a corrupting presence 
and that Britain and the United States were perceived as “milch cows” by Saudi Arabian 
officials.
450
 Acknowledging the merits of the British arguments over subsidies, nonetheless, the 
Americans came to a different conclusion. On balance, they thought the subsidies were effective 
as they benefited the Kingdom’s economic conditions for the present, and more importantly, 
contributed to cementing Saudi-American relations for the future. Although the subsidy question 
would remain a source of tension, in the summer of 1944, Britain and the United States did take 
steps to further integrate their policies by finding a joint agreement in which each country would 
come to terms acceptable to both parties, and allow each country to equally provide subsidies to 
the Kingdom. 
  While the subject of oil and Saudi Arabia’s finances sowed the seeds of disharmony, 
there is a question which historians have yet to sufficiently acknowledge or address. Why were 
British and American officials at this juncture able to overlook these significant differences? 
With the wartime alliance, in the words of Warren Kimball, in a state of “suspended animation” 
in the spring of 1944, the recognition of the overriding importance of strategic interdependence 
went a long way to reconciling the differences between the two powers.451 On the eve of 
Operation Overlord, the emphasis placed on the need for bilateral cooperation that had been 
stressed during the Stettinius Mission and Anglo-American oil talks in April and May of that 
year was ultimately brought to bear on Anglo-American relations in Saudi Arabia.  
The Kingdom was still being eyed as an anchor for greater regional cooperation between 
Britain and the United States. But whereas interpersonal relationships had once been a 
strongpoint of Anglo-American collaboration in Saudi Arabia, policymakers acknowledged that 
the “lack of liaison” now occurring on the ground in Jeddah, specifically between Stanley Jordan 
and James Moose, needed to be addressed. A legitimate concern had emerged on both sides of 
the Atlantic that the disagreements between Britain and the United States sprang - not from an 
incompatibility of ideology or interests - but rather had to do with a clash of personalities; a 
reality which forces one to rethink the conception of Saudi Arabia as strictly being a playing 
field for Anglo-American competition. 
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Anglo-American Relations, the United States & Saudi Arabian Oil 
  
To ascertain how Saudi Arabia’s oil reserves impacted on Anglo-American relations, one 
must first look to the events of February 18, 1943. On that day, President Roosevelt issued 
Executive Order 8926, which declared that Saudi Arabia was eligible for Lend-Lease.
452
 
Concerned with preserving the neutrality of the United States as well as Saudi Arabia, 
Washington had withheld Lend-Lease aid in 1941, a decision made easier by the fact that Britain 
was subsidizing Ibn Saud to keep the King inside the Allied fold. By 1943, however, the 
previous calculus had dramatically changed as the United States had been fighting as a 
belligerent power on a global scale for over a year. This is where the Kingdom fitted into a 
framework of policy outlined by a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) report from that year. It stressed 
that the United States’ primary objective was “to conduct a strategic offensive against the Axis in 
European-Mediterranean Theatre, employing the maximum forces consistent with maintaining 
and extending unremitting pressure against Japan”.453 Taken from this view, Admiral William 
Leahy, Chief of Staff to President Roosevelt, would observe in 1943 that Saudi Arabia would 
become “practically essential to any successful (military) campaign by the Americans” in that he 
foresaw it as a location that would allow for the conveyance of troops and materiel, while its oil 
installations provided a safeguard against future fuel shortages.454  
   In this respect, as the Second World War went on, American policymakers had become 
concerned that wartime oil consumption had unalterably reduced the country’s domestic 
reserves. By 1943, the United States accounted for roughly 70% of the world’s oil output. “It 
require [d] four to five tons of petroleum to drop one ton of bombs on Berlin,” proclaimed the 
Truman Committee, an influential Senatorial body that investigated waste in the United States’ 
war effort. Looking towards the post-war world, in peacetime, the average American consumed 
thirty times as much petroleum as the world average, six times as much as the average of a 
Briton and nine times as much as the average Russian.
455
 In May 1943, a memorandum prepared 
                                               
452
 Miller, Search for Security, pp. 70, 245.  
453
 NARA: RG 218 190 1 74 Box 316, Entry UD1. ‘Current British Policy and Strategies Rel. to that of the US’, 
May 8, 1943.  
454
 William Leahy, I Was There (London, 1950) p. 219. Diary Entry, September 14, 1943. 
455
 See, NARA: RG 59 250 46 35 04 Box 3 Entry 670. Truman Committee Report ‘The Future of the US in the 
World Petroleum Economy’, 1944. 
123 
 
by the Department of the Navy for the JCS caused alarm by announcing that the proven oil 
reserves of the United States were only at 20 billion (42 gallon) barrels and dwindling at a rate 
faster than new sources were being found.
456
 As early as January 1941, British officials in 
London were also concerned about the “heavy strain imposed by the very high level of U.S.A 
consumption”, holding it to be important that their wartime ally start developing the “high 
promise of the petroliferous areas in the Middle East”.457 
In June of 1943, the Roosevelt Administration established the Petroleum Reserves 
Corporation (PRC), which was to be chaired by the Secretary of the Interior and Petroleum 
Administrator, Harold Ickes. In many respects, the PRC emulated the so-called “British 
model”.458 Ever since the British Government had become the majority stakeholder of the Anglo-
Persian Oil Company in 1913, London had openly owned direct interests in oil companies and 
provided them with diplomatic and military support.
459
 Emphasizing the importance of state 
control, the PRC’s first order of business would be to secure oil resources outside of the 
continental United States. Given that the proven oil reserves in Saudi Arabia at this time were 
estimated to be in excess of 22 billion barrels, and that the concession was held by an American 
company, CASOC, the PRC’s attention quickly turned to the oil situation in the Kingdom.460  
Leading up to the announcement of the PRC, the dominant question in Washington can 
be summed up by Max Thornburg, who was serving as a special consultant on “oil matters” for 
the State Department. Writing to his colleague Herbert Feis, chairman of the Committee on 
International Petroleum Policy (CIPP), Thornburg noted: “our facts tell us that if we recognize a 
national interest in Saudi Arabia’s oil development, we ourselves need to see to its well being- 
through the British if they wish- otherwise despite them”.461 With wartime considerations 
ensuring the close alliance of the two powers, the Anglo-American War Planning Group 
(AAWPG) which included the JCS, approved a scheme to construct an oil refinery in Saudi 
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Arabia. Its purpose was to produce 130 octane aviation fuels “based on anticipation of military 
supply needs in the Southwest Pacific”.462 In addition, the Foreign Office at the time also 
appreciated the strategic value of CASOC “whose operations are in themselves of some 
importance to the war effort.”463 
 With this wartime dimension at play, most American authorities dealing with the Saudi 
Arabian oil issue did not view the British as a menacing presence in the shadows. Speaking with 
a group of senators in Washington, Cordell Hull confirmed that even the management at CASOC 
never truly “intimated… that they feared the British were trying to steal the concession in that 
territory”.464 Herbert Feis, an American official who arguably followed the issue the closest 
during the Second World War, believed that the accusations that Britain was trying to usurp 
American oil concessions in Saudi Arabia were built on sensationalism and were in reality 
entirely “baseless”.465 Indeed, much of the deliberation in Washington surrounding the PRC at 
this time, according to him had been “to get [the] correct public presentation in the eyes 
particularly of the British (Government)”, so not to upset the United States’ closest wartime 
ally.
466
  
  Still, there continued to be a group of American officials who harboured doubts 
regarding British intentions in Saudi Arabia. No American figure acted in as paranoid a manner 
as the roving American Ambassador William Bullitt, who in 1943 told Harold Ickes that “he 
wouldn’t put it past the British to have King Ibn Saud assassinated if necessary and set up a 
puppet who would see the oil situation through their eyes”.467Although not nearly as hyperbolic, 
to Harold Ickes the creation of the PRC had been necessary to “counteract certain known 
activities of a foreign power which presently are jeopardizing American interests in Arabian oil 
reserves…”468 The unspoken threat that Ickes referred to was “America’s closest wartime ally, 
Great Britain”, according to Barry Rubin. Using this example, the scholar makes Ickes the 
centrepiece of his argument that “nowhere else…did the conflict of (Anglo-American relations) 
                                               
462
 FRUS 1943. Vol. IV, The Near East and Africa, Feis to Hull, July 26, 1943, pp. 933-934.  
463
 IOR: R/15/2/538.  Foreign Office to Jeddah, May 4, 1944.  
464
 NARA: RG 38 370 14 13 3, Box 5. ‘Memorandum of Conversation; Oil Matters in the Near East’, Senator 
Maloney, Richard Joyce Smith & Cordell Hull, May 10, 1944. 
465
 LSE Library: Pamphlet Collection, HD9/605. Herbert Feis, ‘Petroleum and American Foreign Policy’ p. 43.  
466
 NARA: Microfilm T1179, Reel 8. Feis to Hull, October 8, 1943.  
467
 Library of Congress (LC): Harold Ickes Diaries, Microfilm, Reel 6. May 29, 1943.  
468
 Rubin, ‘Anglo-American Relations in Saudi Arabia, 1941-1945’, p 253.  
125 
 
reach the heights it attained in Saudi Arabia”.469 Without question, Ickes was an influential figure 
in the Roosevelt Administration, but as a measuring stick to gauge the state of Anglo-American 
relations in Saudi Arabia, he falls short.
470
  
To understand Ickes’ role in the Anglo-American oil drama, it is important to realize his 
overarching modus operandi. Known for his bombastic personality, during the war, Ickes 
received acclaim and notoriety for writing a book called Fightin’ Oil, in which he portrayed 
himself as acting as America’s first oil czar. He would later go as far as to tell the president that 
the idea of Washington getting involved in the oil business was “his baby”.471 From this angle, 
true or not, the idea that Britain was somehow a threat in Saudi Arabia was in this instance 
exploited by Ickes as a decoy to compel the United States into playing a greater role in that 
country’s oil sector. Only a year later, he would maintain to the Undersecretary of State, Edward 
Stettinius, that cooperation with British officials over oil issues in the Middle East were 
“essential”.472 For an ardent New Dealer like Ickes, that when it came to the United States long-
term oil security, the government’s main priority would be best served by keeping a closer eye 
on the intrigue of private oil companies, not Britain.   
   Despite a Foreign Office report written earlier in the war that had marked oil as being 
“almost a controlling factor in determining future British policy in the Middle East,” London’s 
perception of Ibn Saud’s kingdom had not been measured by gallons of oil, but rather by the 
influence it wielded in the Arab world and throughout the British Empire.
473
 The scant oil 
concession that Britain held in Saudi Arabia was located on the Farasan Islands in the Red Sea, 
which had already been abandoned by 1942. British oil interests in the Middle East instead 
cantered on Iraq, Kuwait and Iran; the latter containing the world’s largest oil refinery at the time 
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in Abadan. In this respect, London felt that it could do without Saudi Arabian oil.
474
 Even the 
State Department acknowledged at this time that Ibn Saud would not offer Britain the Kingdom’s 
oil concession because to protect their own oil interests in Iraq and Iran, the British sought “to 
prevent its [Saudi Arabian oil] immediate development [rather] than to stimulate it,” a move that 
would in the process benefit other independent American oil companies that were competing 
with CASOC.
475
  
 Yet, in October of 1943, the American legation in Jeddah accused the new British 
minister Stanley Jordan of pestering Saudi Arabian officials to see if they had copies of the 
original oil agreement that Ibn Saud signed with CASOC. American officials in Washington 
wondered aloud  if Jordan’s enthusiasm in this regard was “merely an aberrant reflection of 
coordinated Anglo-American plans”, or whether it was an expression of British intent to latch on 
to the American concession.
476
As Stanley Jordan would later write to the Foreign Office in 1944, 
His Majesty’s Government had purposely left oil development to the United States with the 
direct purpose of hoping to extinguish any sense of oil rivalry in the country.
477
 Thus, British 
policy makers for the rest of the war regarded it as imperative not to adopt a “dog in the manger 
attitude” towards America’s long-term development of Saudi Arabia. If Britain took this 
stubborn tack, the effect would be “disastrous” for the maintenance of sound Anglo-American 
relations.
478
  
*** 
What one notices when examining the controversies surrounding Saudi Arabian oil and 
Anglo-American relations is that it was far less volatile than the highly charged dispute that was 
taking place concurrently in the United States, between those who supported the government’s 
intervention in the oil business against those who felt such views ran counter to the country’s 
Laissez-Faire economic approach.
479
 There were American officials who strongly felt that the 
absence of governmental interference had been one of the main reasons why an American oil 
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company like CASOC had won over Ibn Saud in the 1930s. 
480
 In this respect, the same factors 
that had guided the wartime alliance’s policy in Saudi Arabia were also at play with regard to the 
oil question. Articulating the importance of restraint, Alexander Kirk warned that “overt 
American Government intervention in oil operation in SA would lend to tar us with the same 
brush” as an aggressive imperial power.481 
  Private American oil companies were also wary of Washington entering their line of 
work. While CASOC had supported the Roosevelt Administration’s decision to finally offer 
Saudi Arabia Lend-Lease, the company’s American ownership balked at the PRC’s attempt to 
purchase their concession.
482
Anticipating that Ickes planned to further nationalize oil production, 
CASOC’s competitors, such as Gulf, Socony-Vacuum and Union Oil, also put pressure on the 
Roosevelt Administration by publically opposing the PRC.
483
  
Changing course in February 1944, the PRC put forth a preliminary plan in which the 
United States government would sponsor an oil pipeline across Saudi Arabia that would connect 
the oil of Ras Tanura in the eastern part of the country to the Mediterranean; an idea 
foreshadowing the creation of TAPLINE (Trans-Arabian Pipeline) in 1950.
484 
Before the British 
Government needed to react in any way, the pipeline project was already doomed due to what 
Lord Halifax described as “vigorous opposition” in the United States.485 Senators from oil 
producing states like Tom Connolly of Texas saw the pipeline as being adversarial to the 
interests of their constituents, while Elihu Ben-Horin, speaking on behalf of the Independent 
Petroleum Association of America (IPAA), noted that such an arrangement would “permanently 
depress the domestic oil industry which would in turn threaten the safety of the country in the 
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event of future wars”.486 Even the oilman Jay Moffett, who had tried to orchestrate Lend-Lease 
for Saudi Arabia in 1941, now wrote to Cordell Hull arguing that a pipeline owned by the US 
Government was “a gigantic scandal of the American public and taxpayer”.487  
  While these domestic forces were at play, from a foreign policy perspective, the State 
Department took a dim view of the pipeline project. Edward Stettinius informed Harold Ickes 
that he was convinced that it would be “disadvantageous from the viewpoint of our relations with 
the British.
488
 In the interval during which the pipeline proposal had come to the fore, Middle 
Eastern oil had become a tense topic of debate for the wartime alliance. Washington had accused 
the British Government of manipulating oil prices in the region by bolstering oil production in 
Iran while cutting back in Iraq. This in turn had angered the American consortium, which owned 
a 23 ¾ percent share of the Iraq Petroleum company.
489
 Word also reached London that 
Roosevelt’s Anglophobic envoy, Patrick Hurley, had told the president that he had knowledge of 
the British Government opposing the pipeline option and the American plan to develop the Saudi 
Arabian oil concession. As a result, Lord Halifax was forced to meet with American officials in 
Washington to refute Hurley’s charges as being “entirely erroneous”.490   
To account for the infighting, the geopolitical situation in the Middle East had changed 
once the oil shipping lanes of the region were no longer threatened by the Axis. For the 
upcoming year of 1945, it was estimated that the level of oil production of Iraq, Iran, Saudi 
Arabia and Bahrain would increase by 52 percent as compared to 1939.  But looking to a 
productive future, the region’s total oil reserves were conservatively forecast to hold between 15 
to 26 billion barrels of oil.
491
 It was only natural that the potential to develop Middle East oil 
reserves was bound to create a set of new inter-allied tensions. President Roosevelt was adamant 
that something had to be done to squash the unending rumours that Britain “wish[ed] to horn in” 
on American oil concessions in Saudi Arabia, while concurrently refuting British claims that the 
United States had “sheep eyes” for Britain’s oil assets in Iran and Iraq.492 In this climate of 
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intrigue and innuendo, Roosevelt persuaded Churchill that the time had come to initiate cabinet 
level discussions on Middle East oil. 
 
1944 Anglo-American Oil Agreement  
 
 Leading up to the Anglo-American oil talks that were to begin in Washington that spring, 
Simon Davis has said that both countries were trying to avoid a full-out “oil war”.493 But for 
those who thought the allies were locked in a struggle for oil concessions in Saudi Arabia, the 
talks in Washington, which were meant to ease those tensions, in fact, highlighted the 
interdependent qualities of Anglo-American relations. Earlier in 1944, the Truman Committee 
had been correct in its assertion that from the start of the Second World War “American and 
British oil resources have been employed jointly” and although the two powers’ “contributions 
may have been unequal, they have not been inequitable”.494 Likewise, in Britain, some members 
of the War Cabinet had suggested that the Americans were pushing for the oil talks so they could 
acquire British assets, a view that the Foreign Office considered to be “untrue”. The Near East 
Department drew attention to the fact that Britain would likely have to call upon US oil reserves 
for future wars and by having these talks it would put a stop to a “hell for leather race” with the 
Americans for acquisition of new oil concessions.
495
  
Recognizing this need for collaboration, American representatives led by Charles Rayner 
of the Petroleum Division of the State Department met a British delegation overseen by Sir 
William Brown, which also included officials from the Petroleum Department, Foreign Office, 
Treasury and Admiralty. The two parties formally concluded the Anglo-American Memorandum 
of Understanding in Washington on May 3, 1944. For Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, coming 
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to preliminary terms with the British had served as a “material contribution” towards protecting 
American oil concessions in Saudi Arabia by including the principle “that each Government and 
its nationals shall respect all valid (oil) concessions”.
496
 
  Before the talks even began, the New York Times had reported that the “stated position of 
the British is that they want, not to compete with the US in obtaining oil concessions in the 
Middle East but to develop them pari passu with those held there by US companies”.497 In 
Washington, the British delegation was able to dispel the lingering rumours that they opposed 
American plans for a pipeline, especially at a time when they themselves were seeking Lend-
Lease aid for their own pipeline project between Kirkuk and Haifa.
498
 London did not feel 
threatened on the grounds that an American backed pipeline that ran through Saudi Arabia still 
left “ample room for the operation of British interests in the Middle East,”  a point stressed by 
the Financial Times afterwards.
499
 Taking a broader look at the situation in Saudi Arabia, The 
Times of London charted a similar path, claiming that there was “no cause for controversy 
between Britain and the United States” and praised the “spirit of the Washington discussions and 
the merging or defining of British and American interests in one of the most important and most 
controversial of all raw materials…”500  
  These bilateral discussions would serve as a platform for greater cabinet level talks on 
Middle Eastern oil. In Washington, the Acting Secretary of State, Edward Stettinius and Winston 
Churchill’s trusted friend, the Lord Privy Seal, Lord Beaverbrook signed the Anglo-American 
Oil Agreement in August 1944.
501 The intricacies of the agreement were not lost on American 
officials that had been intimately involved in the negotiations, such as Herbert Feis.  In his 
words, the agreement had been like “walking among the spaces and angles of an abstract 
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painting”. Yet, the intersection of British and American interests in Saudi Arabia, according to 
Feis, had prompted a determined Anglo-American “attempt to establish an international standard 
of rights and obligations, an international scheme of order in oil”.502 This is why the State 
Department had originally intended the Anglo-American Oil Agreement to be an executive 
agreement rather than a treaty that had to go through a more difficult process of being ratified by 
United States Senate. Ultimately, the agreement died on the Senate floor, but not because it was 
too closely aligned to the British, but because once again, those senators who came from oil 
states complained that its existence was “unfair to the American oil industry”.503 
 Nonetheless, writing after the agreement had been signed, Paul F. McGuire, an American 
official working for the Office of International Economic Affairs, noted that the controversies 
that had surrounded the PRC in 1943 and 1944, “convince[d] the King that he [could not] depend 
upon either ARAMCO or the US Gov. to protect his interests in the international petroleum 
poker game”.504 Anything that can be interpreted as “having any kinship with the ill-fated 
pipeline deal,” opined McGuire, “was very likely to destroy the opportunity for friendly 
unsuspicious discussion between nations, and create an unfavourable atmosphere of acrimonious 
debate in Congress and amongst our own business interests and the general public”.505 To help 
repair the United States’ damaged credibility, McGuire saw the accumulated gain of the Anglo-
American Oil Agreement. He accurately pinpointed the similarity of British and American oil 
objectives while juxtaposing them with the interdependent security interests of both nations:   
 
“I believe those who talk in terms of a battle for strategic military oil reserves 
between the US and Great Britain misinterpret the true nature of the struggle 
over oil. From a military standpoint, I feel that British and American holdings 
form a joint strategic reserve, since I do not foresee that any war in the 
predictable future will find Britain and the US on opposite sides.  If the British 
covet control over Arabian oil, it is for strictly commercial reasons, which apply 
as well to the American producers who do not share in the Arabian 
concession”.506 
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  In other words, British attitudes were not chauvinistic or anti-American, but rather 
reflected the capitalist nature of the world oil market; an open market in which the concerns of 
the British Government sometimes overlapped the interests of the independent American oil 
producers. In this way, the oil question belies those assertions that Saudi Arabia only existed as 
another area of “contested space” between Britain and the United States. Certainly, some 
scholars like Wm. Roger Louis have noted that in facing up to the oil issue, the Anglo-American 
Oil Agreement in effect removed “an irritant between the two governments”.507 Likewise, Aaron 
David Miller has similarly observed that although being “intentionally vague”, the accord 
“seemed to contain something for everyone”.508 The fact is that Saudi Arabian oil would always 
cause a modicum of contention throughout the rest of the Second World War, and although the 
points made by Louis and Miller are correct, they undersell the lengths to which British and 
American officials went to secure an accommodation.  
 
Saudi Arabian Financial Reform  
 
  In terms of sparking Anglo-American tensions, there was an issue that outmatched the 
high drama of oil politics, and it came from an unexpected source; the question of how to deal 
with the Saudi Arabian Government’s systematic mishandling of its finances. With the new 
availability of Lend-Lease aid to Saudi Arabia from early 1943, it was clear that the United 
States would play a greater role in the economic sphere of the Kingdom than it had in 1941 and 
1942. While promoting the strategic aspects and oil components of Lend-Lease, the State 
Department had stressed that the policy would also strengthen Saudi Arabia’s sovereignty by 
helping Ibn Saud to offset the perception that he was a subaltern of British influence. Recent 
examples of Britain using the pretext of wartime exigency to lord over Middle East territories, an 
April 1943 State Department report concluded, were “an all too obvious warning to Ibn Saud” of 
what would happen if the King leaned too heavily towards the British.
509
 Over the next two years 
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the Kingdom would receive from the United States approximately $18 million dollars of Lend-
Lease aid.
510
 
 After strongly advocating that Washington should grant Lend-Lease to Saudi Arabia in 
1941, Britain was - now that it was actually happening - “suspicious” of American motives, 
according to Simon Davis.
511
 Although it is true that the Foreign Office’s immediate reaction had 
been that His Majesty’s Government should be the “channel through which American influence 
is expressed in the Middle East,” this early lack of support for Lend-Lease entering Saudi Arabia 
had been largely based on the British fear that it would be saddled with the final bill. As Harry 
Eyres, who worked on Saudi Arabia in the Near East Department, insightfully noted: “our point 
against it is that Middle Eastern Countries are supposed to pay for Lease Lend material in the 
later end, and this Ibn Saud will presumably never be in a position to do except on our 
expense”.512 Ultimately, however, Lend Lease aid for Saudi Arabia aligned favourably with 
Britain’s Middle East policy.513 London knew that long-term, the initiative fitted within the dual 
British aims of procuring greater American regional assistance and assaying the Kingdom’s 
precarious economic position. Furthermore, on a logistical level, the British Government would 
play a fundamental role in shaping the implementation of Lend-Lease aid as the United States 
still lacked the governmental agency to see through such a wide ranging policy.
514
 
Regardless of Lend-Lease’s arrival in Saudi Arabia, Britain and the United States 
understood that the Saudi Arabian government’s lack of financial oversight left the country in a 
continuous state of financial chaos. Saudi Arabia’s currency, the Saudi Riyal, was not a paper 
currency, but was solely based on coins. The coins that the Saudi Government had minted were 
made of precious metals. This gave the coinage a high bullion value and made it susceptible to 
hoarding.
515
Adding to the instability, the gold sovereign, not the Riyal, was the preferred 
currency of choice for the Saudi Government. From October 1942 to February 1943, 95,000 gold 
sovereigns that were believed to have been part of the British subsidy package for Saudi Arabia 
had been seized in Iraq.
516
 If gold sovereigns and silver riyals were to be offered to Saudi Arabia 
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in the future, both the American and British Governments shared a common interest in Riyadh 
providing better financial safeguards. 
  Although Anglo-American discussions on ways to institute reforms began in April 1943, 
efforts did not gain steam until the British Treasury official, Sir Francis Rugman, was sent to 
Jeddah that summer. Rugman relayed to London that a paper currency needed to be introduced in 
Saudi Arabia, along with a currency board that would help the Saudi Arabian Government 
manage its finances. Even before the Briton’s visit, American officials had concurred with 
Rugman’s analysis. “By putting into circulation a currency having no commodity value,” a State 
Department report noted that, “… the exportation of the local currency will no longer be 
profitable”. 517 Yet, before Washington could send their own expert, Treasury official John 
Guenther, to inspect the Kingdom’s financial situation, Stanley Jordan on his way to present his 
diplomatic credentials had bypassed the American legation and introduced Ibn Saud to a 
proposal for a British-backed currency board. Hearing of Jordan’s actions, American authorities 
from the State Department and the American Treasury Department in Washington met with their 
British counterparts to stress the importance of close Anglo-American cooperation:   
 
“To avoid any appearance of conflict between British and American aims, it was 
imperative that British officials in Washington realized that the United States, 
desired and expected, to work jointly with the British on any plan for establishing 
a permanent currency system in SA”. 518 
  
   Soon thereafter in October 1943, Stanley Jordan and James Moose jointly informed Ibn 
Saud of the need to replace Riyal coins with paper currency. The King rejected the proposition as 
he considered it to be a violation of Islamic orthodoxy, and the issue was not resolved until after 
the war’s conclusion.519 The currency board issue, however, was a different matter as it carried 
certain intangibles that put a spotlight on the notion of hegemony. One month later, American 
officials had come to the concrete decision that because United States’ oil interests were going to 
be a significant part of the Kingdom’s financial future, the Riyal should not be tied solely  to the 
Sterling bloc, but should also be linked to the dollar, silver and gold. This would mean that any 
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foreign exchange assets that the Kingdom might acquire would be “held or disposed of by its 
own currency board in accordance with the best interests of the Saudi Arabian people”. In this 
idealistic vein, the Treasury Department suggested that the proposed currency board should have 
a strong Saudi-component, with a membership in Jeddah consisting of one American, one Briton 
and rounded out by three Saudi Arabian representatives.
520
  
  Accepting the United States special position, the British Government agreed to the new 
American proposals per se, but hesitated to implement it. Given that Riyadh had little desire to 
truly reform its profligate ways, if Saudi Arabian authorities gained control of the “modern 
potentialities of the printing press,” British officials believed that they would bring the “whole 
new banking and currency system to ruin”.521 To the American Henry Dexter White, assistant to 
the Secretary of the Treasury, such views perfectly exposed Britain’s retrograde outlook. 
According to White:  
 
“…when a sovereign nation approaches the US treasury with a request for 
advice, it is the Treasury’s policy, as stated by the Secretary himself, to give the 
best advise possible as to what will be in that nation’s own best interest. We do 
not withhold knowledge on the theory that it is dangerous to teach backward 
nations modern methods”.522 
 
  Still, as critical as White was towards Britain, it merits attention that he still advised that 
the United States should give credence to the long term experience of Britain when it came to 
handling Saudi Arabia’s financial questions.523 
 
The Question of Anglo-American Subsidies  
 
 At the end of the Second World War, C.W. Baxter, head of the Near East Department at 
the Foreign Office, looked back to explain the purpose of Anglo-American subsidies. They were 
implemented to “provide the help which his (Ibn Saud's) country so urgently needed in the 
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critical war years”.524 Between 1940 and 1943, the grand total of the British subsidies to Saudi 
Arabia had been a robust total of 8.3 million pounds.
525
 From the beginning of 1943 through 
January of 1944, the subsidy included supplies and food stuffs estimated at a value of 3 million 
pounds.526 However, as the aggregate sum kept rising as the Axis threat against Saudi Arabia 
was receding, the increase in the British subsidy no longer computed.
 527
  
  Foremost, the Hajj - the Kingdom’s greatest source of income - had by 1943 rebounded 
to almost two-thirds of its pre-war levels and was predicted to further improve in 1944.528 
Moreover, the poor finances of the country had little to do with wartime conditions and the 
smaller Hajj, but rather, was the result of the Saudi Arabian government having “monopolized 
trade and taken it out of the hands of the merchants”. This left the bulk of Saudi riyals out of 
circulation and in the hands of hoarders.”529 In addition, the accumulated deficit of the Saudi 
Arabian Government reached six million pounds in 1944, surpassing the country’s entire gross 
domestic product since 1939. During the early years of the war, strategic exigencies had forged a 
policy that had been necessary and shrewd, but now increasingly it appeared that this policy was 
no longer viable.   
  In a missive entitled Memorandum on Extravagance of S.A. Gov., the British minister, 
Stanley Jordan gave a rundown of what he perceived to be the negative consequences of the 
subsidy. “Bribery and corruption are everywhere”, noted Jordan, which according to him were 
creating a “new class of paupers” that had formerly not had to rely on the Saudi Arabian 
government for charity. When Saudi Arabian officials complained of the dire economic situation 
in the areas around Riyadh, Jordan was left unmoved because he believed that the subsidy was 
being siphoned away by Saudi officials.
530
 As the British political agent in Jeddah from 1925-
1927, he observed that “the only improvement which I have seen in Arabia since I was here 
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sixteen years ago is to be found in the making of palaces”.531 How much could Britain or the 
United States rely on if Ibn Saud’s influence in the region if the Kingdom’s traditional ways 
were being systematically broken down? The King had spoken to Jordan about the parasitic 
nature of the subsidies and was concerned, but in the end he claimed “our religion and character 
safeguard us against the evils and dirt” associated with largesse.532 Nevertheless, by New Years 
Eve of 1943, Jordan in a revealing message sent to the Foreign Office, once again highlighted the 
undermining effect that the subsidies had on the Saudi Arabian Government: “I fear that it is a 
case of easy come and easy go”.533      
  While Jordan’s line of reasoning offers a window into British thinking, from the 
American point of view, the subsidy issue was understood in two distinct ways. On one level, if 
the American subsidy remained the same, the disproportionate amount of political influence that 
London held in the circles of power in Saudi Arabia would continue. Writing to his State 
Department colleagues back in January 1943, Alexander Kirk noted: 
 
“I feel impelled to state that after watching the operation of the system by which 
American assistance to Saudi Arabia has been channelized through the British, I 
have gained the impression that we have thereby lost considerable prestige in the 
eyes of Saudi Arabia who have been given increasingly to feel that the British 
were their only friends in need”.534  
 
  The subsidies, according to Kirk, were in many respects a question of hegemony in that 
they symbolized authority. Kirk did not advocate a new American unilateral approach, but did 
support policies that presented Anglo-American efforts in Saudi Arabia as an equal and mutually 
responsible enterprise. If not, American interests may be left out in the cold as there was a 
“discernible tendency toward British economic entrenchment in this area”, Kirk warned, which 
“might materially negate the best intentioned post-war agreements for equality of 
opportunity”.535 Over the next two years, American aid to Saudi Arabia would total 
approximately $18 million dollars.
536
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 On the ground in Jeddah, unlike Stanley Jordan, the American minister James Moose felt 
strongly that removing the subsidies would have an even more adverse effect on the long-term 
rule of Ibn Saud.  It could not be denied that the financial hardships endured by the Saudis were 
real. Compounding the problem was not only the austerity engendered by the war, but also the 
drought that was occurring in the region during this time, one of the worst droughts in living 
memory. At this time, the Nejd, the ancestral home to the ruling Saud family, faced a ten-to-
fifteen-fold increase in inflation, while three quarters of Saudi Arabia’s entire livestock 
succumbed to the drought.537 Moose, for instance, described the condition of Saudi Arabia as the 
“progressive desiccation of Arabia”.538 Regardless of some of the more overt examples of 
malfeasance pointed out by the British minister; Moose believed that the ongoing episodes of 
Saudi corruption could be managed eventually. Bearing in mind all of these factors, in February 
1944, Moose stood in the way of Jordan’s own assertion and recommended to Washington that 
the subsidy earmarked for Saudi Arabia should be increased for the upcoming year.539  
  With London being keen on scaling back the subsidy, the State Department in the spring 
of 1944, seeking a compromise, offered to share it.
540
 In the case of Saudi Arabia, in one way, 
the proposition certainly was meant to diffuse any question of Anglo-American rivalry that the 
subsidy question had fomented in Saudi Arabia over the previous half year. But with closer 
analysis, there were other reasons besides building inter-allied solidarity. In many respects, 
Washington’s push for splitting the subsidy stemmed from their own fear that by continually 
following Britain’s lead, American prestige was reduced in the eyes of Saudi Arabian officials. 
Entering the year 1944, direct American aid to Saudi Arabia, including Lend-Lease assistance, 
only amounted to one-sixth of the British total.
 541
  
  Still concerned about the nature of Stanley Jordan’s influence over Ibn Saud, Secretary of 
State, Cordell Hull, warned President Roosevelt that the significant difference  in the amount of 
the  subsidies needed to come to an end. Sharing the subsidy equally with Britain for the rest of 
1944, Hull believed, would “obviate” the dangers arising from allowing Ibn Saud to rely too 
heavily on the British Government.
542
 From the Foreign Office’s perspective, the talk of a 50-50 
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arrangement appeared to be suspiciously ambiguous in its form. By pointedly omitting a cap on 
future expenditure, American subsidies could continue to increase, thus leaving British influence 
in Saudi Arabia looking parsimonious and weak. Foreign Office minutes suggest that James 
Moose had tried to persuade Ibn Saud to request a larger subsidy from the British Government, 
knowing full well that London would be unwilling to meet the ample American contributions.
543
  
   Before a 50-50 Anglo-American subsidy could be agreed upon, on April 12, 1944, the 
United States Government planned to increase its aid to Saudi Arabia. Secretary of the Treasury, 
Henry Morgenthau, extended 3,437,500 ounces of silver for the minting of Saudi Riyals.
544
 This 
was met with dismay by the Foreign Office as they believed it would aggravate the currency 
question further and they asked that the minting be postponed until an official Anglo-American 
subsidy agreement had been reached.
545
 Morganthau’s minting was put on hold but it was a 
sneak preview to Saudi Arabian officials that the United States had the potential to outstrip 
Britain’s offerings of financial aid. Hence, it was not a question of “if”, but “when” Britain 
would be unable to participate on an equal financial footing with the United States.   
 Although looking to scale back its financial commitment to Saudi Arabia, London was 
not ready to relinquish its influence entirely. After being notified of Ibn Saud’s request for a 
financial advisor that spring, Cordell Hull had proclaimed that because of the “United States' 
preponderant interest in the Saudi Arabian economy”, the position should be filled by an 
American.
 546
 On hearing this, the Undersecretary of State for the Foreign Office, Sir Maurice 
Peterson, remarked that the glare from their allies’ oil holdings in the Kingdom had blinded their 
judgment. On their way to the Holy Cities, pilgrims from British territories and Sterling area 
countries, Peterson snapped, had accounted for over 40 million riyals entering the country, a 
percentage that dwarfed American contributions to Saudi Arabia's revenue.
 547
 In Washington, 
the British Embassy, according to a Foreign Office report at the time, “debunked in no uncertain 
terms” American claims of economic supremacy in Saudi Arabia.548   
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Before these economic questions could boil over, however, in the summer of 1944, both 
sides eventually came to an agreement that would at least temporarily lead to an important 
compromise over the question of splitting the subsidy for Saudi Arabia. On July 7, 1944, the 
Anglo-American joint-subsidy programme for Saudi Arabia was enacted, and it was agreed that 
the British Government would proffer supplies and goods totalling 2,754,000 pounds, including 
10,000 pounds per month allocated for Saudi Arabia’s worldwide diplomatic missions. The 
United States would continue to subsidize Saudi Arabia through Lend-Lease and would mint 
10,000,000 Silver Riyals worth roughly the total of the British subsidy and Lend-Lease goods 
totalling 292,000 pounds.
549
  
 
Revitalizing the Wartime Alliance  
 
  So what were the factors that had ostensibly led Britain and the United States to put aside 
some of their major differences when it came to Saudi Arabian oil and the Kingdom’s economic 
issues? In retrospect, the prevailing political winds of the wartime alliance in the spring of 1944 
had called for the imperative of Anglo-American cooperation. At a time when the American 
official Harley Notter of the Division of Special Research had come up with blueprints for a 
permanent Anglo-American military alliance, leading up to this period, a set of high profile 
disputes had in fact alienated the two allies.
550
 Most conspicuously, the events of the Tehran 
Conference (November 28-December 1, 1943) had openly wiped the sheen off the perceived 
intimacy of Roosevelt and Churchill and heightened tensions in the Anglo-American relationship 
vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.551 Debates over wartime strategy at this time had also given rise to a 
divergence in views. The United States’ wartime objectives had shifted increasingly towards the 
Pacific, while Britain, thinking of ways to maximize its imperial power, continued to give special 
priority to the Mediterranean theatre.
552
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 To rejuvenate the wartime alliance, especially in the context of the imminent Allied 
invasion of Western Europe, in April 1944, an American delegation led by Edward Stettinius, 
met British counterparts in London to try to alleviate the developing friction.553 Historically, this 
trip has since been referred to as the Stettinius Mission. Stettinius, characterized by The Times as 
a “man of efficiency and imagination” on his arrival to London, said that the objective of his 
mission was to create a framework which would allow disagreements between the United States 
and Britain to be “raised frankly, jointly examined and disposed of as soon as they arise”.554 
Backing Stettinius, the British Permanent Undersecretary of State of Foreign Affairs, Sir 
Maurice Peterson, remarked that the talks held the “laudable object” of overcoming differences, 
which “threatened to obstruct the conduct of the war and to prejudice harmony when it came to 
the making of peace”.555 At the conclusion of the Stettinius mission, Edward Stettinius had sent 
Winston Churchill the message that “we may look forward to a bright future of permanent 
harmonious and beneficial Anglo-American relations”.556 
  While having discussed such high profile issues as their policies towards the Axis 
powers, the Soviet Union, and post-war world organizations, during the Stettinius Mission 
British and American officials also found time to press for further Anglo-American integration in 
Saudi Arabia.
557
 While pledging to combine their aid packages to Saudi Arabia in the months 
ahead, Britain and the United States also made a preliminary vow to establish a joint Anglo-
American military mission to assist Ibn Saud in training a “modern Saudi Arabian Army,” a 
subject that will be discussed further in the following chapter.
558
  
 Lord Halifax, who was at times especially critical of the Americans with regards to their 
conduct in Saudi Arabia, wrote after the Stettinius Mission of the two countries common 
interests. Halifax noted: “There is nothing really predator or sinister in American intentions 
toward us (sic)…”559 His colleague back in London C.W. Baxter put it even more 
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straightforwardly: “to some degree Anglo-American cooperation in Jedda has become a test of 
the possibility of Anglo-American cooperation in the Middle East as a whole”.560 Taking into 
account this far-reaching consideration, Wm. Roger Louis holds that Saudi Arabia at this point 
was not judged by British officials to be an area of inter-allied rivalry, but as an “anchor” for 
greater American involvement in the Middle East that would benefit the security of Britain’s 
own regional interests.
561
 
  Baxter’s opposite number, Wallace Murray, who had been a member of Stettinius’ 
entourage and led discussions on all Anglo-American Middle East issues, felt that the two 
powers were now on the same page in the Kingdom. For Murray, it was clear “that British 
political and strategic interests and paramount United States oil interests in Saudi 
Arabia…should not conflict”.562 For the United States to assert its power globally, a close 
working relationship with British officials had to be closely maintained. “We do not wish to 
compete with the British in Saudi Arabia but to cooperate with them,” said Landis, as he felt it 
was unproductive to “compete with the British on an all-out basis in that area”.563 In this respect, 
the global role of the United States - in what the Pulitzer Prize winning journalist Edgar Mowrer 
described as the “world madhouse” - was fragmentary and was not clearly formulated in the 
summer of 1944, specifically in a country like Saudi Arabia where the United States government 
lacked diplomatic experience.
564
 
 
Fixing the “Lack of Liaison” in Saudi Arabia  
 
  The relationship between ministers in Jeddah is a facet of the Anglo-American 
relationship in Saudi Arabia that warrants more attention than has previously been given to it.
565
 
Given Saudi Arabia’s geography, far removed from the corridors of power in London and 
Washington, the diplomatic representatives on the ground consistently figured highly in shaping 
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and implementing their nations’ policies in the Kingdom. In a missive sent to the Foreign Office 
in the afterglow of the Stettinius Mission, Lord Halifax discussed the role of personnel in trying 
to ascertain the reasons for the faltering cooperation between British and American officials in 
Saudi Arabia. Halifax explained:  
 
“State Department tells me, have lately been receiving a number of reports from their 
representative at Jedda criticizing our alleged lack of co-operation with the Americans in 
S.A. and even implying that on occasion our people there have been working against the 
Americans. Some of these reports have found their way to Capitol, Post (Washington 
Post), etc. and Hull (Secretary of State) is getting upset by them”.566 
   
  In answering Halifax’s comments, C.W. Baxter acknowledged problems with the Anglo-
American alliance on the ground in Saudi Arabia, and he suggested that to avoid such situations 
as the Sahla affair, inter-allied communication on the “spot” in Jeddah needed to be improved:  
 
“Our people in Saudi Arabia have not been working against the 
Americans…many  elements in the Middle East are anxious to take advantage of 
any lack of liaison on the spot and we share with the State Department the hope 
that if closer co-operation can be established this most undesirable state of affairs 
will come to an end”.567  
 
Reflecting on this, Halifax came up with a plan to fix the latest glitch in Anglo-American 
relations in Saudi Arabia, seeing it as a personnel problem rather than a symptom of hegemonic 
rivalry. He suggested to Wallace Murray that they should look to Egypt. “If their (American) 
representatives at Jedda were on terms of close confidence with our representative as Kirk 
(Alexander Kirk) has been with Lord Killearn (Sir Miles Lampson) in Cairo, said Halifax, these 
difficulties (in Saudi Arabia) would not arise”.568  
Afterwards, Lord Halifax in Washington and C.W. Baxter in London summarily 
concluded that Stanley Jordan must “establish relations of friendship and confidence with Mr. 
Moose” and “discuss all supply and financial questions with him [James Moose] on a joint basis, 
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securing agreement with his recommendations wherever possible”.569Proposals were additionally 
put forth for Jordan’s entire staff to work more closely with their American counterparts. 
Identical instructions, mutatis mutandis, would later be explicitly sent to Moose by the Near East 
Department.570  
Even after both ministers received these instructions, the Secretary of State Cordell Hull 
complained to Halifax that Stanley Jordan was still “doing his level best to injure the American 
Government’s relations with the King and, in other ways, endeavouring to undermine the 
American situation, and that we just could not put up with this without constant and louder 
complaint”.571 That spring, the Foreign Office had already warned Stanley Jordan of his conduct, 
explaining to him that he had not kept Moose “adequately informed on matters of supply and 
finance” and that “Washington are equally worried at lack of close liaison between you and Mr. 
Moose”.572  
*** 
  Back in March 1944, unbeknownst to American officials, Stanley Jordan had intercepted 
a memorandum written by the Saudi Arabian Minister of Mines and Supply, Nagib Sahla, in 
which he tried to convince the Minister of Finance, Abdullah Suleimann that Ibn Saud should 
cease his traditional association with Britain and build more formative ties with the United 
States. 573 Sahla extolled in his memo: “the Americans are wholeheartedly with us and wish to 
help but will not do it on their own accord. They want us to ask them so that they will have a say 
in the matter”.574At least one of the “Americans” of whom Sahla believed he had the support of 
was the American representative of the Middle East Supply Centre, Judge James Landis. Based 
in Cairo, Landis principally oversaw American economic and supply issues in Saudi Arabia in 
early 1944.  Landis was told by Sahla in secret that Jordan’s estimates of Saudi Arabia’s current 
financial position did not include the debts that were owed to the British Government. Landis, he 
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was “amazed” by this information as Jordan had mentioned none of this to him when they met 
the previous month in Cairo.575 
   In defense of Jordan’s actions, the reason why he had chosen not to inform his American 
colleagues about the Sahla connection in the first place was that he wanted to protect the identity 
of another Saudi Arabian official, Hafiz Wahba, the Saudi Arabian Ambassador to Britain, who 
had alerted British officials about his compatriot’s behind-the-scenes chicanery.576 After the 
incident, Richard Law, Minister of State and Churchill’s Private Parliamentary Secretary, wrote 
to Lord Moyne: “we shall not confront (the Americans) with documents which support the ideal 
of American encouragement of Nagib Sahla, but we can say that the latter has clearly been trying 
to play them off against us and point out the obvious moral”.577 To further his case that the 
United States was uninterested in working in partnership with Britain, Barry Rubin had 
explained that unlike their British colleagues, American officials did not realize the “provocative 
role of the Saudis themselves”.578 Rubin’s claim, however, is exaggerated as during this same 
time none other than Henry Stimson wrote personally to Cordell to warn him of “the willingness 
of King Ibn Saud to play each nation (the United States and Britain) against the other as a means 
of obtaining the assistance he desires”.579 
  The situation grew more complicated on March 30, 1944, when a new memorandum to 
be held in the “strictest confidence” was sent by James Moose to American officials at the State 
Department regarding the conduct of Stanley Jordan. An insider within the Saudi Arabian 
Government told Moose that the British minister had also orchestrated the removal of Najib Bey 
Salim, an official believed to be friendly to the United States. Bey Salim was to be succeeded by 
Izzedi Neshawar, who Jordan claimed, “is now playing ball with us [the British Government]”. 
What proved to be so incendiary about the accusation was that the Saudi Arabian official had 
told Moose that Jordan had gone rogue, making up his own independent policy without the 
consent of the Foreign Office.580  
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  Even if some of his colleagues conceded that at times it was “extraordinarily hard to 
follow Mr. Jordan’s thoughts”, C.W. Baxter of the Foreign Office backed his man in Jeddah.581 
Because Jordan sought to curtail Anglo-American largesse in the Kingdom, he had fallen out of 
favour with Saudi Arabian officials and by doing so had “earned the enmity of various influential 
persons who may well have been tale-bearers to the American minister”.
582
Despite putting the 
blame on the manipulation of Saudi Arabian officials, it had become evident that Stanley Jordan 
would not have the same breezy relationship with his American colleagues that his predecessor, 
Hugh Stonehewer-Bird enjoyed, with this state of affairs being further underscored by the 
incidents of March 1944.
583
  
  With this in mind, to alleviate the mounting tensions in Jeddah, Edward Stettinius, fresh 
off his successful mission to London, decided to directly intervene. According to Halifax, 
Stettinius - backed by a consensus from the NEA at the State Department - stressed that the 
“good that was achieved by Middle East talks in London should not be undone by continued 
friction in Jeddah, which might merely be due to personalities”.584 Another American official 
who believed that Anglo-American cooperation in Saudi Arabia was being jeopardized because 
of personnel problems was James Landis, who declared that “the British minister in SA has been 
working against us, it is essential that there be someone there who will work with us…”585 But, 
at the same time as the Americans heaped scorn on Stanley Jordan, London scrutinized James 
Moose, wondering if he was up to the task of facilitating Anglo-American cooperation. Despite 
working well with Stonehewer-Bird, there were some British officials, who harboured a low 
opinion of Moose and considered him “second rate” and a “lightweight poorly equipped for his 
job”.586 Moose’s position in Jeddah had already been weakened that spring by the arrival of the 
envoy Colonel William Eddy in April 1944. According to the Charge d’Affaires Parker Hart, 
during the short time of his visit, Eddy had “superimposed” Moose as the chief of the American 
legation.587  
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  In late May 1944, Stettinius had telephoned the Counsellor of the British Embassy in 
Washington, Sir Ronald Campbell, to inform him that the United States would be replacing 
Moose with a new representative. Stettinius held that it was the “personal informal feeling” of 
the State Department that Britain should in turn, reciprocate and replace its minister, thus 
permitting both countries to “change horses at the same time”.588 Stettinius’ proposition indicates 
that, like Halifax, he emphasized the role of personnel and personality, believing that Anglo-
American tensions could be eased by putting in place British and American ministers, who 
worked well together.  
  On this score, Washington made the first personnel change that summer as Colonel 
William Eddy returned to Jeddah and succeeded Moose on September 1, 1944, taking his place 
as the new American minister to Saudi Arabia.589 The British on the other hand proved to be 
more circumspect about the planned swap. Halifax had cabled the Foreign Office explaining that 
Stettinius’ original proposal had in fact put them in a bind. “The matter is naturally somewhat 
delicate since they (the Americans) imply that the fault may be that of their own man and a 
difficult situation would be created if he (Moose) learned of their appeal to us”.590 Indeed, some 
of Moose’s own American colleagues, including Eddy, had intimated that he lacked the gravitas 
that came with his ministerial authority.
591
 Despite some of the reservations London had 
concerning Jordan, C.W. Baxter concluded: “We see no reason to change our own representation 
there; a change which as it appears to us would be not only unjustifiable but highly inconvenient 
in view of the shortage of Arabic experts”.592  
With Jordan for the moment standing pat, that August, there was added controversy when 
without notifying the British legation, Moose personally informed Saudi Arabian officials that as 
part of the Anglo-American supply programme, the Governments of the United States and 
Britain would be furnishing a large shipment of foodstuffs, which included tea, sugar, and 
cereals. Although the incident seems relatively minor, Jordan was angered by it. Before Moose 
left Jeddah for good on August 18, 1944, the British minister pointed out to his American 
counterpart the troubling underlying gist of his actions, especially in light of the decrees 
espoused from the Stettinius Mission. As far as Jordan could see, “such communication made to 
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the SA government without HMG’s approval destroyed the whole basis of collaboration between 
United States and UK in regard to Saudi Arabia, which had been built up so industriously over 
the last few months”.593 
By the same token, the Foreign Office had their own view of the current state of Anglo-
American relations. Once receiving a “prompt” retraction from the Americans over Moose’s 
diplomatic faux pas, the Foreign Office sent a revealing missive to Jordan that gives an insight 
into how British officialdom took a long-term view of their relationship with the United States in 
the Kingdom. While expressing disappointment “that Mr. Moose has not (their emphasis) more 
fully reciprocated your efforts at collaboration,” Jordan was also reminded that in future he was 
to refrain from being “over suspicious” of US motives. “American impulsiveness and 
inexperience in dealing with the Arabs may sometimes lead them to act injudiciously”, the 
Foreign Office noted “but we must endeavour to persuade and guide them on the right lines, and 
be patient with their mistakes”.594 Ironically, London would eventually lose patience with 
Stanley Jordan and remove him from Jeddah,  after it had become clear that the British minister 
also had trouble getting on with his new American colleague, William Eddy. This sore subject 
for Anglo-American relations will be examined more closely in the next chapter.
 595
    
 
Conclusion  
 
  In the summer of 1944, a report from the American legation in Cairo had claimed that 
“Saudi Arabia presents the best test case for concrete cooperation with the British in all the 
Middle East and we should succeed in making it work here”.
596 
Even when the oil concessions in 
Saudi Arabia in 1943 had come to be considered by American officials as a vital national interest 
- not only to the immediate war effort - but also to the future security of the United States, the 
Anglo- American relationship in the Kingdom did in fact undergo a change, but it did not 
diminish.
 
The overwhelming line of thinking coming from Washington and London was that 
British influence and the development of an American oil concession in Saudi Arabia did not 
have to be antipathetic, but could be reciprocal. Certainly, in some influential American circles, 
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there were deeply held suspicions that the British Government was eyeing the oil concession, but 
this was in fact not a majority view. Likewise, although London had its doubts about the United 
States Government entering the Kingdom’s oil sphere, the loudest complaints emanated largely 
from American critics, who feared that their government was turning into a commercial oil 
cartel. If one still sees the subject of Saudi Arabian oil being a cause of inter-allied tension, the 
efforts to alleviate this cause of friction paradoxically further enjoined the two wartime allies, 
culminating in the signing of the Anglo-American Oil Agreement in 1944.  
 The debate over Saudi Arabia’s finances proved to be a highly contested and sensitive 
issue. While both powers acknowledged the need for Riyadh to overhaul its currency, they 
disagreed on what shape and extent the reforms should take. With regard to the subsidy question, 
as far as Stanley Jordan was concerned, raising them opened up a Pandora’s Box, one that would 
bring down the fabric of Saudi Arabian society and unravel Ibn Saud’s authority and his image  
as being completely independent in the process. The United States since the beginning of the 
Second World War shared similar concerns, yet the American minister deviated from his British 
counterpart’s final assessment. Like many American officials at the time, James Moose saw that 
increased subsidies would stabilize the poor economic situation in the Kingdom and be 
beneficial to the burgeoning Saudi-American relationship. Although the subsidy question would 
continue to be a source of friction as the next chapter will show, the two sides did make 
impressive headway in by agreeing to subsidize Saudi Arabia on an equal level. 
 What one cannot be overlooked is the fact that the fulcrum of Anglo-American relations 
in Saudi Arabia laid in the evolving strategic interdependence of the wartime allies. With the D-
Day landings approaching, the projection of Anglo-American unity became axiomatic for British 
and American officials in 1944. Indeed, the Kingdom had been marked out on both sides of the 
Atlantic as an area where both powers could effectively bind their interests and policies together 
into a single Anglo-American body. Thus, when trying to account for the examples of discord 
between the powers, an element that historians have not stressed enough is that London and 
Washington understood these occasional punch-ups manifesting more from a clash of 
personalities rather than an actual divergence of interests between the two nations.    
 
 
150 
 
Chapter VI            
Anglo-American Relations in Saudi Arabia, 1944-1945: The 
Limits and Advantages of Cooperation 
 
Introduction 
 
  The ambitious expectations that British and American policymakers had for Anglo-
American relations in Saudi Arabia were still prevalent when the new American minister 
William Eddy arrived in Jeddah in September 1944. In one sense, the poor communication on 
the ground that had been a major problem for Washington and London in the spring and summer 
of 1944 had improved by autumn. But during those months while still committed to close 
collaboration, it became clear that the wider views held by the two allies on how to engage with 
the Saudi Arabian Government had reached an impasse. Certainly, British and American policies 
were at this juncture still constructed to align firmly with the emerging anti-colonial consensus, 
designed not to infringe upon the Kingdom’s sovereignty on which Ibn-Saud’s influence as an 
Arab statesman was seen to hinge. Yet, some American officials like Eddy were worried about 
being openly associated with what they perceived to be the imperial taint of Britain’s influence 
in Saudi Arabia. Ironically, British officials in Jeddah and the Foreign Office had their own 
concerns about their American ally. They grumbled that Eddy’s push for policies founded on the 
provision of rapid and excessive aid possessed all the hallmarks of a new form of colonialism; 
one that would in the process destabilize - not only the Al-Saud regime - but also Britain’s 
Middle East Imperia. 
 The schisms, which were developing within the Anglo-American relationship in Saudi 
Arabia, were also in part the result of the different national priorities of both countries. The 
United States Government desired to be on the “ground floor” in Saudi Arabia and was ready to 
implement ambitious policies in a bid to firmly secure access to the Kingdom’s oil supplies.597 
Although Ibn Saud remained a key to British foreign policy, stretched by an array of imperial 
concerns around the globe, London was not in a position to match an American policy in Saudi 
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Arabia that was increasingly driven by largesse. This was however not to say that Britain was 
heading down a path towards irrelevancy in the Kingdom. On the contrary, in spite of the 
growing US presence in Saudi Arabia, the diplomatic influence that British officials had crafted 
for over a generation remained strong; a point that American officials would on more than one 
occasion reflect upon as they apprehensively considered the limits of their own national power. 
  The wartime alliance also encountered two further issues in late 1944 and early 1945 that 
had hegemonic implications. By its very nature, a project like establishing a joint Anglo-
American military mission for Ibn Saud was a conspicuous symbol of power and influence, 
naturally inclined to prey upon feelings of national rivalry and distrust. The other critical issue, 
the US’s aim of constructing an airfield in Dhahran, was based on bolstering Allied supply routes 
for the Pacific theatre. However, control of the skies and the subsidiary issues that were linked to 
it, namely civil aviation and telecommunications, represented new spheres of power that risked 
fomenting inter-allied competition. 
 As highlighted in earlier chapters, the relationship between the two powers in Saudi 
Arabia nonetheless had a remarkable propensity to renew itself against all odds. Although at 
times the events in the Kingdom bore a resemblance to Simon Davis’ description of the period as 
an “enduring microcosm of Anglo-American antagonism”, more often than not, the second half 
of 1944 entering into 1945 saw the reciprocal properties of strategic interdependence between 
Britain and the United States develop and grow.
598
 Despite reservations concerning the nature of 
American policy, British officials believed that their ally’s rising ascendancy in the Kingdom 
could still complement Britain’s own position of influence. Conversely, with Saudi Arabia and 
its oil concerns now considered a fixture in American foreign policy, the pattern of Washington 
turning to the British to facilitate its own strategic objectives emerges once again. At this time, 
Britain and the United States were on the path towards recognizing that while their policy 
objectives and perceptions of Saudi Arabia would not always be the same, their relationship 
could still be strategically valuable. 
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William Eddy and Anglo-American Relations in Saudi Arabia 
 
  Born and raised in Sidon, modern day Lebanon, the new US Minister to Saudi Arabia, 
Colonel William Eddy’s formative years had endowed him with an intimate knowledge of the 
Middle East. An accomplished Arabist, he had once taught at the American University in Cairo 
and was also known as the first person to translate the rules of basketball into Arabic.
599
 Like his 
cousin Harold Hoskins, he was particularly connected to the powers of the East Coast American 
establishment through his past growing up in Lebanon as part of the small, yet influential 
American-Protestant missionary community.600 With Eddy’s background, it is little wonder that 
one scholar of American foreign policy in the Middle East has remarked that he was “probably 
the nearest thing the United States had to a Lawrence of Arabia.”601  
 Eddy had already travelled to Jeddah in the spring of 1944, and on his arrival, the British 
legation notified the Foreign Office that Eddy held an unusual amount of influence and political 
clout, but they could not ascertain the nature of his “work”.602 Eddy was in fact under the 
supervision of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), attempting to establish a US intelligence 
service in Saudi Arabia in order that, like Britain, the United States could use “unorthodox 
procedures in collecting information”.603 Ironically, like Moose, Eddy quickly fell out with 
Stanley Jordan. The British minister’s highhandedness grated on Eddy as he lectured him about, 
“the natural greed of the Arabs”, a greed, he asserted, that had been sharpened by his HMG’s 
generosity and by the more recent participation of the United States in the provision of 
supplies”.604 Eddy held Jordan’s views in contempt and complained to his colleagues about what 
he regarded as Jordan’s “incipient insanity”. Such an overstatement leaves the American 
sounding a bit unhinged himself.
 605
 Nevertheless, the notion that a change in diplomatic 
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personnel in Jeddah would be a means in itself to facilitate greater Anglo-American cooperation 
did not fully materialize.  
 September 1, 1944 - the day that Eddy first met with Stanley Jordan as American 
minister - the USS John Barry carrying a shipment of three million newly minted riyals 
earmarked for the Saudi Arabian government, was sunk off the coast of Aden. The British navy 
was responsible for the protection of all Allied vessels between the Suez Canal and the Persian 
Gulf, and the American legation in Jeddah was up in arms over what it perceived as British 
“incompetence”.606 With tensions between the two allies already in an aggravated state, Eddy 
had come to discuss with Jordan American objectives in the Kingdom. He carefully explained 
that his country had no interest in Iraq, Palestine, the Levant States and Egypt – traditional areas 
of British influence -but it did have a substantial stake in Saudi Arabia. Eddy announced that the 
United States had ambitious plans to modernize the Kingdom and would seek to implement 
“costly projects” – building up infrastructure, promoting education and expanding the earlier 
work at the US agricultural mission in Al Kharj.
607
 To show his sincerity, the final point that 
Eddy made to his British colleague was that the United States was “prepared to force legislation 
through Congress, which would assure a continuity of their benevolent policy towards this 
country (Saudi Arabia)”.608  
 In conjunction with Eddy’s message on the United States' objectives in Saudi Arabia, 
revelations which pointed towards the post-war world, British officialdom took stock of their 
relations with their wartime ally. A Foreign Office memorandum from September 1944 tried to 
assess this new sense of American urgency:  
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“Colonel Eddy is a man of weight and experience and the account he gave of 
American intentions based on his recent discussions with Mr. Cordell Hull and 
the State Department suggests to me that it may be time for H.M.G. to reconsider 
the whole basis of Anglo-American collaboration in Saudi Arabia”.609 
 
   Stanley Jordan made a bold proposal, suggesting that the Kingdom should be split into 
two geographic spheres of British and American influence respectively. In many respects, 
Jordan’s idea ran along the lines of the Iranian model where separate British and Soviet sectors 
had been established. Looking at the new map proposed by Jordan, the Nejd region in the eastern 
part of Saudi Arabia, where the oil concessions lay, would be under American influence. 
Meanwhile, Britain, with the Empire’s millions of Moslem subjects, would oversee the Hedjaz, 
Saudi Arabia’s shoreline on the Red Sea, the home of Islam’s Holy Mecca and Medina. After 
further scrutiny, Jordan’s plan contradicted the established aims of British policy. Namely, by 
dividing the Kingdom, it would reverse the hard fought “Pax Saudica”, which had taken Ibn 
Saud years to forge, and which also continued to be an integral aspect of the stability of Pax 
Britannica in the region. Two months before his assassination at the hands of Zionist extremists, 
Lord Moyne, Britain’s Minister Resident of the Middle East, noted that if the British 
Government was unwilling to develop the Hedjaz on a scale similar to the United States, the 
discrepancy between British and American power would only become further magnified. This is 
a charge that Jordan was ready to accept himself; that from such a policy, “we might lay 
ourselves open to the charges of disinterestedness in the Moslem Holy Land” .610 
From his perch in Cairo, writing to the Foreign Office, Moyne noticed the irony that the 
US, in their haste for action, was becoming too “colonial” and “paternal in their attitude to Saudi 
Arabia”.611 Moyne warned “that a fanatical Moslem population does not take the same view of 
the blessings of American civilisation as they do themselves”.612 Having a similar vantage point, 
the Foreign Office concurred, stating that the United States would cease their overambitious 
activities in Saudi Arabia, “only when they themselves cry enough”.613At the same time, it’s 
important to stress that the British officialdom did not refute the United States presence in Saudi 
Arabia. They took it as part of a greater American commitment in the Middle East region that 
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would benefit British security. For this reason, Lord Moyne was still able to overlook the United 
States’ “somewhat ill-judged philanthropic policy” towards Saudi Arabia, believing that if 
Britain attempted to block such a venture, it would be detrimental to the general health of Anglo-
American relations.
614
 In his final evaluation, the Britain’s Minister Resident emphasized the 
need to work well with the Americans: 
 
“One cannot object to what they are doing, but I feel one might object to the way 
they are doing it. Would with a little consultation and cooperation be more in the 
spirit of the Anglo- U.S. alliance and couldn’t a suggestion of this be made to 
Washington from FO?”615 
 
    For other British officials, such as Moyne’s Chief of Staff, William Croft, stressing 
Anglo-American cooperation was downplayed. The prospect of the United States being able to 
throw around largesse and implement such ambitious polices in the Kingdom was still viewed 
with a healthy amount of scepticism. Predicting the likelihood of a post-war global economic 
depression, any chance of wide-scale American development projects would be thwarted, never 
mind such projects being launched in a hinterland like Saudi Arabia.
 616
 Eventually, the Treasury 
in Washington, Croft declared, would take the reins of American policy towards Saudi Arabia, 
and “the curtain will fall on the fairy godmother act”.617  
 Since Saudi Arabia’s independence, Britain’s policy with regard to the Kingdom had 
been based on the strategic premise of ensuring the status quo, but what the United States was 
now suggesting seemed to go against that. It was one thing to subsidise Ibn Saud during difficult 
wartime conditions, but trying to remake the Kingdom into “Main Street USA” was something 
wholly different. The type of “benign” liberal internationalist foreign policy expressed by Eddy 
was not just a provenance of the United States; it was also the keystone to future British policy 
seeking to reclaim lost influence in the emerging new liberal post-war order. For Lord Moyne, 
His Majesty’s Government used just the right amount of nous, which set the precedent in 
advancing the conditions of “backward peoples,” through schemes like the British Colonial 
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Development and Welfare Act of 1940.
618
 An added arm of Britain’s “soft power” in the Middle 
East was also the British Council on Anglo-Arab Cultural Relations (B.C.A.A.C.R).  Chaired by 
C.W. Baxter, head of the Eastern Department in the Foreign Office, the BCAACR sent 
educational materials, sports equipment, English books and cartoon films to Saudi Arabia 
through the British legation, and Ibn Saud had welcomed the initiative.
619
  
   Whereas once Britain had led talks about financial reform in Saudi Arabia, when Ibn 
Saud turned to Britain in November 1944 to provide him with a financial advisor, London turned 
down the King’s request.620 At this point in time, Neville Butler stressed the need to preserve the 
status quo and claimed that Ibn Saud was “too old to change his ways at this late stage in his 
career".
 621
 Furthermore, the resentment that would be created by Saudi Arabian officials having 
to take advice from a British financial advisor would, according to Neville Butler, “outweigh any 
good achieved”.622 It had also been found out that the whole idea of a financial advisor was the 
brain child of Stanley Jordan, and not King Ibn-Saud.
623
 Yet, the key motive behind the Foreign 
Office’s decision not to send a financial advisor was its aversion to alienating the United States. 
As William Croft explained it, from the time of the Stettinius Mission, London “began to put 
greater weight on Anglo-American relations than anything else and, consequently, Britain’s 
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relationship with the United States altered in Saudi Arabia”.624 It was thus hoped that by backing 
off from the financial advisor issue, this friendly acquiescence would benefit inter-allied 
cooperation and more importantly from the British standpoint, serve as a “useful stick to beat the 
Americans with in future”.625  
With that being said, by 1945, the British Government was not ready to follow the United 
States’ advocacy of providing subsidies to Saudi Arabia. Before Roosevelt and Churchill were 
scheduled to meet with Ibn Saud that February, the Foreign Office advised the prime minister not 
to “broach the subsidy question” with the American president. In response, Foreign Secretary 
Anthony Eden wrote to Churchill shortly afterwards that he had come to the conclusion that 
continuing to subsidize Ibn Saud on a large scale made little economic or political sense. He did 
not want Saudi Arabia to return to the harsh economic conditions of 1939, but at the same time 
he was fully aware that Riyadh’s yearly income had increased and was now “at least four times 
higher than immediately before the war”. 626 If that was not enough, said Eden, it was wholly 
illogical for Britain to increase its subsidy, considering “the view of our foreign financial 
problem”.627Sterling balances were at a tipping point. One report from December 1944 showed 
that in order to provide the pre-war level of imports needed by the United Kingdom, British 
exports would need to increase by fifty percent.
628
 And finally, reiterating another persistent 
theme of British policy, Eddy fully believed that freeing the King from Allied subsidies would be 
the best way to strengthen “Ibn Saud’s prestige”. 629 Having continually viewed the ‘Special 
Relationship’ with a critical eye, it was natural for Anthony Eden to disagree with the Americans 
on the subject of Britain raising its subsidy contribution.
630
 
 However, over the course of that spring, the attitude of British and American 
policymakers toward the subsidy question began to soften. On April 17, 1945, the British 
Embassy in Washington sent a memorandum to the State Department, stating that it was time for 
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a “broad policy” regarding the subsidy question to be arrived at by both parties.631 Shortly before 
the United States Government came to an agreement with their British counterparts, the Director 
of the Office of War Mobilization, Undersecretary of the Navy, and Assistant Secretary of War 
met with officials of the NEA to reaffirm their commitment to Anglo-American cooperation. 
Unsurprisingly, this diverse group of American policymakers took a more expansive view of the 
issue and looked beyond the parochial tensions existing between British and American officials 
on the ground. They told their NEA colleagues that British officials would “be delighted to have 
the United States Government interested materially in Saudi Arabia, would welcome our 
cooperation, and that we have nothing to fear from the British”. 632   
In this atmosphere of evolving accord, by July 1945 Britain and the United States had 
reached a compromise in the form of an Anglo-American joint subsidy programme in Saudi 
Arabia for the upcoming calendar year. The programme would be worth over ten million dollars, 
including essential supplies such as 50,000 tons of cereals, 6,871,000 yards of textiles, 8,500 
tires, $114,000 worth of automobile parts, 300 tons of sugar, 120 tons of tea, plus all of the 
expenses paid for Saudi Arabia’s worldwide diplomatic missions.633 The British contribution had 
fallen to almost one-half the contribution they made in 1944.
634
 Realizing that London was 
unwilling to participate in a joint programme that went over a threshold of 10 million dollars, the 
United States added their own bonus programme, which consisted of minted Saudi Riyals worth 
over three million dollars, plus an array of supply items, such as trucks, writing paper, farm 
equipment, radio equipment, distillation plants, passenger cars, and additional items requested by 
Saudi Arabian officials.
635
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*** 
  Having succeeded Stanley Jordan as British minister to Saudi Arabia in February 1945,  
Laurence Grafftey-Smith was  reminded by his superiors that a significant part of his modus 
operandi was to bridge the gap that had  appeared in Anglo-American relations under Jordan’s 
stewardship.
636 Very unlike a stereotypical “Colonel Blimp”, the charismatic Grafftey-Smith was 
known to be progressive in the sense that he was a Labour Party supporter, a rare bird in the 
conservative flock of the British diplomatic corps. He was welcomed openly by the American 
legation as William Eddy happily observed, “what an improvement over his predecessor.”637 
Shortly after his arrival Grafftey-Smith, much like Jordan, also questioned the haste of the US 
approach: “The Americans seem to be buying many friends in Arabia, and if our policy ever 
becomes unwelcome to the Arabs, we have little to rely on to stop American influence.”638  
What is interesting is that while Grafftey-Smith worried about the decline of British 
power, throughout this period American officials thought the same thing about their own. “Too 
little and too late!” claimed, Major Harry R. Snyder, American military attaché to Cairo and 
Jeddah, lamenting what he believed to be the  incoherence of American policy in the Kingdom  
that had been evident since the summer of 1944. Speaking to Leonard Parker of the NEA, Snyder 
shared his displeasure, warning that the “stakes in Saudi Arabia are so great that our cousins will 
stop at nothing to discredit and outbid us”.639 Suspicious of the British Government’s motives, 
Snyder’s sentiment, however, was running counter to an NEA report that had been written by 
Parker, outlining the key elements of United States’ policy towards Saudi Arabia, in which the 
importance of continuing “to cooperate with Britain...” was one of the main points 
emphasized.
640
The frustrations displayed by Snyder therefore was less about him being anti-
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British, and more about what he perceived as the lack of United States’ diplomatic skill in the 
face of shrewd British diplomacy. In March of 1945, Snyder insisted that it was:  
 
“...humiliating and downright infuriating to see our country out-maneuvered 
simply because our ponderous machinery in Washington grinds so slowly….the 
whole fabric of our prestige and position is breaking down, and if the United 
States wants anything in Saudi Arabia, somebody had better do something at 
once”.641 
 
  When it came to wartime statecraft, American officials being outfoxed by their wily 
British “cousins” had been a recurrent theme of the period. The Division of Public Liaison 
compiled a report to try and gain a sense of the American public’s view on the performance of 
the State Department. “This country raises politicians not diplomats…those slick fellows across 
the pond (the British) can buy and sell our boys anytime,” said one interviewee.642 This notion of 
British superiority in matters of high diplomacy was particularly felt in the Middle East. Like 
Synder, Harold Hoskins also at this time noted that his visit “made more clear (sic) the 
outstanding weakness of US foreign policy in the Middle East- its apparent lack of continuity, its 
uncertainty and, at times, its inconsistency”. Hoskins poignantly noted that British foreign 
policy, on the other hand, appeared more grounded regardless of the winds of political change 
back in the United Kingdom and this lent the British a sense of “influence and prestige...as 
compared with the US”.643 
  Policymakers in Washington realized that the British possessed an advantage over the 
Americans in that included  in their empire were a whole host of Moslem subjects who could 
generate a great deal of revenue for Saudi Arabia through their annual trek to the Holy Cities.  
Additionally, as Saudi Arabia was surrounded by Sterling bloc countries, Arabian merchants 
feared shifting their business to a more uncertain client. And finally, the British ably conveyed a 
sense of permanence in Saudi Arabia, which the Americans, except for the ARAMCO oilmen, 
could not match. William Eddy was of the opinion that the Saudi Arabians believed that the few 
American officials inside the country would leave once the war ended “and cannot therefore be 
dealt with seriously in commerce or politics”. He condemned his American colleagues at the 
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NEA over their wariness of accepting diplomatic postings in the Kingdom. This gave Ibn Saud 
the impression that once the Second World War ended, the Americans would return to being 
minor players in the region, and thus it would be a much better policy for him to keep his long-
term and tested association with the British in good order. 
644
  
   Some of the weak areas of American diplomacy were made abundantly clear in April 
1944, when a shipment of riyals for the Saudi Arabian Government, minted in the United States, 
had arrived in Jeddah. While Britain had delivered its subsidies for years and proceeded without 
affectation, the American delivery party in contrast comprised of a detachment of no less than 
twenty-one United States Army officials, including a group of photographers. The fanfare was 
not appreciated by Saudi Arabian officials as James Landis described the mission to Dean 
Acheson as “pretty much a flop”.645 Likewise, Kermit Roosevelt, who was visiting Jeddah on his 
own Middle East mission for the OSS, had witnessed the proceedings and claimed: “One must 
remember the Arabs have been receiving subsidies from outsiders for generations”. According to 
Roosevelt, the objective of shipment delivery was “calculated to improve US relations with the 
Government (Saudi Arabia) and people of SA…the purpose should not be that of seeking to 
place an article or pictures in Life or Time Magazine”.646 
  As late as October 1944, the total amount of Lend-Lease extended to the Saudi Arabian 
government by the Americans totalled $ 11,100,930. Regardless of this money sent to his 
country, the King, having never fully forgotten America’s failure to lend his country sufficient 
financial aid back in 1941, angrily asked William Eddy: “Whom can I rely? I cannot afford to 
antagonize the British”. The American contingent was caught unaware, surprised by the King’s 
force of feeling.
 647
 In this instance, Ibn Saud was upset that a shipment of minted riyals worth 
2,000,000 dollars that his government had purchased from the US on credit was behind schedule 
and would not arrive in time for that year’s Hajj. 648 But coming to the rescue was the British 
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legation, who in collaboration with the shipping company, Gellatly Hankey, quickly organized 
an emergency loan for the Saudi Arabian Government.
649
 Although the American deliveries 
eventually arrived, the bureaucratic ineffectiveness and mistakes in communication gave the 
impression that the United States was not sufficiently concerned during a time when the 
Kingdom’s needs were so urgent.650 In these cases, the Foreign Office realized that, despite their 
own doubts of losing influence to the Americans, the British Government was still in a “happy 
position” in that a “cardinal point” of the King’s own foreign policy was his view that Britain 
was the only power he could fully rely on.
651
  
 
Ibn Saud’s Request for a Military Mission 
  
  As American and British officials weighed the benefits of their collaboration in Saudi 
Arabia, the Stettinius talks had made sure to note that “prompt consideration” should be given to 
establishing a joint Anglo-American military mission to assist Ibn Saud in training a “modern 
Saudi Arabian Army”.652 Other neutral nations in the region, such as Turkey and Afghanistan, 
had also at this time requested military missions from the Allies.
653
 Plans to jointly establish 
these kinds of military missions presented a host of challenges for British and American officials 
as their martial elements were perceived as a manifestation of a country’s national power. 
Though a major issue in terms of the development of Anglo-American relations in Saudi Arabia, 
Ibn Saud’s request for a military mission has not been a prominent part of the subject’s 
historiography.
 654
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  The plans for providing Ibn Saud with a military mission had their origins in December 
1943 when Major General Ralph Royce of the United States Armed Forces in the Middle East 
(USAFIME) travelled to Saudi Arabia to discuss the King’s military supply needs. 655 That same 
month Britain and the United States preliminarily agreed to furnish over two million dollars 
worth of military equipment, split equally between the two powers.
656
 In March 1944, Royce, 
alongside his successor Brigadier General B.G. Giles, met again with Ibn Saud to further discuss 
the details of the Anglo-American joint supply programme; a conversation in which the King 
also asked Colonel Royce for the United States to establish an American mission that would train 
the Saudi Arabian Army.
657
 Although the visit of the two generals was a glaring example of 
American influence emerging from the shadow cast by their wartime ally, afterwards in his 
report, Royce stressed the importance of the United States working closely with its British 
counterparts.
 658
 For the upcoming mission, the United States would instruct the Saudi Arabian 
army in the use of equipment, which was to be “furnished on a combined basis” with British 
military officials.
659
  
 Royce’s view was seconded by key American officials back in Washington. For example,  
Henry Stimson believed that separate British and American military missions in Saudi Arabia 
might give the wrong impression and suggest Allied disunity. Dividing the mission into separate 
British and American entities, according to Stimson, would pose a grave risk of “Balkanizing” 
the Saudi Arabian army into competing tribal factions. Moreover, establishing separate missions 
once again played right into Ibn Saud’s hands, as the Secretary of War saw it, pitting the two 
allies against the other “as a means of obtaining the assistance he desires”.660 Now that Saudi 
Arabia was starting to play a greater part in America’s grand strategy, Stimson - in response to 
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the talk of a military mission - had written Cordell Hull in May 1944: “It is the opinion of the 
War Department that it would be highly desirable to establish a definite policy of Anglo-
American cooperation in affairs pertaining to Saudi Arabia, based on an understanding that the 
interests of both nations will be mutually respected”.661 
  A month later, the State Department backed a plan that would allow London to take part 
and help organize a mission that would train Saudi Arabian armed forces under joint Anglo-
American auspices.
662
 But from the beginning, the British Government was not sold on the 
military mission idea. On one level, helping Ibn Saud in this capacity still held a wide range of 
strategic benefits for Britain. The Foreign Office understood the advantages that came with the 
mission as the United States would be “heavily committed in the defence of Saudi Arabia and 
therefore of the Middle East generally”.663 Furthermore, taking part in the military mission 
afforded Britain the opportunity to smooth over any frayed feelings with the King in light of the 
decision to decrease Britain’s financial commitment to Saudi Arabia. Indeed, Stanley Jordan 
argued that if British officials did not participate, it would be interpreted by Ibn Saud as Britain 
surrendering its influence in the Kingdom.
664
 Jordan had informed the Foreign Office that shortly 
after Royce’s visit in March, Ibn Saud had secretly told him that the “Americans were prepared 
to train his army but that he looked to us for the assistance he required”.665 Warning the Foreign 
Office, Jordan wrote: “I cannot stress too strongly the importance” that Ibn Saud attached to 
receiving military experts, and a British refusal “would cause him grave disappointment”.666  
  But at the same time, policymakers back in London also appreciated the many complex 
considerations, which might arise while supplying Ibn Saud with a military mission. To start, 
British officials were uneasy about the possibility of a conflict between cultures, which might be 
the result of fielding a military mission composed of “Christian Elements” in the home of Islam. 
At the Foreign Office, Thomas Wikeley made this observation when he noted: “we could 
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perhaps point out that it is a question of balancing the advantage of obtaining some trained Saudi 
pilots against the disadvantage of having a lot of non-Moslem pilots flying about the country and 
possibly violating the sanctity of the Holy Places”.667 Moreover, such a venture would deliver a 
propaganda coup to Ibn Saud’s Arab rivals and the Axis powers as the King would be accused of 
handing the Holy Places over to foreign interests.
668
  
  These were the reasons why Stanley Jordan believed that Ibn Saud had been reluctant to 
agree to US military officials training Saudi soldiers because - unlike the British the Americans 
were unable to send Sunni Moslem officers. Although Simon Davis has quoted William Eddy, 
praising the “professional success” of the US military officials in Saudi Arabia to try and make 
the point of American ascendancy, during the same period, Eddy had his own doubts about their 
ability to mingle with Saudi officials.
669
 When Eddy had first visited Saudi Arabia in April 1944, 
he witnessed a small band of American personnel under the command of Colonel Garrett 
Shomber, who were there to deliver a small cache of military equipment to Saudi Arabian 
authorities. After the transaction Eddy had come to the conclusion that the local reaction to the 
American presence was “not too good”.670 It was incidents like this, which led the Foreign Office 
to believe that only British soldiers were “capable of establishing just that sort of informal and 
friendly understanding which the Arabs appreciated.” 671 
    But regardless of their confidence, British officials wanted to assist Ibn Saud militarily 
only up to a certain point. Under no conditions did they want to give the Saudi Arabian King the 
tools to act aggressively, say against other British allies in the Middle East, such as the 
Hashemite kingdoms. Indeed, the great fear from London’s perspective was that if Ibn Saud 
attacked Iraq over unresolved borders issues, treaty obligations would mean that Britain would 
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be bound to favour the former in “active opposition to the American backing the Saudis”.672 The 
Foreign Office missive sent to the American Embassy in London that summer articulated this 
view, agreeing that Ibn Saud should be sent sufficient materiel, while reiterating that military 
training and provision of arms that went beyond the narrow ambit of internal security in Saudi 
Arabia would be a serious mistake: 
 
“In the first place, it is impossible to foretell how these arms might be used in the 
period of political uncertainty in Arabia which is likely to follow in Ibn Saud’s 
death. Secondly, the acquisition by Ibn Saud of large quantities of area might very 
easily have the effect of alarming neighbouring countries. Thirdly, there is the 
probability that the arms would be smuggled into Palestine…” 673 
  
  With that being said, the British Government, still finalized the substantial Anglo-
American military supply programme for Saudi Arabia in 1944 that included: 50 light 
reconnaissance cars, 500 light machine guns, 10,000 rifles and ammunition.
674
 
  Despite this fact, the third reason for the lack of British enthusiasm towards the joint 
Allied military mission was that it was not deemed practical. It is true that Britain and the United 
States had successfully executed Operation Overlord in the summer of 1944, a feat that the 
historian Max Hastings called “the greatest organization achievement of the Second World 
War...”, but fighting alongside one another and assimilating each nation's military personnel to 
train a third party’s army was an entirely different matter.675 For this sort of assignment, the two 
allies had their own distinct protocols, guidelines and equipment that were not always 
interchangeable. As Stanley Jordan’s successor, Laurence Grafftey-Smith saw things, an Anglo-
American joint military mission was a problematic proposition, largely because of the confusion 
materializing from “two different sets of equipment and the two, no doubt, divergent conceptions 
of, and what, the Saudis were to be taught” .676 
  The Anglo-American joint military mission was withdrawn largely due to Britain’s 
misgivings. But it is important to note, however, that the fourth and final justification for 
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opposing it was that British officials like Grafftey-Smith felt that it would have a detrimental 
impact on Anglo-American relations. “The disadvantage of a joint mission, and, to a lesser 
extent, of two separate missions,” said Grafftey-Smith “is that there would probably be a certain 
amount of rivalry between the two teams...”677 Therefore, when in November of 1944, Saudi 
Arabian Minister of Defence, Amir Mansour (Ibn Saud’s son), had requested sole British 
assistance in reorganizing Saudi Arabia’s armed forces under traditional British lines, much like 
the Arab Legion in Transjordan. Mansour’s request highlighted the delicate political balancing 
act underlying the military mission issue. Much like the considerations surrounding Ibn Saud’s 
request for a financial advisor, if the mission was supplied to Saudi Arabian authorities, the 
British Legation in Jeddah was under the impression that American officials in response would 
react “most violently”.678  
   Consequently, London buried its head in the sand, as it were, but a small British mission 
did appear outside of Jeddah in the mountain city of Taif in February 1945.
679
 This was largely a 
symbolic gesture, meant to placate the Saudi Arabian government without aggravating the 
United States, and was quickly dismantled.
680
 While the wider political pressures of maintaining 
transatlantic harmony had always encompassed British thinking in Saudi Arabia, on this specific 
occasion, they acquiesced to the Americans in the hope that by doing so, the gesture would bring 
the two closer together. 
    
Dhahran Airfield and the New Frontiers of Anglo-American Relations   
 
    As Britain and the United States were unable to come to terms over implementing a joint 
Anglo-American military mission in Saudi Arabia, they also found themselves dealing with the 
issue of the United States desire to construct an airfield in Dhahran.
681
 For both Britain and the 
                                               
677
 PRO: FO 371/45543.  ‘Ibn Saud’s Request for a British Military Mission’, Grafftey-Smith to Foreign Office, 
November 12, 1945. 
678
 PRO: FO 371/45543.  ‘Ibn Saud’s Request for a British Military Mission’, Grafftey-Smith to Foreign Office, 
November 12, 1945. 
679
 FRUS 1945.  Vol. VIII, Near East, South Asia, Africa and Middle East, Eddy to State Department, April 9, 1945, 
p. 872. 
680
 Davis, Contested Space, p. 214.  
681
 While the Dhahran Airfield story has been covered extensively from the vantage point of Saudi-American 
relations, the Anglo-American angle has been far less studied. Arguably, the most extensive study of the subject has 
been offered by Parker Hart. His account is part memoir, part history from his recollections as the Vice Consul in 
Dhahran. See, Hart, ‘Diplomacy of an Airbase’, Saudi Arabia and the United States: Birth of a Security Partnership 
(Indiana: Bloomington Press, 1998) p. 12-20. Also see, Davis, Contested Space, pp. 181-183, 213-217.  Miller, 
168 
 
United States, any subject pertaining to aviation would be a fundamental part of their own 
foreign policy strategies as it helped to fasten together their diverse points of influence around 
the globe into an integrated system. With the Allied war effort continuing apace, building an 
airfield in Saudi Arabia had the unintended effect of further blurring the lines of what constituted 
civil and military aviation - was it related to the military exigency, or the exclusive objective of 
long-term national planning? In some respects, the historian Alan Dobson is not guilty of 
hyperbole when he calls Anglo-American aviation rivalry during the Second World War the 
“Other Air-Battle”.682    
 The United States Government’s plan to construct an airfield in Dhahran had its origins 
in the Allied search for air routes in Saudi Arabia in 1942, when Britain and the United States 
had worked closely together under an Anglo-American umbrella. And just like in 1942, seeking 
Ibn Saud’s consent to construct an airfield in Dhahran, the Americans turned once again to 
Britain for diplomatic assistance. In June 1944, Major General Donald H. Connolly of the United 
States Forces in the Middle East (USAFIME) had been told by his superiors in Washington that 
in relation to the airfield, “a British officer would visit King Ibn Saud and represent combined 
American and British interests”. Almost immediately, however, the American Legation in 
Jeddah wondered openly if the British-led proposal was going to be presented to the King as an 
Anglo-American joint venture, or as separate British and American initiatives. Soon after, news 
came that Ibn Saud had rejected the American proposals while rumours emerged that the British 
legation in their discussions with Ibn Saud had unilaterally, without Washington’s knowledge, 
requested permission to build an airfield of their own. Taking this story to be the truth, in 
Connolly’s view, the “choice of having a field of our own, or sharing one with the British, gives 
rise to no doubt in my mind, the former is preferable”.683 
In one of his first orders of business as American minister, Eddy sought to get to the 
bottom of the mystery to see if Connolly’s accusations of British meddling in the airfield affair 
were true. He found no evidence of a British officer even visiting Riyadh, possessing the 
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authority to represent both American and British interests, or for that matter, that British 
representatives had prejudiced the USAFIME airfield request. Yet, in October 1944, there was a 
curious episode in which the new American consulate in Dhahran reported that a British survey 
party from Bahrain was inquiring about “aerodromes” and were calling themselves 
“technicians”.684 Eddy was adamant that the British survey team’s appearance was an 
“unfriendly act constituting anti-American coercion of Saudi Government and restriction to 
Allied War effort…”685 Commenting on the British provocation in Dhahran, Eddy from his perch 
as the new American minister wryly noted, perhaps it is a test of equal opportunities for US and 
British cooperation in Saudi Arabia”.686 Like Connolly, Eddy was now strongly committed to the 
United States operating its own airfields, without having to share facilities with the British.
687
   
There were influential American voices who took a noticeably different view, including 
Wallace Murray who speaking to Adolf Berle believed that the charges laid out against the 
British survey team were baseless, and that British authorities had by no means pressured Ibn 
Saud into refusing the American request for airfields.
688
 However, Murray’s superior, the 
Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, remained suspicious of British manoeuvring. He claimed that 
the latest airfield controversy was evidence of Britain reverting to “dog eat dog” policies...”689  
Writing to the American Ambassador in London, John Winant, on October 17, 1944, Hull, 
opined: “A covert contest which begins to assume unpleasant proportions is prevailing over 
airfields in the Middle East.” Hull asked Winant in London to speak to Anthony Eden and tell 
the Foreign Secretary that the airfield saga had “made an extremely painful impression here 
Washington”; in part because it was symptomatic of a broader trend of unilateral British 
policymaking that was interpreted as contradictory to the spirit of the Stettinius declaration.
690
   
  That October, not to be outdone, the British Government had also accused William Eddy 
of acting in an underhanded fashion. Eddy had alerted the British legation that the United States 
military aircraft would no longer carry civilian personnel en route from Jeddah to Cairo that were 
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not directly related to the war effort. 
691
 Not surprisingly, British officials were affronted by 
Eddy’s comment, viewing them not only as an insult from an ally, but also as very foolish. While 
Benjamin F. Giles, Commanding General of USAFIME, would later overrule Eddy’s decision, 
British officials were more annoyed that the American minister had been seeking out greater air 
rights for the United States from the King without informing the British legation. Indeed in their 
view, Eddy had used the airfield issue as a smokescreen to acquire civil air-rights in Saudi 
Arabia for the American airline, Trans World Airlines (TWA).  
  British officials like Captain C.E. Colbeck, the military attaché of the British legation in 
Jeddah, complained that “it is fortunate that we now know he (Colonel Eddy) is prepared to 
misrepresent the position in order to further his own case.” 692 Later, Laurence Grafftey-Smith 
would suggest to London that they could also play Eddy’s devious game, organizing it so that the 
British Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC) could make a proposal to equip Ibn Saud with “a 
small civil aviation unit for passenger/freight transport within Saudi Arabia”.693 In Washington, 
Paul Alling sought to assuage British authorities and tried to explain away the American 
minister’s indiscretion. He stated that Eddy’s request for civil air rights had been couched - not 
solely as an American endeavour - but in terms of Anglo-American collaboration: “We were 
thus, in effect, opening up the field to the British as well to an American”.694 Although the flap 
over Eddy’s actions had been unfortunate, the stated goal of the Stettinius talks was still intact. 
As such, the “general policy of cooperation between Ministers in Saudi Arabia”, said Alling, 
“remained unchanged, so far as we were concerned”.695   
  While British officials did not take kindly to Eddy’s subterfuge, they agreed with him 
that the United States had a right to establish its own commercial aviation interests in the 
Kingdom. Simon Davis has explained the air issue in terms of subservience, stating that “British 
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diplomats in Washington sacrificed …civil aviation in search for broader Anglo-American 
harmony”.696 Yet, the issue needs to be placed within the greater political context of the time. It 
needs to be considered in light of the International Aviation Conference that had taken place in 
Chicago in November and December 1944 during which 54 nations of the world sought to "make 
arrangements for the immediate establishment of provisional world air routes and services".
697
 
From there, Britain and the United States governments began negotiations with Riyadh on the 
question of Fifth Freedom Rights in Saudi Arabia, which pertained to liberalizing rules 
concerning the right of one nation to fly to another nation. Though at times quarrelsome, the fact 
that the United States had a foot in the door with regard to Saudi Arabia’s civil aviation sphere 
was largely considered a fait accompli and helped the whole issue from  becoming more 
combative. Indeed, a year later in 1945, the NEA would concede that it was in the long-term 
interest of the United States to strive to collaborate with Britain on air right issues in Saudi 
Arabia on equal and open terms.
698
  
 Relations between London and Washington in the autumn of 1944 still remained uneasy 
as another tangential issue was further complicating the Dhahran airfield matter. Similar to the 
East India Company of the previous century, the British company, Cable & Wireless Ltd., was 
synonymous with British imperialism. Its technological innovations had helped London 
communicate with its vast worldwide empire.
699
 Since 1926, in return for Britain’s recognition of 
his independence, Ibn Saud had among other things granted Cable & Wireless Ltd. a concession 
to provide electronic communication throughout the nascent state. Although this arrangement 
was monopolistic in nature, the King continuously renewed the British contract throughout the 
1930s and 1940s without concerning himself with the growing American presence in his 
kingdom.
700
 That October in 1944, American complaints were raised that the Cable & Wireless 
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Ltd. only served Britain and its imperial byways while excluding Saudi Arabia’s contact with 
United States. This was a major problem since the American legation in Jeddah at this stage did 
not possess equipment with mechanical or electronic encryption. What’s more, rather than 
discuss the issue with his British counterpart, Eddy complained directly to Ibn Saud, a move that 
for a short time caused an added rift in Anglo-American relations.  
  After hearing of the incident Wallace Murray apologised to his British colleagues over 
William Eddy’s lack of protocol, agreeing that his actions had been counterproductive to the 
spirit of Anglo-American cooperation. He did mention, however, that strategic communications 
in this area of the world were now an essential part of American national security.
701
Seeking to 
be good allies, the British were willing to accept a modification to the Cable & Wireless Ltd. 
agreement.
702
 Even Stanley Jordan  acknowledged that “because of an exclusive concession to 
Cable & Wireless Ltd, our critics here will be given a concrete issue on which to attack us.” 
Putting Anglo- American cooperation first, Jordan agreed that the United States had made a 
reasonable request, and that it was a “matter of interest to us both in the prosecution of the war 
and as a matter of one Ally helping the other”.703 The contretemps was eventually solved that 
October when Cable & Wireless made their services available to the American legation in 
Jeddah, the consulate in Dhahran and the facilities of ARAMCO.
 704
    
*** 
 With the hurdles over civil air rights and telecommunications having been overcome, the 
scholar James Gormly has argued that in attempting to build the Dhahran airfield, US officials 
still viewed, “the British...as the major obstacle”. 705 However, early as October 1944, the British 
embassy in Washington was the main source of inspiration offering the best advice to the 
Americans on the best means to procure London’s support. The Counsellor of the British 
Embassy, Michael Wright, working in close collaboration with Wallace Murray stated to him 
that it was imperative to stress to authorities in London the military necessity of the airfield. 
“Make no mention of any post-war civil aviation rights since that would be sure to cause endless 
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delay in London,” claimed Wright.706 The British Air Marshall Chief of the Middle East, Sir 
Charles Medhurst, had originally opposed American plans for a military field in Dhahran 
believing that British bases in the area would be adequate for the Allied war effort’s ongoing 
shift to the Pacific.
707
 That month, the War Department therefore made the case that the RAF 
controlled airbase in Bahrain - located on the island of Muhrak - was unsuitable for this task. 
They explained to British authorities that the airbase was too small and expansion was 
impossible as the ground on the island was made up of unstable deposits of fossiliferous and sea 
shell lime. Instead, Dhahran was a much more desirable location, allowing for an estimated 2000 
landings for military related activities a month.
708
 From their discussions with British military 
authorities in the Middle East, the War Department had sharpened its analysis of the British 
Government’s regional concerns when it came to an American airfield in Dhahran. In a 
memorandum drafted for Paul Alling on November 22, 1944, the War Department explained: 
 
“Should the British be concerned about possible desires for Saudi Arabian  
interests on the part of nations other than Great Britain and the United States, it 
seems reasonable to expect that they would willing to aid in securing the King’s 
approval for an entirely American military air field at Dhahran which could used 
by British aircraft, if necessary”. 709 
 
  Not wanting to alienate its two Allied benefactors, the Saudi Arabian Government would 
prefer, said Alling, that if an airfield was to be operated by the United States, it would likely only 
be granted under joint Anglo-American tenancy.
710Alling’s appeal exhibits once again that 
beyond the squabbles, the State Department recognized that American policy in Saudi Arabia 
was still intimately connected to the continuity of British influence.  
  In January 1945 President Roosevelt approved in principle the State and War 
Departments and Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) plan to create an air mission headed 
by Colonel Voris Connor that would help train Saudi pilots and ground crew, as well as offering 
equipment and medical assistance. In return, the United States Government hoped to receive 
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preferential treatment with regards to planned airfield in Dhahran.
 711
 American officials, 
however, did not notify the British legation in Jeddah of this latest gambit. This bit of 
information has in turn been used by some scholars to attack the notion that Britain and the 
United States were allies in Saudi Arabia in the first months of 1945, but this particular event has 
been largely misconstrued.
712
 The State Department in fact did inform their British counterparts, 
but only in Washington. Wallace Murray disclosed to Michael Wright that the reason for this 
concealment was specifically laid at the door of Stanley Jordan’s “generally uncooperative 
attitude in the past”.713 The irony is that there were British officials in Jeddah who were still 
convinced that the United States could function as a bulwark for British security in the Middle 
East and responded positively to the news of American intentions. Expressing such a view, C.E. 
Colbeck writing to the Foreign Office stated that Ibn Saud would be “perfectly justified” in 
accepting American methods of training and experiencing first-hand modern aviation, 
communication and airfield development schemes.
714
  
When considering the proposed Connor mission, it is important to note that instead of 
jumping at the American offer, the King immediately alerted the British legation, consulting with 
them on the pros and cons of developing a closer relationship with the US authorities. The 
scholar Clive Leatherdale in his writings has tried to highlight the point that “through diplomatic 
relations with the US Ibn Saud had found his counter-balance to Britain”, but on this particular 
occasion, it was turned the other way around.
715
 The British minister, Laurence Grafftey-Smith, 
was circumspect in his appraisal of the situation. Not wanting to compromise Ibn Saud’s trust, 
the British legation in their dealings with American officials pretended to know nothing of the 
United States’ unilateral offer. Laying heavy emphasis on the King’s self-reliance, Grafftey-
Smith took a subtle approach, advising Ibn Saud to do what was in his country’s best interest.716 
The King felt that too much foreign military assistance as envisioned by the United States would 
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raise the ire of his Wahhabist subjects. As a result, Ibn Saud turned down Washington’s offer, an 
act that took American officialdom by surprise.
 717
 
American officials, notably acting Secretary of State, Joseph Grew, blamed London for 
the King’s decision which aligns with the historiography’s emphasis on confrontation.718 
Commenting on the subject, Simon Davis  has taken the nuanced view of suggesting that 
American frustration came from Washington’s hope that London’s support would “disguise US 
ambitions” from Saudi Arabian officials, who were becoming increasingly disenchanted about 
the scale of American intervention.
719
 However, inferring that Britain was a political pawn in 
Washington’s diplomatic game distorts the fact that British officials had ascended to a unique 
strategic position, serving as a diplomatic intermediary between their two close allies, the United 
States and Ibn Saud. 
  When the next round of discussions on the Dhahran airfield went ahead that spring, 
American officials in Jeddah were instructed to negotiate with the Saudi Arabian Government 
only once Ibn Saud was informed that British had finally acquiesced to the proposal.
720
 Writing 
on the subject, the scholar Fred Lawson has stated that throughout this time period, British 
officials “voiced persistent opposition to the project”.721 However, on April 17, 1945, Edward 
Stettinius informed US officials in Jeddah that the British Chiefs of Staff had come around to the 
American view and “concur[red] in our proposal to construct a military airfield at Dhahran...and 
is prepared to support our case to King Abdul Aziz should we so request.” For their support, 
British forces in return would be given fly over and landing privileges at the airfield.
 722
 Less 
than a month later, British minister Laurence Grafftey- Smith met with the Saudi minister Yussef 
Yassin and prevailed  upon him to effect his  government‘s support of the construction of an 
airfield in Dhahran because of “its essential importance to the joint war effort in the Far East”.723 
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  Still acknowledged as the leading hegemonic power in the Middle East, it was not in the 
interest of Ibn Saud to alienate Britain. Once the Saudi Arabian Government had London’s 
backing, construction and the Connor Mission was given the go-ahead that summer and the 
Dhahran airfield would be completed by American engineers in May 1946. From this point 
onwards, the airfield issue would become one of the key pillars for Anglo-American security 
arrangements vis-a-vis the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
724
 Summing up the Dhahran 
airfield episode, it is undeniable that the subject created a certain amount of consternation on 
both sides. Yet, writing about this event years later, Parker Hart, who at the time was the 
American Vice Consul in Dhahran said that British approval had opened the way for the United 
States to gain an airfield, but also helped to achieve better Anglo-American cooperation”.725 
 
 Conclusion 
 
 The arrival in Saudi Arabia of American minister William Eddy signalled that the Anglo-
American relationship had shifted into a new phase. In view of American policymakers linking 
Saudi Arabia to their country’s national security, Eddy had announced to his British colleagues 
that the United States sought to expand its policies in Saudi Arabia. By September of 1944, 
British officials had realized for quite some time that all forms of Anglo-American cooperation 
would have to go hand-in-hand with the United States playing a significantly greater role in the 
affairs of Saudi Arabia. While at times it seemed that American and British attitudes towards 
Saudi Arabia were moving in different directions, the search for greater Anglo-American 
cooperation carried on in spite of this.  
  A large part of the controversy arising from the main issues covered in this chapter 
stemmed from a debate that had been the subject of discussions since 1941. What were the limits 
with regard to the scale of Anglo-American intervention in Saudi Arabia and would it have a 
reverse effect of weakening Al-Saud authority, thus putting the various interests of the British 
and American in jeopardy? British officials remained convinced that offering excessive aid to 
Ibn Saud did not serve their national interests. In a growing climate of austerity, combined with 
imperial priorities that outweighed Britain’s concerns in Saudi Arabia, London was both 
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politically and financially unable to press forward with policies primarily based on significant 
amounts of largesse.  
 When it came to dealing with the contemporaneous issues of Ibn Saud’s request for a 
military mission and the US’ aim to build an airfield in Dhahran, Anglo-American agreement 
was still sought after by both powers. From the American perspective, fulfilling Ibn Saud’s 
request for a military mission was part of a wider national strategy in which aid in this form 
buttressed the Saudi-American partnership. But British officials saw things differently. A 
military mission of the nature proposed by the United States would weaken the king’s sovereign 
status, which would injure Britain’s panoply of regional interests. The subject of building an 
American airfield in Dhahran, on the other hand, had more to do with the wartime concern of 
supplying Allied military activities in the Pacific theatre. Both the US and Britain were wary of 
dealing with the airfield issue because it touched on more contentious debates like civil aviation, 
telecommunications and questions of regional power. But what is most striking is that the 
historiography has played down the fact that diplomatic solutions were found by the allies which 
would eventually resolve these areas of discord. The British Government continued to be a 
strong influence in Saudi Arabia and in turn the United States looked to the weight of their 
wartime ally’s diplomatic power, viewing it as an effective channel to gain Ibn Saud’s 
acceptance to the airfield project. In return, British forces were given free access to use the 
airfield, which offered another layer to Britain’s own security in the Middle East.  
Anglo-American cooperation was not always a smooth or straight road. There is no doubt 
that Britain and the United States worked together on some issues better than others in Saudi 
Arabia. Difference in policy priorities and the hegemonic controversies attached to them 
sometimes made collaboration difficult. However, although the high expectations of the 
Stettinius Mission proved to be out of reach, the strategic interests of the United States and 
Britain in Saudi Arabia continued to be correlative in character. In trying to find an effective 
arrangement for an Anglo-American partnership, the ongoing paradigm can be observed in the 
final chapter as the Second World War wound down and the two allies faced the new and 
quickly approaching challenge of the post-war world.   
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Chapter-VII            
Anglo-American Relations in Saudi Arabia, 1945: The Post-
War World  
 
Introduction 
 
  On February 12, 1945, with great public fanfare, President Roosevelt met Ibn Saud 
aboard the USS Quincy in Great Bitter Lake. This event has been interpreted by many historians 
as a moment when the “American Century” would be empowered by Saudi Arabian oil, while at 
the same time it indirectly inferred the waning of British influence more broadly.
726
 
Unsurprisingly, the event  left an indelible mark on the way that Anglo-American relationship in 
Saudi Arabia during the Second World War has been construed, serving to cast the subject in 
terms of hegemonic rivalry. This final chapter challenges this perception and affirms that the 
Roosevelt-Ibn Saud meeting did not in fact eliminate British power from the Kingdom, nor did it 
mark the end of Anglo-American interaction there.  
 Though Britain had lost some of its power in the intervening war years, its prestige in the 
Middle East remained a source of its strategic strength. Certainly, Washington still found 
London’s influence to be irksome at times, but American policymakers could not deny the 
significant part that British statecraft continued to play in Saudi Arabia. As this chapter will 
show, even when tensions arose in 1945 over issues such as when the King declared war against 
Germany, or when Saudi Arabia joined the United Nations, it was the fact that close Anglo-
American consultation had not been adhered to that proved to be the main source of controversy. 
Indeed, the transitory nature of international geopolitics at the time made it imperative for Britain 
and the United States to hold fast to the idea that greater Anglo-American accord was possible, 
especially in the uncertain political terrain that was the Middle East.  
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  Given that Saudi Arabia’s “benevolent neutrality” had been a major factor in binding 
Britain and the United States closer together in the Kingdom, could this same benevolence be 
applied to secure their collective interests in the post-war world? The final section of this chapter 
addresses this issue, which by the end of the war had become an overriding question. Crucially, 
Ibn Saud and Saudi Arabia had a role to play as the Cold War made headway into the Middle 
East. On both sides of the Atlantic, a firm belief continued to exist that the combined influence 
of the US and the UK in Saudi Arabia, and throughout the Middle East, would play a key role in 
cementing security in the region in the future with regard to containing an expansionist Soviet 
Union. Hence, from the perspective of both London and Washington,  this type of example of 
strategic interdependence linked Britain and the United States together in Saudi Arabia, which 
would in turn become a hallmark of the wider post-war international system. 
 
Roosevelt & Churchill’s Meeting with Ibn Saud  
 
In the wake of Roosevelt’s meeting with Ibn Saud in February 1945, Neville Butler of the 
British Embassy in Washington wrote to Laurence Grafftey-Smith:  
 
“The fact that President Roosevelt went out of his way to see Ibn Saud confirms 
what we have long known, namely that the Americans mean to interest themselves 
much more in Saudi Arabia than they have in the past; we cannot quarrel with 
that, provided they show a proper respect for our interests and observe the 
decencies, and do not try to restrict our legitimate activities in other parts of the 
world”.727 
 
  While Butler took this moment as a stepping stone for greater regional Anglo-American 
cooperation, that same week, the American minister, William Eddy took away a different 
meaning from Roosevelt’s visit. Nine years later in 1954, Eddy, in his hagiographic monograph 
F.D.R. Meets Ibn Saud, celebrated the Saudi-American union in the most salutary terms: “This 
moral alliance, this willingness of Islam to face West and bind his fortunes to ours, symbolizes a 
consummation devoutly to be wished in the world today”.728 Eddy has often been cited as the 
main source of information on how events played out on Great Bitter Lake, but his interpretation 
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should be questioned to some extent given the fact that he was the sole translator of the Ibn Saud 
and Roosevelt conversation.  
  According to Eddy, the King had rhapsodized to him that President Roosevelt was the 
“the spirit of benevolence and justice…an example of human perfection in the Twentieth 
Century” .729 His account of Churchill’s meeting with Ibn Saud on February 17, 1945 in Fayoum 
could not have been any more different. In a private audience on February 20, 1945, the King 
apparently told him:  
 
“The contrast between the President and Mr. Churchill is very great. Mr. 
Churchill speaks deviously, evades understanding, changes the subject to avoid 
commitment, forcing me repeatedly to bring him back to the point. The president 
seeks understanding in conversation his effort is to make the two minds meet; to 
dispel darkness and shed light upon the issue”.730 
 
  What is most astounding about this missive is not what Ibn Saud apparently claimed, but 
that Eddy took his words so completely at face value. From the beginning, William Eddy had 
accused the British of trying “to cap (if not capture) every American move in Saudi Arabia,” and 
the king’s meeting with the president, was no different. Eddy declined Admiral Sir John 
Cunningham’s offer to send a cruiser to Jeddah to transport Ibn Saud to the Canal Zone, viewing 
the British overture as suspicious.
731
 When the King met with Churchill afterwards, Eddy scoffed 
that “the British persisted in their determination to take over the royal party for a bigger and 
longer visit than he had made with the President of the United States” .732 The British minister, 
Laurence Grafftey-Smith meanwhile rejected Eddy’s version of events in full, claiming that the 
“meeting passed off very well”, and that there had been no “unpleasant debate” between the two 
men, partly because Churchill allowed Roosevelt to discuss the thorny issue of Palestine.
733
  
 Nevertheless, thanks to Eddy, scholars have felt it necessary to put particular emphasis on 
Churchill’s alleged poor showing with the King. Other stories have added to Eddy’s assessment. 
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The State Department had organized gifts for Ibn Saud, which have attained semi-legendary 
status; a DC-10 aircraft and a gold-encrusted wheelchair for the King.
734
 The Foreign Office, on 
the other hand, hastily arranged for a Rolls Royce to be presented to Ibn Saud. Although it 
seemed like an appropriate gift, the car’s design unceremoniously forced Ibn Saud to sit on the 
passenger’s side, which dishonoured Saudi Arabian social customs.735  
  This may all seem like anecdotal evidence, but it has nonetheless given symmetry to an 
important notion that the United States had overtaken British influence in Saudi Arabia. 
Generations of Americans, who have found it in their interest to support their “special 
relationship” with Saudi Arabia continually refer back to the meeting between Roosevelt and Ibn 
Saud as a cornerstone of that alliance.
736
 However, it is misleading to describe Roosevelt and 
Churchill’s separate meetings with Ibn Saud as a referendum determining whether American or 
British influence would subsequently dominate in Saudi Arabia. By doing so, the study of 
Anglo-American relations once again falls into the trap of being mistakenly observed in 
isolation, cut off from the wider context of wartime international politics.  
 To begin with, Roosevelt and Churchill’s journey to Great Bitter Lake only occurred 
because they were returning from the Yalta Conference (February 4-11, 1945), and Ibn Saud was 
just one of several kings, along with Farouk of Egypt and Haile Selassie of Ethiopia whom they 
saw during their visit to the region. Secondly, contrary to popular belief, Roosevelt did not reach 
an agreement with Ibn Saud over access to oil. The ARAMCO Concession was secure, and the 
subject was barely raised.
737
 Rather, Roosevelt once again believed that during their conversation 
he could persuade the Saudi Arabian King to work as an Arab arbiter for a key strategic 
American objective, namely Arab acquiescence for a Zionist state in Palestine. His attempt failed 
spectacularly and damaged the president’s reputation once he returned to the United States. In a 
radio address to the American public that spring, Roosevelt said: “I learned more about that 
whole -Moslem problem by talking with Ibn Saud for five minutes, than I could have learned in 
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the exchange of two or three dozen letters”.738 Such a statement made it look like it had been 
Roosevelt who had been swayed rather than persuading the King.
 
 In comparison, Churchill at 
this juncture held no illusions about the possibility of his changing the mind of Ibn Saud over the 
Palestine issue.  His opposition to the idea had been an integral part of his legitimacy, power and 
influence within the Moslem world.  Instead, the prime minister’s conversations with Ibn Saud 
were focused on something far more agreeable: Allied appreciation of Saudi Arabia’s 
“benevolent neutrality.”739  
 
The Power Dynamics of Anglo-American Relations in Saudi Arabia, 1945 
   
  Churchill’s meeting with Ibn Saud nonetheless has been used by historians to convey an 
overriding sense of fin de siècle in terms of British power in Saudi Arabia in 1945. Some British 
officials like Laurence Grafftey-Smith could also see the writing on the wall. Reporting on a 
meeting between Viceroy Wavell and Ibn Saud, Grafftey-Smith described how the two men 
waxed nostalgic about the years of close Anglo-Saudi friendship. Later that same day, Ibn Saud 
asked Grafftey-Smith if it was all possible that His Majesty’s Government could supply a “half a 
dozen ‘war veteran’ air-craft”. The British minister was pained to tell him that it was unlikely 
that Britain had the resources to help, but as he told the Foreign Office, he felt that there was 
“something touching in the King’s hope that we may one day offer some material assistance 
enabling him to dispense with that so expansively and vigorously”. Poignantly, in the end, Ibn 
Saud asked Grafftey-Smith if he could get the Americans to help him.
740
 
 Examples like this exposed a feeling of British insecurity and thus play into the theme 
that by 1945 their influence was being swallowed up by the dawning of American power. David 
Reynolds has rightly said that in the wartime alliance, “the United States was clearly the 
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dominant partner by the last year of the war”.741 However, when scrutinizing Anglo-American 
relations in the Middle East, it is equally important to note that in the words of the historian 
Ritchie Ovendale, “in 1945, Britain was the paramount power of the Middle East”.742 If one 
looks more closely at the region, the European countries against which Britain had competed for 
influence in the 1930s had in various ways been vanquished in the Middle East by 1945.
743
 In 
contrast, the network of British military furnishings throughout the region - the Suez Canal Zone, 
air installations at Lydda, naval ports in Haifa, Bahrain and Aden, the Iraqi air bases in 
Habanniya and Shaiba, the Arab Legion led by John Glubb, and bases in the Sudan - were proof 
that Britain’s status as the leading military power in the Middle East was still intact.744 
Commenting on British supremacy, The Arab World, a journal which gave an Arab 
perspective on world affairs in both Britain and the United States,  argued that coming out of the 
Second World War, the British Government would have a “firmer grip on the Near East and 
greater prestige than before”.745 Because British policy still adhered to Foreign Secretary 
Anthony Eden’s Mansion House Speech of 1941, which provided support for some form of Arab 
union, the establishment of the Arab League in March 1945 did not necessarily insinuate British 
decline in the Middle East.
746
 “With Arab federalism”, R.M.A. Hankey wrote, Britain “should be 
able to influence its activities much more than any other Power can”.747  
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The British Government’s backing for Arab unity also ran concurrently with it 
identifying itself less with the Zionist cause in Palestine. This change in British attitude was 
being closely watched by Saudi Arabian officials who were concerned by Washington’s 
increasingly pro-Zionist outlook.  Describing the quandary in which the State Department found 
itself in the region, Gordon Merriam remarked that “they (Saudi Arabian officials) might be 
cheered up if they knew that our stock is just as low with Zionists”.748 As William Roger Louis 
has pointed out, regardless of American excuses, during 1945 Laurence Grafftey-Smith 
“detected a change in Saudi mood”.749 London’s standing in the Kingdom was on the rise due to 
the pro-Zionist stance shown by the Roosevelt and Truman administrations, which according to 
Grafftey-Smith created a great amount of “American unpopularity” amongst everyday Saudi 
Arabians and had “shaken Ibn Saud considerably”.750 
  The sturdiness of Britain’s regional influence was also a subject of speculation for 
American officials in relation to what would happen after Ibn Saud’s reign had come to a close. 
Writing in 1945, Harold Hoskins noted that despite his age and infirmities, “the King continues 
to run all affairs himself,” uncomfortable with delegating important decisions to his successor 
sons.
751
 Because Ibn Saud’s leading sons – Saud, Faisal and Mansour - were considered to be 
rivals, both American and British officials had little confidence that an orderly transition of 
power in Saudi Arabia would occur following Ibn Saud’s death. Rumours had been swirling 
holding that if Ibn Saud died, and Saudi Arabia was thrown into chaos, Iraq would enter the 
kingdom to commandeer the oil-rich Hasa Coast.
752
 Stories like this made the State Department 
nervous. Prior to serving as the American minister to Iraq, the new director of NEA, Loy 
Henderson, noticed firsthand the way in which Britain had adeptly used its network of diplomats 
to modify and moderate the policies of the Iraqi Government.
753
 Given the fact that it was the 
NEA’s job, said Henderson, to “see to it that order prevailed in Saudi Arabia, and that Ibn Saud 
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remained firmly on his throne”, the State Department had a vested interest in British suzerainty 
keeping the Kingdom’s neighbours at bay.754 
*** 
With London’s influence in Saudi Arabia still a force to be reckoned with in 1945, it 
sometimes seemed prohibitive to accommodate both British and American aspirations for power 
in the Kingdom. This jostling for hegemonic position came into play when Ibn Saud finally 
declared war on the Axis powers on February 28, 1945. Saudi Arabia’s neutrality in the strictest 
definition of the word was no longer a strategic objective in itself for Ibn Saud or for that matter 
for British and American policymakers. At this stage in the war, Ibn Saud’s decision to declare 
war could no longer be used by Axis propagandists or his Arab rivals to deny the legitimacy of 
Saudi Arabia’s independence. Declaring war against the Axis was now deemed a rite of passage 
for joining the United Nations and the new liberal post-war international order.
755
 
   Occurring only a week after the Roosevelt-Ibn Saud meeting, the United States was 
caught completely off guard by Saudi Arabia’s declaration of war. Embarrassed, Wallace Murray 
sent a diplomatic demarche directly to Lord Halifax, asking why the United States was not 
informed by British officials. Murray also added that this injustice undermined the consultation 
framework set up by the Stettinius Mission of 1944, which the State Department still believed 
held “great importance”. The British Ambassador was alarmed by Murray’s complaint. He sent 
an urgent message reprimanding Laurence Grafftey-Smith for not informing the American 
legation of Saudi Arabia’s declaration of war.756  
  However, for the Foreign Office - naturally defending one of their own - Wallace 
Murray’s complaints were completely unwarranted, and his reaction had shown that he had 
“gone a bit off the rails”. 757  Firstly, British officials in Jeddah were not responsible for “Ibn 
Saud on the question of his declaration of war”.758 From its perspective, the agreements that had 
emanated from the Stettinius Mission had been committed to the “fullest possible consultation 
between British and American officials in the Middle East, with a view to settling complaints 
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and grievances locally at the lowest possible level”. Up to this point, said RMA Hankey “it’s 
clear that the arrangement is working pretty well...”759 But rather than protesting directly to 
Grafftey-Smith, the American legation in Jeddah complained directly to Lord Halifax in 
Washington which was not in “accordance with the procedure agreed upon for the ventilation of 
complaints”.760 
  In any case, the Americans did not have to be consulted on every minor concern in Saudi 
Arabia. Though British foreign policy sought American support, and British officials in Jeddah 
were instructed to do “everything they can to avoid any appearance of Anglo-American rivalry”, 
they were nonetheless told by the Foreign Office that “this should not be interpreted in too 
restrictive a sense”.761 Other local Arab leaders that Britain relied upon such as Emir Abdullah of 
Transjordan lacked independent credentials making him a limited ally in the Arab world. 
Meanwhile in Egypt, King Farouk’s “vagaries…were becoming altogether too much,” said Lord 
Killearn and he could no longer to be trusted.
762
 Given this unreliable company, Ibn Saud was 
still looked upon as an essential part of British foreign policy by London and too much of a key 
player to just sit back and let American officials completely take him over. On that score, it is 
worth pointing out that bowing to American pressure was not the only means to ensuring the 
long term aim of Anglo-American cooperation. Like other issues that had divided Britain and the 
United States, what this controversy had shown is that it had grown - not from a fundamental 
disagreement over Saudi Arabia’s declaration of war- but rather from a breakdown in Anglo-
American liaison. 
  In a matter that was distinct, yet ultimately linked to bilateral communication, on April 7, 
1945, the Foreign Office received reports that Colonel Eddy was “scheming” to convince Amir 
Faisal that his trip to San Francisco for the United Nations inauguration was purely a United 
States function, when it had really been organized jointly by both American and British officials. 
The Foreign Office advised Grafftey-Smith not to worry about Eddy’s chicanery. The irony was 
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that “the Arab is truly democratic and cares little for protocol, and the American efforts to 
impress usually miss the mark”. Indeed the Foreign Office retold an amusing story from 1943 
when the first Lend-Lease riyals arrived and were carried by American Marines with Tommy 
guns and “all of Jidda laughed”.763  
  Nevertheless, British officials regarded the lack of communication as somewhat ominous, 
and the fact that the United States demanded to host the Saudi delegation during in its stay in San 
Francisco made it appear that furthering Anglo-American cooperation was not necessarily its top 
priority. Certainly in some respects, the United States in its handling of Saudi Arabia joining the 
newly established United Nations comes across as retaliatory in nature. Just as Grafftey-Smith 
had not notified the American legation of Riyadh’s declaration of war, Eddy kept the British 
Embassy in the dark about his discussions with Saudi Arabian officials over joining the United 
Nations.
764
  
  Another area where British officials feared they may be losing influence was with Saudi 
Arabia’s neighbours in the Persian Gulf, the Trucial States.765 This collection of sheikdoms had 
been tied to the British Government by treaty and had dealt with Indian Civil Service’s (ICS) 
political agents for over a century. Their geographic location and proximity to the Indian Ocean, 
Basra, Iran and India were critical pieces to London’s hegemony in that part of the world. Given 
its importance, one Foreign Office official at the time  observed that if “floods of American 
money” poured into Saudi Arabia; what kind of impact would that have on the adjacent Trucial 
States?
766
  
Conversely, Washington had its own misgivings over this aspect of their association with 
the British in Saudi Arabia. In 1944, Loy Henderson authored a lengthy report, which he 
delivered to the Secretary of State, outlining the “British desire to restrict American activities in 
the Persian Gulf Sheikdoms”.767 Rather than actively seeking to thwart American interests, what 
truly troubled Henderson was that the British Government was effective at blurring the line 
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between outright formal control and informal influence in the Persian Gulf.
768
 Therefore, 
undetermined frontiers between Saudi Arabia and the smaller sheikdoms of the Trucial Coast 
made it a potential arena for future discord. Like Henderson, Grafftey-Smith also highlighted the 
problem, but he saw things differently, warning his British colleagues that in this no-man zone 
“oil is suspected to exist, possibly in large quantities”, which one day could cause trouble to both 
Saudi Arabia and the United States.
769
 Grafftey-Smith’s prediction partly materialized in the 
1950s with the Buraimi Oasis dispute when Britain, bound by treaty, defended the Trucial States 
against Saudi Arabia and the commercial interests of ARAMCO which was tacitly backed by the 
United States Government.
770
  
While there seemed to be some tension building between British officials in the Trucial 
Coast and American officials in Saudi Arabia, it was not the only quarrel bubbling under the 
surface. Within the corridors of British policymaking, the Trucial Coast was an area in which the 
Government of India, whose political agents had been responsible for British interests there for 
decades, sparred with members of the Foreign Office, who took a softer line towards Ibn Saud 
and the Americans.
771
 The US consulate in Dhahran led by Parker Hart was disappointed, but 
understood, why there seemed to be some obstructionism on the part of British political agents in 
this area, and thus sought out friendlier channels. For questions related to the Trucial Coast, 
American officials involved in Saudi Arabia preferred to deal directly with the Foreign Office.
772
 
Simon Davis cites the Political Agent of Bahrain, Thomas Hickinbotham as a British 
representative whose imperious attitude towards Hart had helped raise Anglo-American tensions 
over the Trucial Coast issue. Yet, at the same time, Hart was quite aware that the Government of 
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India saw this territory as its own personal sphere of influence and equally resented outside 
interference, whether it be it from Washington or London. Writing to his colleagues in Jeddah, 
Hart would later claim that Hickinbotham was an “exceptionally well-informed and able man”, 
who was by no means anti-American, but whose judgment was sometimes clouded by the fact 
that he was “intensely jealous of his authority”.773 By the spring of 1945, relations between the 
two sides would improve further after Hickinbotham was succeeded by C.G. Pelly, who 
contended that his predecessor’s middle name was “Pomposity”. Pelly got along well with Hart 
and was praised by US officials for having “predilections…toward friendliness and cooperation 
towards Americans”. Another crucial aspect to take note of with regard to Pelly was that he 
found the Soviet Union to be “nothing but trouble”, a message which by the end of the Second 
World War would add a new meaning to the Anglo-American relationship in Saudi Arabia.
774
 
 
Anglo-American Relations in Saudi Arabia and the Emerging Cold War 
 
  By the end of the Second World War, the spectre of the Soviet Union becoming more 
involved with Saudi Arabia loomed large. Since 1941, the British and American war effort had 
“indirectly” built up Moscow’s contacts in the Arabian Peninsula.  By 1944, 28.8 percent of all 
cargo shipped from the Western Hemisphere to the Soviet Union was transported through the 
Persian Gulf. 
775
 But when it came to the Foreign Office and the State Department, it was the 
former that viewed this fact about the Soviet’s possible influence in the region with a more 
analytical, and wary eye.
776
 Rejecting the hopeful optimism that marked aspects of the Roosevelt 
Administration’s policy towards Moscow, London instinctively relied on lessons learned from 
the “Great Game”, the geo-strategic battle waged by Britain and Russia on the northwest frontier 
of Central Asia for over a century.
777
  
                                               
773
 NARA: RG 84 350/67/22/1 Entry 3153. ‘The Political Agent at Bahrein, Major Thomas Hickinbotham C.I.E.’, 
Hart to the legations of Jeddah, Cairo and Embassy in Tehran, November 18, 1944. 
774
 NARA: RG 84 350/67/22/1 Entry 3153.Vice Consul William Sands to Gordon Merriam, July 15, 1945. 
775
 LL: Tim Mulligan Papers. Bernard Reich, ‘The Persian Gulf’, Research Analysis Corp Prepared for the US Army 
(June, 1971).  
776
  Taking a different view of things, the historian Martin Folly claims that the Foreign Office was cautiously 
optimistic that Britain and the Soviet Union shared enough interests that cooperation was thought to be feasible. See, 
Martin H. Foley, Churchill, Whitehall, and the Soviet Union, 1941-1945 (London, 2000). 
777
 For works relating to the “Great Game”, see K. Meyer & S. Brysac, Tournament of Shadows: The Game and the 
Race for Empire in Asia (Britain: Abacas, 1999).  Peter Hopkirk, The Great Game: On Secret Service in High Asia 
(London: John Murray, 2006. Kathleen Burk ‘Imperial Rivalry with the Russian Empire’, Lecture given at Gresham 
College, November 28, 2005. 
190 
 
  To counter a post-war Soviet threat, Britain was ready to continue its old strategy of 
supporting buffer states like Saudi Arabia to impede Russian expansion. London hoped that this 
paradigm would be strengthened by a growing US presence in the Kingdom, which would do 
double duty, by also protecting British interests along the way. Back in September 1944, Lord 
Moyne and his Chief of Staff, William Croft, had both concurred that there was strategic value in 
an American presence, believing Britain’s position would be “reinforced” in the event of a 
Soviet threat.
778
 In London, the Foreign Office also acknowledged that it would be a 
“considerable advantage” if the United States became more entrenched in the affairs of Saudi 
Arabia.
779
 Moreover, if another European war materialized (i.e. against the Soviet Union), the 
United States would therefore “directly or indirectly” protect British interests in the region.780 
 As it happened, Britain’s fixation on the Soviet Union also coincided with Ibn Saud’s 
own worldview. Once, for a brief period in the interwar years, Saudi Arabia - home of Islamic 
Holy Places - and the atheist Soviet Union had favourable relations, even though they were the 
most unlikely of bedfellows. The Soviet Union had been the first country to recognize the new 
“Hedjaz- Nejd” state and in one of history’s great ironies, Moscow had sent Saudi Arabia, the 
land of the Two Holy Mosques, 42,000 cases of Russian kerosene oil in 1932.
781
 However, this 
peculiar friendship had dramatically come to an end by the time of the Second World War. As 
early as January 31, 1940, Ibn Saud proposed a “confederation of Arab countries under the aegis 
of Great Britain” that he believed would act as a bulwark against Russian penetration of the 
Middle East.
782
  
In the run up to Churchill’s meeting with Ibn Saud in February 1945, London’s 
apprehension over the Soviet Union had grown in the wake of Foreign Minister V.M. Molotov’s 
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appeal at Yalta for trusteeship of the Italian Middle Eastern colony of Tripolitania.
783
 When the 
two men finally had a chance to speak face-to-face in Fayoum, the King spoke of Soviet power 
in terms of allegory, a type of dialogue that he often used with both British and American 
officials throughout the war. In the King’s mind, the Soviet Union was a serpent who had used a 
man (Britain and the United States) for protection against the wolf (Nazi Germany). Once the 
wolf was driven off, the serpent would attack the man.
784
 Churchill, playing the unfamiliar role 
of conciliatory diplomat, tried to allay the King’s misgivings. But it must have been reassuring to 
know that the level of suspicion that Ibn Saud held for Moscow matched his own anti-communist 
sympathies. Ibn Saud’s cryptic parable put into focus his view of the dangers of the Soviet Union 
and helped to justify to London the acceptance of the United States taking a firmer role in Saudi 
Arabia.  
  As a longtime gatekeeper of British interests in this part of the world, the Government of 
India also envisioned the possibility of a Soviet challenge in the near future and looked to the 
power of the United States. In the beginning of 1945, its External Affairs Department of 
informed the British War Cabinet that a strategic priority of Britain should be “to ensure that no 
single potentially hostile power secures predominance” in the Arab countries, making special 
note of Saudi Arabia. What was therefore needed was “a steadfast understanding with the USA”, 
which would be “the best chance of preserving the living force of the Commonwealth in this 
region”.785  
  Thus the “Great Game” was alive and well and London had no plans to discourage the 
United States from stepping up to the front lines in Saudi Arabia.
786
 In this respect the underlying 
objective to use the United States for protection of Britain’s interests in Saudi Arabia invokes the 
classic Anglo-American relations analogy. This analogy - put forth by Harold Macmillan to 
Richard Crossman- proposed that Britain’s mentoring of the United States was similar to that of 
the Greeks to the Romans.
787
 During the Second World War and thereafter, Britain with all its 
accumulated wisdom would harness the inexperience and might of America to protect its own 
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national objectives. An internal Foreign Office paper from March 1944 fully elaborated these 
plans: “The transmutation of their (The Americans) power into useful forms, and its direction in 
advantageous channels, is our concern,” serving as a perfect illustration of how British officials 
were influenced by this “Greek” way of thinking.788 
  Yet, the Cold War creed that the Soviet Union was a direct menace to the United States 
had by no means permeated all aspects of American policy-making, and thus it was unclear that 
Washington would become a willing participant in their ally’s new “Great Game”. Some 
American officials like William Eddy applauded the fact that President Truman had refused to 
see Churchill before the Potsdam Conference (July 16 to August 2, 1945), stating that “for too 
long it has looked as though the US were always backing Britain up to counterbalance 
Russia...let’s keep ourselves off their apron strings”.789 On his return from a highly publicized 
trip to Saudi Arabia in 1945, Senator Claude Pepper, who clearly sat in the Henry Wallace 
foreign policy camp of being pro-Moscow and anti-London, wrote in his pamphlet on ‘Big Three 
Unity and American-Soviet Friendship’: “exhausted and financially pressed as she is, Britain still 
keeps huge armies on alert, constantly building more. She holds to her corner of the atomic bomb 
like Grim Death, backing America’s stand on secrecy with a determination born of panic”.790 
  While it is true that the United States approach in Saudi Arabia lacked Britain’s sense of 
urgency to contain the Soviet Union, the aforementioned views of Eddy and especially Pepper’s 
were considered to be extreme amongst most American policymakers at the time. Adolf Berle 
largely spoke for the majority when examining if the United States should seek to strengthen the 
Anglo-American alliance or befriend the Russians: 
 
“When and if there ceases to be a reasonable hope, the danger of arousing 
Russian suspicions will be part of the price we will have to pay for the policy of 
closer friendship with Britain. In view of the United Kingdom’s geographical 
location as an outpost of security for us, to say nothing of less ponderable (sic) 
reasons it is not too great a price to pay”.791 
 
  Adding to the notion that the United States and Britain were interdependent in Saudi 
Arabia was the fact that Washington could no longer ignore the growing evidence that suggested 
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that the Soviets had expansionist ambitions. Since the beginning of 1943, the State Department 
was carefully watching the virtual subjugation of the USSR’s occupation of Northern Iran, a 
presence which seemed to have no limit.
792
 Commenting on the Soviet Union’s aim of acquiring 
a warm water port, an intelligence report on January 1945 from a U.S. Naval Observer in Basra 
remarked: “The question repeatedly asked in this area is “When will Russia move out of North 
Persia? …a more apt question would be “When will Russia move in South Persia”.793  
  As the historian Henry Butterfield Ryan has remarked, as the year of 1945 progressed, 
Washington willingly allowed their British counterparts “to launch a trial balloon for a firmer 
policy towards the USSR”.794 In this emerging Cold War context, A.B. Calder, the former first 
secretary to the American Embassy in Moscow who  now working at the American Embassy in 
Cairo, used his own experience to warn his fellow colleagues at the State Department of Soviet 
designs in the Middle East. Writing a memorandum on the political situation two days before the 
Potsdam Conference, Calder emphasized that to combat Soviet intrusion, it was important to: 
 
“explore at once the possibilities for a collaborative effort with the British in the 
Middle East in feasible ways for improving the economy of the region without 
impairing British chances for recovery and future prosperity and in ways 
mutually beneficial to the British, the countries concerned and ourselves”. 795 
 
  Like other American officials, such as Harold Hoskins and Herbert Feis before him, 
Calder believed that United States Government did not possess the experience or diplomatic 
infrastructure to turn the region into some sort of an American protectorate. At this critical 
juncture, it was essential that the United States alongside Britain would “assume protective 
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functions” and protect their interests in Arab countries like Saudi Arabia jointly as a unit to keep 
them from falling into “hostile hands”.796  
  Scholars have attempted to explain the Soviet dimension in Anglo-American relations in 
Saudi Arabia. Barry Rubin asserts that although it was true that London “was glad to see the 
Americans with a substantial stake in the Middle East”, he lays greater emphasis on the Saudis 
trying to “leverage” the threat of Russia “in order to obtain US aid and support for 
themselves”.797 Simon Davis is one example of a historian going overboard by exaggerating that 
by the end of the Second World War American officials in Saudi Arabia were “equating Britain 
in many ways with the USSR”.798 Overall, the historiography of the subject has not substantially 
delved into the possibility of Soviet expansion acting as a binding agent, leading the United 
States and Britain to find common ground against a shared enemy in the Kingdom.
799
 In many 
respects, the pattern that had begun to surface in Saudi Arabia would serve as a prescient 
template to the early Cold War era during which the Soviet threat served as a catalyst for Anglo-
American interdependence.
800
  
  Above all, it was this kind of thinking that led the State Department to reiterate as late as 
November 20, 1945 that even in the face of obstacles, Anglo-American cooperation remained 
enduringly valuable. A rejoinder to those that thought the “Special Relationship” was 
euphemistic, a report entitled “Revision of Policy Manual-Saudi Arabia” recommended that it 
was in the US’s interest to: 
 “not to seek a preferred position in Saudi Arabia, but to consult with the British 
Government in connection with important moves which this Government may 
make in that country, in the belief that the United States and Great Britain have a 
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common interest in securing prosperity and political stability in Saudi Arabia, 
and in working in harmony to that end.”801    
 
Conclusion 
 
The power dynamics of Anglo-American relations at the end of the Second World War 
have been drawn in such a way that the historian Alex Danchev has characterized them to a 
weigh-in between a “poor little English donkey” and a “great American buffalo”.802 Many 
historical accounts, though, have tended to apply this broader portrait of the wartime alliance 
directly to the wider circumstances of the relationship between Britain and the United States in 
the Kingdom, which makes for an inaccurate depiction.  As this chapter has shown, having 
cleared away some of the hyperbole of the famed Roosevelt-Ibn Saud meeting in February 1945, 
the rise of the United States as the premier foreign power in the Kingdom’s affairs, and the 
concurrent decline of Britain were by no means pre-ordained.  
By 1945, officials on both sides of the Atlantic engaged in Saudi Arabia would concede 
that the earlier high expectations held for a close Anglo-American partnership in Saudi Arabia 
had not been fully achieved. During the ensuing year, there were complex issues which tested the 
two allies, namely the question as to whether Britain’s long-standing quasi-colonial influence in 
the Trucial Coast was compatible with the United States’ largesse-based policies in Saudi 
Arabia. There were also other examples where the two sides fell out over such issues as Saudi 
Arabia declaring war on the Axis and joining the United Nations, but these specific grievances 
were mainly the result of poor communication between allies rather than actual schisms in 
policy. Despite the tensions present in the bilateral relationship, when observing Anglo-
American relations in Saudi Arabia in 1945, one sees the two allies still committed to the idea of 
collaboration.  
Looking toward the post-war international scene, what this chapter has shown is that the 
underlying rationale behind the Kingdom’s “benevolent neutrality” still applied in the post-war 
world as Ibn Saud and his kingdom mattered in terms of wider geostrategic considerations. By 
the latter half of 1945, the State Department was generally comfortable with British agency in 
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the Middle East, as this provided an extra layer of protection for US interests in Saudi Arabia. 
Equally, from the vantage point of British strategic thinking, by adapting to the United States’ 
greater involvement with Ibn Saud, one could head off any Soviet schemes aimed at breaking up 
Britain’s informal empire in the Middle East.  
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Conclusion            
Anglo-American Relations in Saudi Arabia: A Study of a 
Trying Relationship 
   
  During the Second World War, Britain and the United States fought together as allies in a 
global struggle against “enemies so evil”, as one writer put it,  that “they seemed to be outlandish 
characters of cruelty”.803 Regardless of this fact, there is a general inclination to believe that in 
Saudi Arabia, the two world powers were prone to be rivals. This distorts the true nature of the 
relationship between them. Robert Musil, the novelist of The Man Without Qualities, once 
observed: 
    
“Place a greyhound beside a pug, willow beside a poplar, a glass of wine on a 
freshly plowed field, a portrait in a sailboat instead of in an art gallery - in short, 
place side by side two highbred and distinct forms of life, and a void will come 
into being between them, they will cancel each other out, with the effect of a quite 
malicious, bottomless absurdity”.804 
 
  In the same vein, the recent historiography of the Anglo-American wartime alliance has 
in many respects epitomized Musil’s line of thinking, tending to be either pre-occupied with or 
misinterpreting the forces of polarization. The documents from the US and UK national archives, 
which were made available from the 1970s onwards, tended to show officials invariably framing 
their actions in the lexicon of often diverging “national interests”. This led historians to develop 
interpretations of the relationship in which the theme of cooperation took second place to that of 
competition. Scholars like David Reynolds argued that the wartime alliance was built - not upon 
the evangelical Churchillian themes of cultural, historical and ideological unity- but rather on a 
nexus characterized by the much less heroic and more complex idea of “competitive 
cooperation”. The idea of high-minded cooperation was replaced by the realities of practical 
bargaining, and the partnership that saved the West became an alliance of a kind. The 
accentuation of rivalry and discord in the subsequent historiography has ironically contributed to 
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a new form of evangelism; the belief that Anglo-American relations were nothing more than a 
byword for antagonism and narrow rivalry. This is, however, an incomplete portrayal of Anglo-
American relations in Saudi Arabia during the Second World War. 
   In analysing Anglo-American relations in Saudi Arabia between 1941 and 1945 this 
thesis has emphasized the forces which shaped the alliance. During this period, it must be 
acknowledged that Britain and the United States’ actions in the Kingdom to some degree were an 
adversarial affair. Nonetheless, this thesis offers a new interpretation of the subject arguing that 
the unique value attributed by both powers to Saudi Arabia’s regional influence encouraged a 
continuous search for a lasting Anglo-American partnership in the Kingdom. Their association 
can best be described as founded on the concept of strategic interdependence.  
  Prior to 1941, British and American influence in the Kingdom mostly took a discrete 
form. Britain, the greatest regional power in the interwar years, had been far more heavily 
involved in Saudi Arabia than the United States. London’s relations with Saudi Arabia had 
helped to secure the country’s independence, while its king, Ibn Saud, was an important ally 
within the Pax Britannica system in the Middle East. In contrast, the official contact that 
Washington had had with the Saudi Arabian King was largely insignificant. What fostered early 
relations between the two countries and made American influence relevant in Saudi Arabia were 
the philanthropic endeavours of individual Americans as well as the operations of private 
commercial enterprises. However, in the lead-up to the Second World War, British and 
American interests in the Kingdom drew closer together in an effort to block Axis influence from 
penetrating the Middle East. 
  For more than forty-years, while Ibn Saud forged the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in an area 
notorious for its irredentism, the King was regarded by officials and policymakers in London and 
Washington as a pillar of regional stability. This thesis sets itself apart from other studies in the 
emphasis that it places on the wider international influence attributed to Ibn Saud by the Allies. 
As such, it highlights the fact that Anglo-American relations in Saudi Arabia had ramifications 
which spread out well beyond the Kingdom's borders. Once war broke out, the US and Britain 
were keenly aware of the geographic centrality of Ibn Saud’s kingdom, which connected the 
Mediterranean and Pacific theatres of war and also served as a potential Allied supply route to 
the Soviet Union from June 1941 onwards. As the “Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques”, Ibn 
Saud was also valued as an influential religious figure. In the Allied-Axis propaganda war being 
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waged in the Middle East, he could help sway Arab and Moslem populations to back the Allied 
cause. Within an international system, which was growing increasingly anti-imperialistic, the 
King’s political credibility was further enhanced by the fact that his country was an outlier in the 
Arab world; a sovereign nation which was not under colonial rule. As the American official 
Parker Hart noted, “in Arabia, Ibn Saud and the law of the Koran are unchallenged, except by the 
vast distances and the careless independence of the desert”.805 
 During the Second World War, one of the ways in which the Saudi Arabian king 
exhibited his independence was through his country’s position of neutrality, interpreted by 
British and American officials to be a form of “benevolent neutrality”. Historically, neutrality 
has been deemed an “antisocial policy”, but as Efraim Karsh notes, in the realm of twentieth 
century international politics it had been transformed “into a dynamic, enterprising policy”.806 
While the American envoy, Wendell Willkie, would claim that Nuri Said’s early declaration of 
war against the Axis had “assured Iraqi leadership in the Arab World, British and American 
officials involved in Saudi Arabian affairs viewed things differently. On both sides of the 
Atlantic, officials knew that Ibn Saud would be better utilized by the Allied cause if he remained 
officially neutral. The greater the perception that he was not under the thumb of Britain or the 
United States made the Saudi Arabian king a more credible ally. Access to the favourable 
influence of a sovereign Arab ruler like Ibn Saud meant that British and American officials 
would have more room for political manoeuvring in terms of dealing with such regional issues as 
the deadlock in Palestine. It also meant that respecting Saudi Arabia’s autonomy was a useful 
propaganda tool in the war of public opinion. It was a first-rate example of the glaring difference 
between the Allied commitment to self-determination and the Axis’ promise of coerced 
subjugation. “It was to the interest of both British and Americans”, wrote James Landis in 1945, 
“that the political independence of Saudi Arabia should be assured”.807 
 Given the strategic value of Saudi Arabia and the desire to keep Ibn Saud firmly within 
the Allied orbit, inter-allied cooperation in the Kingdom was the key theme of the Anglo-
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American relationship in the early years of the Second World War. The fact that scholars have 
tended to neglect this early period of Anglo-American relations in Saudi Arabia in their analysis 
is one of the main shortcomings of the historiography of the subject. During 1941,Washington 
went on to support Britain’s aim of maintaining its close relationship with Ibn Saud, viewing it 
as a buffer against Axis penetration in the Middle East as well as additional insurance against 
Axis designs on the American-owned oil concessions inside Saudi Arabia. By the same token, 
London realized the reciprocal benefits from enlisting the US Government's support in Saudi 
Arabian affairs. Financially, Riyadh at this juncture was in a precarious position as the 
government’s main source of income, revenues drawn from the Hajj, had dwindled due to poor 
wartime travel conditions. From the vantage point of British policymakers, American provisions 
for financial aid and an agricultural mission to Saudi Arabia helped strengthen the al-Saud 
regime, further binding it to the Allied cause, while at the same time serving to bring the 
officially neutral United States closer to entering the war.  
   In conjunction to the strategic interdependence that was shaping Anglo-American 
relations, the Foreign Office and State Department both recognized that the best way to ensure 
that their policies would be successful in Saudi Arabia was to take no action that would be 
interpreted as threatening to the country’s sovereignty. These interconnected paradigms 
continued to define the contours of the Anglo-American relationship in the Kingdom during 
1942. In their efforts to protect Saudi Arabian oilfields and to gain air routes over the country, 
British and American officials were far from rivals. Keeping in mind the value of Saudi Arabia’s 
“benevolent neutrality”, the two allies rather found themselves sharing common ground in their 
efforts to deal with the intricate balancing act of increasing their co-involvement in the country 
without nullifying the country’s independence in the process. Most importantly, the strategic 
interdependence at play in Saudi Arabia remained a driving force in the Anglo-American 
relationship. For example, the crucial backing of British diplomats in Jeddah convinced Ibn Saud 
to allow American war planners to acquire emergency air routes. This key episode clearly 
demonstrated to Washington the value of British influence in the Kingdom. Conversely, 
expanding Anglo-American cooperation had always been a wartime objective for London, and in 
the case of Saudi Arabia, it allowed British officials to have a say in the formulation of US 
policy. 
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   Relations between Britain and the United States in Saudi Arabia can only be fully 
grasped when considered in a wider context. This is the reason why, unlike other studies, this 
thesis has delved into the question of Palestine during the war years. The failed attempt by the 
Allies to turn Ibn Saud into an arbiter for Palestine in 1943 did not damage the two powers’ 
relations in Saudi Arabia. Instead, the episode confirmed the belief of the State Department and 
Foreign Office in the vital importance of preserving the King’s political credibility as an 
independent Arab leader. Furthermore, one of the abiding lessons learned from the Hoskins 
Mission, a point which has been almost completely neglected by previous historians, is that it 
underscored just how interdependent British and American interests were, not only in Saudi 
Arabia, but in the entire Middle East. 
 From 1943 until the end of the war, however, there were ongoing debates between Britain 
and the United States, which sometimes became heated, over an array of issues such as oil, 
subsidies, and reforming the Kingdom’s finances. These differences surfaced largely as a result 
of the United States Government’s desire to play a greater role in Saudi affairs. Policymakers in 
Washington started to draw a link between the Kingdom’s oil reserves and broader concerns of 
American national security. On the surface, the fact that the Americans had acquired oil 
concessions in the heart of Pax Britannica made it appear only natural that the topic of oil would 
be a lightning rod for allied antagonism. Yet, the question of oil and its impact must be placed in 
the broader context of the wartime politics of the Anglo-American alliance.     
 Firstly, it is worth noting that Saudi oil reserves had not yet acquired the political and 
economic significance in the 1940s, which they were to assume from the 1970s onwards. To give 
one example of this, shortly after the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima in August 1945, 
Paul Alling of the State Department wrote to Colonel William Eddy: 
 
“I have been wondering what long term effect the research work on the atomic   
bomb would have on our relations with Saudi Arabia and with all the Middle 
East. According to newspaper gossip the power of atomic energy can eventually 
be used for peacetime activities. In that case what becomes of the vast oil fields in 
the Middle East! One could speculate indefinitely on the results of this new 
discovery but if it is as important as everyone seems to be believe, the effect on 
the Near East may be profound”.808 
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  Between 1941 and 1943, far from worrying about losing their oil concession to British 
interests, policymakers in Washington were far more concerned with ensuring that London 
would be responsible for the protection of Saudi Arabia against Axis incursions. Thereafter, the 
controversy over oil was largely manufactured by American officials who dealt with Saudi 
Arabia to protect themselves from charges of negligence in the unlikely event that ARAMCO’s 
concession might fall into the hands of the British Government. Moreover, the subject of oil was 
not solely an Anglo-American contest. Greater competition took place within different branches 
of the US Government and the American oil industry. In terms of outcome, it was the immediate 
goal of assuaging tensions stemming from Saudi Arabian oil, which spurred the signing of the 
Anglo-American Oil Agreement in Washington DC in August 1944.  
Both in the scholarly writing as well as in the popular imagination, the subject of British 
decline has been used as a means to interpret Anglo-American relations in Saudi Arabia during 
the Second World War. Britain, it is argued, was militarily overstretched, financially insolvent, 
worn out by war, and as such was no match for the juggernaut of American power. This 
circumstance was especially the case in a country like Saudi Arabia, which was outside of the 
British Empire. Finding itself in a weakened state, Britain thus bowed to the prospect of the 
United States gaining a greater foothold in Saudi Arabia as a means to indirectly guard its own 
interests in the Middle East, interests which the British Government no longer felt confident 
protecting alone. While there is a grain of truth in this depiction, a determinist paradigm 
portraying Britain as an inexorably weakened power in contrast to the rising power of the United 
States, is excessively simplistic and reductive. As clear as it may seem in hindsight that Pax 
Britannica would eventually be supplanted by a Pax Americana, this was by no means 
considered inevitable by British and American officials involved in the affairs of the Kingdom at 
the time. 
 Leaning on F. Scott Fitzgerald's adage in The Great Gatsby and seeing British policy as 
being “borne back ceaselessly into the past” ignores its dynamic qualities. One of the foremost 
historians of the wartime alliance, Christopher Thorne, has remarked that the equilibrium of 
Anglo-American relations ceased about the time of the Cairo Conference held in November 
1943, when Britain “declined to junior status”.809 However, the power structure of the wartime 
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alliance as a whole was not neatly replicated in the dynamics of British and American influence 
inside Saudi Arabia. 
In fact, the United States’ relationship with Saudi Arabia may best be characterised as 
moving from infancy to puberty during the Second World War. As this characterisation implies, 
considerable uncertainty and insecurity remained with regard to Washington's influence despite 
the outward appearance of a dramatic expansion of American powers. Veiled beneath the 
spectacle and pomp of FDR's meeting with Ibn Saud in February 1945 at Great Bitter Lake, US 
policy in Saudi Arabia was described as uncertain and rudderless by some American officials. 
British policymakers had for more than forty years carefully crafted a mutually beneficial 
relationship with Ibn Saud which the Americans could not lightly dismiss. Time and again, 
American officialdom needed to rely on the diplomatic influence of their “British cousins” in 
order for the US to be heard in Saudi Arabia.
 
 
Between 1941 and 1945, London and Washington found it to be in their common interest 
to cooperate as much as possible. The times when British and American influence in Saudi 
Arabia did clash, the disparities were not the result of simple national rivalry. By autumn of 
1944, it can be said that the two powers had come to an impasse over how they should channel 
their collaborative efforts in Saudi Arabia. Initially, British and American officials in equal 
measure recognized the fact that pushing ahead an activist agenda in the Kingdom carried the 
dangers of chipping away at the politically valuable image of Saudi Arabia’s sovereignty. This is 
why projects such as the offering of Anglo-American financial subsidies, plans to build up 
infrastructure, and expanding military largesse in Saudi Arabia, had been largely restrained and 
carefully applied to dispel notions of renascent colonialism.
810
 But compared to London, 
Washington had grown increasingly assertive in its approach to securing its interests in Saudi 
Arabia. Casting themselves as the “anti-colonial” power, American officials more often than not 
considered that their pro-active policies were “progressive” and liberal as opposed to reactionary 
and imperialist. Their thinking with regard to protecting the sovereignty of Saudi Arabia 
revolved around the question of what would become of the Kingdom if it was cut off from the 
“modernity” of the twentieth century. In the post-war world, would Riyadh’s independence be 
secure in its present torpor if the wartime alliance did not intercede and aid the Saudis?  
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 After a visit to Saudi Arabia, Archibald Roosevelt Jr., the grandson of Theodore 
Roosevelt, and an Army intelligence officer in the Second World War, described American 
activities in the Kingdom in boastful and celebratory terms: 
 
“We had waffles! To see what the Americans are doing in this hitherto forbidding 
land makes one very proud. It is perhaps the most exciting thing I’ve seen in the 
Middle East, about the only thing holding promise for a bright future”.811 
 
  From the British perspective, however, officials in Jeddah, most notably Stanley Jordan, 
were unsure if Saudi Arabia was ready for this kind of “modernity”. Earlier policies that had 
once been constructed as an emergency measure, such as the prodigious subsidies that were 
offered to Ibn Saud, had now outlived their usefulness. They were no longer considered to be 
serving as an asset but were instead thought to encourage corruption amongst Saudi officials.  
The consequences of a pious Moslem Kingdom coming face to face with the realities of a 
materialistic United States with all of its excesses seemed uncertain and perilous to many British 
observers. More importantly, Britain which was more cash-strapped than ever by 1944 did not 
have the funds or the political will to equal Washington’s largesse-driven policies.  
 Certainly, many years of experience in the Middle East led Britain to believe that on the 
whole they were endowed with a certain amount of foresight, which the newly arrived 
Americans did not possess. From what they were witnessing in Saudi Arabia, British officials 
feared that the United States was at risk of pursuing a new form of American colonialism. News 
that Washington had further ambitious plans, including supplying Ibn Saud with a military 
mission and constructing an airfield in Dhahran were originally met with dismay by London. 
British officials saw the potential for these conspicuous projects to undermine the King’s rule. 
American military intrusions like these might also negatively impact Britain’s own regional 
prestige.  
 Yet in the end, London overlooked these concerns regarding US policy, hoping that the 
advantages of having the United States engaged in Saudi Arabia would outweigh any harm that 
might be done. Most notably, when American officials turned to their British colleagues and 
asked them to use their diplomatic influence to persuade Ibn Saud to accept the Dhahran airfield 
project, they acquiesced, knowing full well that in return an American base would add another 
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layer of protection to Britain’s regional security. This is just one of many episodes in which 
initial discord in Saudi Arabia was to be ultimately resolved through Anglo-American 
cooperation with mutually beneficial outcomes for both parties.  
 As this thesis has demonstrated, one of the most enduring and underappreciated dynamics 
of Anglo-American relations in Saudi Arabia during this period is the degree to which strategic 
interdependence acted as a foundation upon which the two allies cemented their relationship. As 
Nigel Ashton has aptly put it, “the most noteworthy feature of the wartime relationship from 
1941 to 1945 was the way in which differences in interests around the globe were largely 
overcome in the face of the unifying Axis threat”.812 It is this wartime context that has been 
consistently neglected when it comes to the scholarship of Anglo-American relations in Saudi 
Arabia. In an episode that deserves greater attention, the Stettinius Mission in the spring of 1944 
pinpointed the over-arching cooperation shown by British and American officials in Saudi 
Arabia as a “test-case” on which to build a more solid inter-allied strategic partnership not 
limited to Saudi Arabia, but a partnership that could be implemented throughout the Middle East 
and survive the war. Indeed, there existed a strong belief that allies could fully integrate their 
respective policies in the Kingdom.  
 On a personal level, Clarence J. McIntosh, Vice-Consul of the American Legation from 
1943-1945, recalled more than sixty years later that the British were “excellent and nice 
fellows”, and that the rivalry “never seemed to come up” among the officials on the ground in 
Jeddah.
813
 On a day-to-day basis, the Americans were invited to the British Legation to watch 
films with such titles as “Desert Victory” and “Pimpernel Smith” starring the archetypal Briton, 
Leslie Howard.
814
 This human and social element played an important role in Anglo-American 
relations in Saudi Arabia throughout the war, a dimension stressed in this thesis that has been 
overlooked by most studies of the subject.  
 In particular, this study has highlighted the almost entirely overlooked personal 
interaction between the American quasi-official Karl Twitchell and officials from British 
Embassy in Washington in 1941. Their work and close collaboration helped to kick start Anglo-
American cooperation in Saudi Arabia. Later, this was followed by the closely knit bond forged 
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between the British minister Hugh-Stonehewer-Bird and the American minister James Moose in 
1942 and 1943, which proved to be another key building block in constructing the Anglo-
American partnership in the Kingdom. In fact, it was precisely these cases of personal amity 
advancing Anglo-American interests that led policymakers in London and Washington to assume 
that compatibility amongst British and American officials in Jeddah could ease any possible 
political or strategic differences.  
  This is why, when diplomatic communication between the allies in Saudi Arabia faltered 
in the spring of 1944, as the need for inter-allied harmony grew ever more essential, key officials 
from both sides of the Atlantic took stock and concluded that the problems derived from “lack of 
liaison” between officials on the ground. The importance of this episode for Anglo-American 
relations in Saudi Arabia has not been fully accounted for by historians. What it shows is that 
American and British officialdom were not inclined to believe that their countries’ interests in 
Saudi Arabia were irreconcilable. Instead, Edward Stettinius and Lord Halifax boldly suggested 
that each nation should remove their ministers in the service of reconstituting sound Anglo-
American relations. This is an example that speaks to the willingness of the two allies to build 
and maintain a workable alliance whatever the local difficulties this may occasionally have 
presented in the Kingdom.  
 To underscore this point, when early signs of the approaching Cold War began to appear 
in 1945, the interplay of common British and American interests over Saudi Arabia was 
highlighted once again. With the vociferous support of Ibn Saud, British views of Saudi Arabia 
took on a Cold War complexion at a very early stage, which might be seen as an extension of the 
Anglo-Russian rivalry dating back to the eighteenth century. London most certainly had no 
desire for Washington to retreat back into a non-interventionist Fortress America strategy. 
Retaining the United States’ engagement in Saudi Arabia had now come to be viewed as an 
important bulwark against Moscow’s potential designs on Britain’s informal Middle Eastern 
empire. Some Americans in Saudi Arabia, led notably by William Eddy, were however not so 
willing to play a supportive role in Britain’s “Great Game”. Nonetheless, as Soviet expansionist 
tendencies came into full view in neighbouring Iran, American policymakers took comfort in 
Britain’s entrenched position in the region. 
 *** 
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   Donald Cameron Watt once noted that, “the distinguishing mark of the international 
historian is a bias toward the studies of crises”.815 This thesis has analysed the development of 
Anglo-American relations in Saudi Arabia without such a predisposition and has thus made a 
distinctive contribution to the subject’s historiography. Those historians who have stressed 
disproportionately polarization have not sufficiently answered two fundamental questions. While 
Britain and the United States were not always aligned in their policies vis a vis Saudi Arabia, the 
question as to why the two powers continued to pursue the objective of partnership remains 
unexplained. The logical follow-up question is what this pattern of resilience infers about the 
nature of Anglo-American relations in Saudi Arabia during the Second World War. Thus far, 
these questions have been left unaddressed as historians have tended to focus too much on often 
conflictual processes in Anglo-American relations at the expense of cooperative outcomes.  
   This thesis has sought to address these hitherto unanswered questions. Challenging those 
interpretations whose advocates have generally overemphasized the conflictual features of 
Anglo-American relations in Saudi Arabia, this thesis has accounted for the reasons why the 
cooperative nature of the relationship deserves fuller attention. During the period 1941-45, the 
forging of a lasting, integrated Anglo-American partnership in Saudi Arabia fell short of the high 
expectations of both Britain and the United States. Nevertheless, the determination with which 
the allies strove to keep the partnership intact is a testament to its essential, multifaceted and 
ultimately cooperative nature. Driven by their common goal of an Allied victory, British and 
American interests in Saudi Arabia were interdependent.  The keynote of their relationship was 
the pursuit for cooperation. Writing in 1945, James Landis, an official with great experience 
when it came to Anglo-American relations in the Middle East, observed that “the ultimate test of 
co-operation must always be that it pays both parties spiritually and materially to work together 
rather than apart”.816 With Landis’s words in mind, the Anglo-American relationship in Saudi 
Arabia between the years of 1941 and 1945 ultimately passed such a test.  
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